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ABSTRACT 
 
At a time in which European governments and senior officials are striving to find an 
agreement on the grand objectives for the new Lisbon strategy, scant attention has been 
dedicated so far to main economic policy of the European Union: the Regional Policy. The 
present work critically investigates the rationales and the intervention tools which shape the 
EU’s flagship policy, with a view to shedding light on the transformations which have lately 
affected the politics of local development in Europe.  
The analysis will focus on the thematic and pragmatic relationship which links together 
Regional Policy and new regionalist theorisations. It will highlight how, by embracing an 
endogenous and punctuated definition of development, the Regional Policy has fashioned an 
institutional framework in which regions are enrolled as self-contained action units, and are 
expected to compete against each other to secure their economic prosperity. 
Drawing on relational perspectives, I will contend that this approach is doubly problematic. 
From a substantive point of view, it leads to a prioritisation of local links, which fails to 
recognise the multifaceted spatialities characterising modern economic relations. In 
procedural terms, the institutional mechanisms involved in the Regional Policy encourage a 
“regional centralism” which, in the name of EU funds, compresses dissent and “technicalises” 
political choices. 
These arguments will be empirically scrutinized through a study of the innovation policy 
implemented in Tuscany under the Structural Funds. Methodologically, the inquiry has a bi-
focal nature: on the one hand, I will rely on official evaluation reports to assess the 
effectiveness of new regionalist policy schemes; on the other hand, I will reconstruct regional 
governance dynamics, by tracing how a certain policy concept (innovation networks) has been 
adopted by the EU, translated at the local level, and finally consolidated in a set of institutional 
relations, expectations and power asymmetries. 
The heuristic hypothesis is that only by combining the two research levels it will be possible 
to grasp the direction and the significance of the political project pursued by the European 
Commission through the Regional Policy. 
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INTRODUCTION: THE EU COHESION POLICY BETWEEN THEMATIC AND 
PROCEDURAL ASPECTS 
The European Union is going through a crucial passage of its political history. The new 
Lisbon Treaty, which re-designs the EU’s competences along with the power balances among 
EU institutions, came finally into force last December, following almost ten years of wearing 
negotiations and rejections by national referenda. A new Commission will soon take up office 
in the reformed institutional environment, and heated debates are already taking place in 
diverse policy areas. 
One of the most important matters under consideration is probably represented by the so-
called Agenda Europe 2020, that is, the new EU’s development approach which should set 
the economic priorities for the next decade, thus replacing the Lisbon strategy, which has 
been as ambitious as it has proved to be unsuccessful. The Commission has recently 
released a Consultation Document on this issue (CEC 2009), which mixes traditional dogmas 
(the knowledge economy) with new fashionable keywords (green economy). However, to be 
effective, the discussion on the grand objectives of the future agenda ought to include a 
parallel reflection on the tools which will be employed to realise it. In this sense, whatever the 
content of the new strategy will be, these will surely have to find an operational synthesis with 
the intervention devices and institutional structures which characterise the main EU’s 
economic policy: the Cohesion Policy. 
 
Indeed, over recent years the EU’s Cohesion Policy (CP) has considerably strengthened 
its political significance, and now it constitutes an essential element of the political-economic 
“landscape” in Europe. What follows is non-exhaustive list of events highlighting this trend. 
With the new programming period (2007-2013), CP has become the most important EU 
policy in financial terms, surpassing agriculture as the largest area of expenditure. Among 
scholars and policy-makers, there is widespread agreement that CP has accelerated the 
regionalisation process in Europe, acting as a driver for the development of regional 
structures for policy planning and implementation. In many EU Countries, the Structural Funds 
(SF) represent the main, if not the only, resource to tackle the spatial manifestations of socio-
economic inequalities. There is evidence that, across Europe, development agencies at 
whatever scale are increasingly conforming and synchronizing their programming tools to 
those of CP. Following the last reform, CP has become spatially more pervasive, as its 
coverage has been extended to almost the totality of the EU territory.  
It is therefore of crucial interest exploring which principles and mechanisms underpin the 
CP, and what processes such a policy is likely to foster or hamper: this will be the focus of the 
present research work. However, it is important to make clear here that questioning the 
direction of the CP is an exercise which differs from or - better - crosses with the issue of the 
policy impact. While in the latter case attention falls on the effectiveness of the relation 
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between means and ends, in the former it is the “navigation chart”, and how this is concretely 
interpreted by the crew, which are under scrutiny. In other words, my attention will concentrate 
on the “object” of the policy: which theories have determined its choice and shaped its 
conceptualization; which set of actors and which kind of relations are prioritised, which 
arrangements and technical equipment have been envisaged to realise - in its widest meaning 
- such an object(ive). 
Clearly, this line of inquiry is not indifferent to the results of evaluation; on the contrary, 
evaluation represents an important heuristic resource, though not the only one. Nevertheless, 
it is important to distinguish the two analytical levels, as they respond to different research 
interests and they entail different theoretical and methodological problems1. 
 
The necessity of opening up a specific debate on the raison d’être of the CP, as distinct 
from the one on evaluation-related issues, has been recognised by the European Commission 
itself, which launched a public consultation on the meaning of territorial cohesion in Autumn 
2008. For that occasion, the Commission also issued a Green Paper on Territorial Cohesion 
(CEC 2008b), serving as discussion document. 
The consultation closed last February and the Commission is now elaborating the 388 
official contributions received from various public organisations and institutions. A seminar is 
going to be held soon in Brussels to take stock of all these inputs. In sum, the debate is still 
open, and it is probably too early to draw conclusions on which will be the future shape of the 
CP. What can be said straightaway is that, via the Green Paper, the Commission has 
expressed the (at least formal) will to question the founding concepts and the policy-design 
mechanisms of its flagship policy. Indeed, the Paper closes with some significant “debate 
questions”:  
“What is the most appropriate definition of territorial cohesion? […] Is there a role for the 
EU in promoting territorial cohesion? […] Which sectoral policies should give more 
consideration to their territorial impact when being designed? […] Does the pursuit of 
territorial cohesion require the participation of new actors in policymaking, such as 
                                                 
1
 Without aspiring to do justice to a rich debate, it is nonetheless important to mention here that 
assessing the impact of the Cohesion Policy is an extremely complex matter. So far, research has not 
come to clear-cut results: studies pointing at the successful outcomes achieved by the Cohesion Policy 
in reducing territorial unbalances (Cappelen et al. 2003) are questioned by studies which find that there 
has not been any substantial impact (Dall’Erba and Le Gallo 2007). In between, there are scholars who 
identified mixed effects. Difficulties are both theoretical and methodological, and refer essentially to the 
capability (for some authors even the epistemological possibility (Stame 2004)) to distinguish precisely 
causes from effects and from feedbacks for programmes which have such a wide spatial, temporal, and 
substantive extension. Leonardi, for example, notwithstanding an overall enthusiastic evaluation of the 
Cohesion Policy, recognizes that different statistical analyses leave undecided “whether Cohesion policy 
by itself accounts for the bulk or only a minor part of the growth produced” (Leonardi 2006, p. 158). In a 
recent review of different evaluation exercises outcomes, Bachtler and Wren (2006, p. 150, emphasis 
added) conclude that: “in many respects the evaluation of EU Cohesion policy is at a watershed. Over 
the past 18 years, an extensive evaluation regime has been constructed to account for spending on 
Structural and Cohesion Funds, to assess the economy, effectiveness and efficiency of the policy, and 
to support the planning, management and delivery of programmes. This has been supported by 
extensive investment in evaluation methods, the promotion of ‘good practice’ and the progressive 
creation of an ‘evaluation culture’ in most Member States. Notwithstanding this activity, the results of 
evaluation are not conclusive on the impact of Cohesion policy”. 
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representatives of the social economy, local stakeholders, voluntary organisations and 
NGOs?” (Ibid., pp. 12-13). 
 However, it is impossible not to notice a sort of mismatch between the object of previous 
questions and the general content of the document. In fact, it is stated that “the questions 
cover the main issues described in this Green Paper” (Ibid., p. 12), but no mention is made, 
throughout the document, of what kind of policy actors, political priorities, institutional 
relations, and procedural arrangements, that is, of what kind of politics of development should 
underpin the formulation and implementation of cohesion policies in Europe. Instead, the 
Paper dwells mostly on a discussion of the new geographies of development and their typical 
manifestations (urban creative environment, high-tech clusters, etc.). In other words, while the 
closing questions involve the sense and the scope of the CP, the main body of the document 
just concentrates on providing an updated and sophisticated reading of spatial-economic 
dynamics. 
 
How to explain this apparent contradiction? The problem does not concern what the new 
approach proposes (which is still, as we have seen, “up for discussion”); rather it lies in what 
is missing2. In this research work, I will claim that not only is this omission not accidental, but it 
is very meaningful indeed, because it can disclose some problematic features involving the 
overall framework of the CP.  
More precisely, the main hypothesis explored throughout this inquiry is that the present 
CP’s approach is affected by an important distortion: some decisive regional governance 
issues - namely who and how should participate in the policy-making and -delivery of 
development policies - are excluded from the local political confrontation, since they are 
surreptitiously determined at EU level by the institutional mechanisms which regulate the CP. 
Apart from the ensuing power imbalances between institutional levels, such a displacement is 
particularly grave because it makes it hard to identify who is politically responsible for a 
certain course of action; consequently, it becomes also harder to understand who and how 
could improve a policy strategy, when this proves to be ineffective. What is more, far from 
being fortuitous, this potential pitfall is directly implied in the very conceptual groundings which 
shape the whole Policy. 
In other words, my intention is to show that, as a result of its underlying rationales, the 
CP’s institutional architecture produces a deformation of the politics of local development, 
since it detaches the policy-delivery - which remains regionalised - from the decision process, 
which is instead dislocated in a political “no man’s land”. It follows that, in order to 
                                                 
2
 The relation between the political finalities of the Cohesion Policy and the governance model 
underpinning its realisation is, on the contrary, thoroughly analysed in a independent report, prepared on 
the former Commissioner’s demand by Fabrizio Barca. The contents of the report - which benefited from 
the contributions of a large number of experts and academics throughout Europe - will be considered 
later on. However, I have decided not to include the analysis of the report in the discussion of the 
Commission’s approach, since the positions expressed in the report have not been officially adopted by 
the EU Institutions so far.  
 4 
comprehend some effects and processes triggered by the Policy, the analysis of its content 
cannot be separated from the investigation of the procedural features which its effective 
implementation hinges upon. In particular, I will argue that the two dimensions - substantive 
and procedural - have to be considered together, as one involves the other: they are two sides 
of the same coin, where the coin is constituted by the relation between a particular spatial 
conception, and the politics of place this conception implies.  
 
To frame these arguments empirically, we have to observe how, during previous 
programming periods, the European Commission put significant resources to modifying the 
governance configurations of regions benefitting from Structural Funds. However this 
institutional change was functional to meet the competitiveness and innovation objectives set 
at the European level. My contention is thus that such a subordination or “functionalisation” of 
the “governance dimension” to the normative content of the Policy is doubly problematic. First, 
it is self-contradictory, as it clashes with the over-emphasised claim for bottom-up strategies. 
Second, and possibly even more importantly, this approach tends to obliterate the always 
political, and hence contextual, origin of collective objectives, by transforming them and their 
achievement in a mere technicality. That, again, limits the possibility of promoting really 
locally-sensitive policies, as it necessarily supports or compresses some needs instead of 
others, without this being the result of a comprehensive debate. 
Such tensions lie at the core of the CP strategy, as they affect the way in which the Policy 
is routinely implemented. For this reason, I will argue that only by unfolding the outlined 
contradictions, that is, only by looking at how the Policy is concretely performed, it will be 
possible to understand some evident shortcomings.  
 
Drawing on this discussion framework, the present research work is organised as follows. 
The first chapter engages in recent regional studies literature. Indeed, academic debate in 
this field is unanimous in recognising the influence exerted by the so-called new regionalist 
approaches on many aspects of the CP. 
In the initial part of the chapter I will thus outline the theoretical building-blocks of new 
regionalism. In particular, I will try to reconstruct that line of reasoning which, beginning with a 
territorialised and endogenous definition of development, leads to conceiving of regions as 
coherent action units which compete against each other “in the global space” on the basis of 
their consensual governance configuration. Subsequently, I will delineate the political vision 
that this conception substantiates, by analysing some related policy models.  
However, I will also consider potential conceptual limits of new regionalism, as they can be 
deduced from a growing body of work which challenges this scholarly strand in both empirical 
and conceptual terms. Accordingly, I will mostly focus on relational approaches, which warn 
against the attribution of intrinsic properties to predetermined spatial concepts, and draw 
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attention instead on how space is routinely (re-)constituted through complex organisational 
architectures and spatially-stretched relations.  
Finally, by following this theoretical strand, I will try to disclose the essential - but also 
contingent - link which exists between a particular spatial conception and the politics of place 
it supposes. Such an approach should thus allow us to join again what in the CP remains 
disconnected, showing why the two aspects ought to be addressed simultaneously. 
 
Building on this theoretical background, the second chapter carries out an analysis of the 
main CP programming documents, with a view to illustrating the new regionalist imprint on the 
Policy.  
The chapter is organised into two parts. In the first one, I will point out how CP has derived 
from this approach both its spatial grammar (especially the global-local dialectics), and, 
importantly, its main rationale, namely the idea that competition and cohesion can be 
reconciled by unlocking the endogenous potential of regions. Accordingly, the CP has then 
absorbed the new regionalist “policy tool-box” too, as demonstrated by the emphasis on 
regionalised university-firm networks, technology-transfer, clusters, and so forth. Also, I will 
pinpoint the political motives which may explain the strong linkage between new regionalism 
and CP; in particular, I will try to describe how, through their coupling, CP and new 
regionalism are actually reinforcing each other.  
In the second half of the chapter, I will shift the focus towards the procedural devices 
(incentives, sanctions, etc.) and strategies that the Commission has designed to transfer its 
policy priorities to regional programming. This analysis is essential, as some of the most 
problematic aspects of the CP reside precisely - I claim - in this transmission mechanism 
which connects the EU policy arena to the regional one; transmission mechanism which is 
indissoluble from the Policy’s content.  
More precisely, my argument is that, by adopting the new regionalist perspective, the 
Commission has put itself in front of the following inescapable conundrum: if regional 
economic performances depend on endogenous social factors - as new regionalism 
advocates -, then the only possibility to boost development in less favoured regions consists 
in socially-engineering those factors. However, that would clash with the other fundamental 
tenet of new regionalist policy models according to which, exactly because of the endogenous 
and territorialised nature of development, policies should be formulated on the basis of 
bottom-up processes. 
The remaining part of the chapter is then dedicated to examining the expedients that the 
Commission has devised to tackle this problem, that is to find an (impossible) balance 
between keeping context-sensitiveness in local policy-making, while orienting development 
priorities from outside. I will particularly focus on a programme implemented under the CP in 
the previous programming period (2000-2006), named Innovative Actions (IA). The 
programme is significant   since, widely resonating with the new regionalist logic, it expressly 
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aims at employing networking as a sort of governance technology to induce that cultural 
change considered as a pre-requisite for the effective translation of the CP policy orientations 
at regional level. In particular, IA demands regional authorities to formulate innovation 
strategies revolving around university-firm network approach, and sets consensus among 
regional stakeholders as a condition to access funds, so to trigger the institutional 
convergence around this innovation strategy. 
 
Drawing on relational perspectives, I will conclude the chapter by arguing that the IA 
programme exemplifies the intrinsic contradictions which affect the overall CP. In particular, 
my thesis is that IA rests on some assumptions which are deeply problematic, and which are 
likely to undermine both its economic and institutional objectives. As for the economic 
aspects, I will contend that CP/new regionalism involve a prioritisation of local links which 
does not mirror the spatialities characterising modern economic relations. Consequently, the 
hypothesis is that the ensuing development strategies are fated to be ineffective. 
Regarding the institutional dimension, CP/new regionalism suggest a sort of “endogenous 
justification” for the causes of territorial disequilibrium which, again, is theoretically and 
empirically questionable, and politically risky. What is more, the IA’s operational mechanisms 
are intimately paradoxical, as they try to foster “from the top” some social dynamics 
(especially consensus), which are supposed to be the result of autonomous and bottom-up 
processes. In this case, my argument is twofold: i) such mechanisms entail that 
“functionalisation” of regional governance I have mentioned before, which is likely to 
compress public debate and “technicalise” political choices; ii) as a consequence, this 
approach will produce the opposite of a consensual and context-sensitive politics of local 
development; that is, it will generate a new centralism at the regional level which is politically 
“empty” though, since is deprived of the possibility to actually decide the direction of its policy 
course. 
 
Several authors have already remarked the “irony” or “paradox” inherent in these aspects 
of the CP. However, the way in which such a problematic knot empirically impacts the design, 
delivery and effects of development policies at regional level seems to remain a relatively 
unexplored issue. The third chapter thus presents the findings stemming from the case-study 
of a particular IA-funded action implemented in Tuscany on Regional Authorities’ initiative, 
that I conducted with the purpose of responding to the previous question. 
More precisely, given the preceding arguments, the case-study has a bifocal nature. On 
the one hand, it aims at providing further insights to assess the effectiveness of new 
regionalist policy approaches, by considering the IA programme’s outcomes in Tuscany. On 
the other hand, it intends to shed light on the effects produced by the CP mechanisms on 
regional governance, and on how these mechanisms are related to the normative objectives 
of the EU regional strategy.  
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Both dimensions are needed to carry out the analysis. Indeed, the outcomes of the 
programme are necessary to validate or to question the strategy’s significance. At the same 
time, the hypothesis is that the institutional procedures which have led the formulation and 
implementation of said strategy (and their consequences in terms of governance) are not 
independent form the spatial conception underpinning the strategy itself. In other words, I will 
try to demonstrate that there exists a circular relation which binds substantive and procedural 
aspects.  
From a methodological point of view, the two research levels require different approaches. 
With regard to the first aspect (the outcomes of the programme), I will rely exclusively on 
secondary data, namely the results contained in the official evaluations reports. 
As for the institutional dimension, the issue consists in tracing the intersections among 
theoretical assumptions, administrative procedures, incentives, etc., which - I argue - hold 
together CP system, regional governance and content of development policies. In order to 
give a readable account of this complex entanglement, I will draw on actor-network theory’s 
suggestion that concepts are not merely communication intermediaries, but they can also 
shape behaviours and relations, thanks to their capacity to enrol and mobilise actors. In this 
sense, I will concentrate on the concept of “regional innovation networks”, to see how this has 
been adopted from the CP, translated at regional level, and consequently consolidated in a 
set of institutional relations, interests, tensions, and policies (the last represented by the target 
programme).  
 
The results emerging from fieldwork will substantially confirm the research hypotheses. In 
particular, the outlined approach will help us understand why a certain policy course (centred 
on innovation networks) is maintained over a long time, notwithstanding consistent (and 
official) empirical evidence has demonstrated it ineffective. Indeed, because of the CP’s 
awarding mechanisms, regional policy-makers are induced to formulate programmes which 
have first and foremost to satisfy Commission’s priorities, thus disregarding programmes’ 
actual feasibility or probable efficacy. That also involves a particular modus operandi in which 
technical compliance with CP thematic and procedural aspects prevails over political 
considerations. 
Besides, the fieldwork will also offer interesting insights in understanding how regional 
governance is affected by the CP. In particular, the analysis will clarify how the CP’s 
architecture influences power relations at the regional level, as it makes regional policy-
makers the gatekeepers of the relation (and funding-stream) between the EU and the regional 
policy-arena, thus strengthening their position to the detriment of other regional stakeholders, 
who find it difficult to ascertain “who decides what”. 
Such an institutional configuration, along with a marked ascendancy of new regionalist 
conceptions over regional officials’ “policyscape”, tends to generate a “dirigist” politics of 
development which has two important manifestations. On the one hand, regional policy-
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makers deem it necessary to direct economic change by transforming entrepreneurs’ 
mentality and by orienting academic research. This is consistent with an endogenous 
conception of development (and hence of underdevelopment as well) according to which, if an 
innovation strategy has proved to be unsuccessful, this is not due to the strategy’s failure, but 
rather to the regional economic actors’ inadequateness. On the other hand, the risk of losing 
EU funding is used by regional-policy makers as a pretext to reject certain socio-economic 
partners’ requests, and to reduce the room for contesting or proposing alternatives to a policy 
programme. The final result is a mistrustful and conflictual governance, in which participation 
in political process is reduced and discouraged, and in which everyone blames everyone else 
for the disappointing results. 
 
The concluding chapter is then dedicated to reassembling the various pieces of the 
empirical puzzle. I will in particular try to show why the disappointing results outlined in the 
preceding chapter were to be expected, and why they should be related to the spatial 
rationales underpinning the CP. Following these arguments, in the final part I’ll make an 
attempt to delineate the contours of an alternative politics of local development, which sets out 
from a thorough inquiry into the sense of multiplicity and heterogeneity in space. 
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CHAPTER I: THE DEBATE ON THE SPATIALITIES OF INNOVATIVE 
PHENOMENA AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR GOVERNANCE 
1.1 Introduction 
Over the last two decades, scholarly research on the spatial dimension of economic 
processes has witnessed a rising interest in the region, both as analytical unit and as 
privileged level for the formulation and delivery of development policies. An expanding mass 
of studies in this field has contributed to build up an original theoretical framework - often 
labelled as “new regionalism” -, which aims at explaining the emergent (regional) geography 
of economic development, shaped by the new forms of socio-economic coordination 
associated with the end of the Fordist regime and the advent of a globalising “knowledge 
economy”. 
Parallel to this growing academic attention to the regional dimension of economic activity, 
many Western countries have undergone substantive processes of re-organisation of their 
institutional set-up, which have led to a significant decentralisation and devolution of political 
structures and responsibility away from central governments to the regional level. Such 
institutional reforms have been particularly marked within the European Union, where the 
management and delivery mechanisms of the EU regional policy have been recognised as 
important drivers of regionalisation dynamics.  
Clearly, there exists a mutually reinforcing relation between the increasing prominence of 
new regionalist accounts in the theoretical debate and the pervasiveness of regionalisation 
processes in the institutional domain. This relation revolves around the definition and the 
foundation - in both theoretical and political terms - of new governance configurations which 
are consistent with the economic imperatives of the global-local dialectic.  
Again, in the European context the link between the two dimensions appears particularly 
evident. On the one hand, the new regionalism has provided the EU with a sound theoretical 
basis to design both the content of its Cohesion Policy3 and the “Multi-Level Governance” 
architecture which underpins its implementation. On the other hand, by adopting the new 
regionalist framework, the EU regional policy has contributed - thanks to its political weight 
(see Introduction) - to foster further rounds of studies in the field, thus strengthening 
cumulatively the two processes according to a typical “increasing returns to adoption” 
process. Also, and more interestingly for our research purposes, the EU regional policy has 
                                                 
3
 The Cohesion Policy is made up of three different funds: the European Regional Development Fund 
(ERDF), the European Social Fund (ESF), and the Cohesion Fund. Only the last of the thee is assigned 
and managed on a national basis. The first two require - to a varying extent depending on national 
regulations - some sort of decentralised structure for their management. In any case, all the three Funds 
contribute to reduce spatial inequalities across Europe on the basis of objectives which have to be 
defined at a regional scale. Therefore, from now on, I will use the names Cohesion Policy and Regional 
Policy as synonyms. 
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represented, to a certain extent, the experimentation field, in which development strategies 
directly inspired to new regionalism have been tested. 
Therefore, while the main analytical focus of this work will be constituted by the relation 
between policy objectives and governance mechanisms characterising EU regional policy, the 
present chapter is dedicated to exploring the core theoretical elements of the new regionalist 
account, and its normative projections for policy-making. This preliminary theoretical review is 
necessary to understand both the rationales and the policy tools concretely employed in the 
EU’s approach. However, this chapter will also take into account the potential explanatory 
limits of new regionalism, drawing on the work of an increasing number of scholars who have 
questioned this theoretical strand in both empirical and conceptual terms. I will then build on 
such a critical inquiry to formulate the research questions which will lead the subsequent 
empirical investigation. 
This chapter is thus organised as follows: in the next section I will consider the main 
conceptual building blocks of the new regionalist framework. I will in particular examine how, 
though encompassing heterogeneous theoretical approaches, the framework does actually 
delineate a precise spatial conception. I will then illustrate how such a conception entails a 
consequent set of policy indications to be delivered in the context of a coherent politics of 
place, that is of a coherent system of institutional relations, political priorities and governing 
methods. In the third section, I will move on to review some empirical findings which challenge 
the new regionalist approach in some of its core elements. Finally, I will analyse how these 
findings point at a fundamentally different spatial grammar, which opens up new questions 
about the role and the sense of local institutions within an alternative policy of regional 
development. 
 
 
1.2 The new regionalist perspective  
As mentioned above, new regionalism interlaces a descriptive account of the geography of 
development with an analysis of the new forms of socio-economic coordination (especially in 
the field of knowledge production), which characterise the modern economy. At the 
intersection between these two perspectives, it then finds - in spatial terms - the role of the 
region. 
However, new regionalism is a label which encompasses a range of rather different 
theoretical strands. At least four of them can be distinguished: research in economic 
geography, focusing on the effects produced by agglomerative dynamics (in terms of 
externalities, spill-overs, etc.); studies of economic sociology investigating the role played by 
social values and institutions; perspectives derived from evolutionary economics and taking 
into account the co-evolutionary dynamics between economic agents and their environment; 
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organisational studies analysing how (economic) organisations structure themselves and 
operate to make (economic) sense of their tangible and intangible resources.  
Clearly, the borders between these strands are blurred and, in part, new regionalism can 
be recognised as a distinct theoretical perspective precisely because it weaves together these 
diverse threads of reasoning (Lagendijk 2006). However, new regionalism does not constitute 
yet a coherent and unitary theory (Amin 1999): while sharing some important 
conceptualisations (the centrality of region in the first place), these different lines of inquiry 
continue to respond to distinct research programmes, often providing contrasting policy 
indications. 
This aspect needs to be stressed from the very beginning, in order to avoid inappropriate 
generalisations and reductionisms. In this sense, it is important to specify that in the next 
sections and throughout the rest of this work we will focus mainly on the institutional-
evolutionary stance. We will follow in particular its reading of the role of regional governance 
in fostering local development, and its policy propositions concerning the development of 
localised innovative networks between firms and university. As will become clear in the next 
chapter, the motive for this choice is that the link between this approach and the content of the 
EU’s regional policy is particularly clear and strong. 
 
 
1.2.1 Main elements of new regionalism: innovation, proximity and institutions 
At core of the new regionalist approach lies the conceptualisation of innovation as the main 
explaining factor for economic growth. 
The centrality of innovation would be connected with the peculiar characteristics of the 
post-mass production and market environment: more and more volatile demand; rapid 
obsolescence of products; increasing consumers’ desire for quality and distinctiveness in their 
purchase decisions; and, finally, liberalisation of both internal and cross-borders markets and 
consequent increase in international competition (Dunning 2000). 
The latter element, in particular, is theoretically crucial, since the supposed pervasiveness 
of globalisation dynamics plays an essential role to justify the claim for a new - compared to 
the Fordist era - political economy, and to legitimate the generalisation of the interpretative 
scheme to the entire economic world. As Cooke et al. (2000, p. 12) point out: 
“What this globalisation of some “georegions” nevertheless means is heightened 
competition compared to the position when national economies rather than trading blocks 
were the key arenas of economic governance and practice. […] Innovation is forced upon 
firms by the twin competitive pressure of rising quality and declining costs, so that even if 
most firms are not in direct contact with a global final market they are indirectly affected 
by it through the supply-chain”  
 We will come back to the spatial significance of this scheme in the following section; here 
it suffices to emphasise that, because of this “globalisation factor” and of the above mentioned 
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changes in the sociology of consumption, new regionalism posits that all firms are affected by 
the innovation imperative; that is all firms are pushed to boost their innovative capacity in 
order to maintain their competitive position. More precisely, by introducing innovations, firms 
are able to gain temporary competitive advantages (until imitation wipes them out), which in 
turn would generate numerous economic benefits, such as increasing returns, higher wages 
and employment intensity (OECD 1992; Dosi 1988). 
If innovation is the engine of growth, knowledge is then considered as the fuel: the 
knowledge base of a firm would represent in fact the most important resource to prompt its 
innovative capacity (Cooke and Morgan 1998). And if knowledge is the strategic resource, the 
capacity of learning and absorbing external knowledge - especially in a highly instable 
environment - consequently becomes the most vital process (Lundvall and Borras 1997). 
Finally, because of both the nature of learning processes and the increasing complexity of 
new technological productions, interaction among heterogeneous actors, who combine 
simultaneously different capabilities and knowledge resources, is seen as a necessary 
condition to create new viable knowledge (Boschma 2004). 
 
The tight relation between interactive learning, innovation and growth represents thus the 
first conceptual building block of new regionalist approaches; the second aspect is constituted 
by an emphasis on the territorialised nature of innovative dynamics, and on the salience of 
spatial proximity. 
 The spatial dimension of interactive learning in the context of productive relationships has 
been addressed in particular by the literature on “localised learning”. The starting point is 
generally the conceptualization of knowledge as a semi-public good, which is neither 
exhausted after use, nor fully appropriable by its producer (Rodriguez-Pose and Crescenzi 
2008). Consequently, knowledge would tend to “spill over” from its original source and to 
spread over space, thus generating what is usually referred to as “knowledge externality”. 
However, according to this analytical scheme only a certain kind of knowledge (codified) can 
be easily been transferred and accessed throughout space; other forms of knowledge (such 
as skills, know-how, etc.), which relate to the way codified knowledge is concretely applied to 
the production processes, tend to be far less formalised and, consequently, would also be 
less mobile in spatial terms (OECD 1992). More precisely, these forms of tacit knowledge are 
said to be accessible only through direct physical interactions, and, as a result, they appear to 
be “geographically bounded” (Rodriguez-Pose and Crescenzi 2008, p. 379) and locationally 
sticky (Cooke et al. 2000).  
According to Malmberg and Maskell (2006), spatial proximity thus favours interactive 
learning, as it makes face-to-face contact easier and more frequent. Consequently, they claim 
that interactive learning ought to be understood as a fundamentally localised phenomenon 
which, in turn, is both an explaining factor and a consequence of the development of industrial 
agglomerations. Indeed, in the authors’ view, localised learning processes favour the 
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development of “localised capabilities”, which attract new firms, eager to benefit from 
knowledge spillovers, thus reinforcing cumulatively learning dynamics within the cluster. 
 The role played by face-to-face contact and spatial proximity is also at the basis of Storper 
and Venables’ concept of buzz (2004). Within a transaction-costs framework, the two authors 
develop an analytical model which emphasises how face-to-face contact represents an 
important mechanism to solve coordination problems in modern economy. It would indeed 
reduce free-riding incentives in collective projects, by signalling partners’ commitments; it 
would facilitate the formation of groups of high-skilled professionals, by acting as a screening 
mechanism about the qualities of the members; it would represent a communication 
technology because eases the transmission of tacit knowledge. Consequently, as in the 
authors’ view face-to-face contact requires co-location, people operating within environments 
characterised with high levels of interaction (buzz environments) would be likely to be more 
productive and more creative. 
In sum, at the core of this perspective lies the idea that there exist different forms of 
knowledge; these forms of knowledge display different spatialities, because their different 
intrinsic qualities require different social mechanisms of transmission and, consequently, they 
are also bearers of diverse spatial effects. Indeed, whereas codified knowledge would foster 
globalisation forces, as it eases standardization and spatial dispersion of previously rare and 
localized resources, tacit knowledge exchange would involve direct interaction and 
propinquity, thus acting as a differentiation drive. Therefore, this line of reasoning points at the 
importance of spatial proximity as an analytical element to explain both the persistence of 
spatial patterns of productive specialisation, and the concentration of higher innovation rates 
in few world-leading technological poles, or “islands” of innovation (Rodriguez-Pose and 
Crescenzi 2008; Storper 2000; Maskell and Malmberg 2006; Cooke et al. 2000).  
 
The idea that spatial proximity may be conductive of interactive learning processes has 
involved further and more targeted researches on the social mechanisms which favour the 
emergence of shared cognitive frameworks at local level: this represents the main field of 
inquiry of institutionalist approaches.  
For authors working within this strand, the interactive nature of innovation processes in 
particular, and of economic activity in general, demands to interpret them as “socially 
embedded” phenomena (Amin and Thrift 1994), whose outcomes are strongly dependent on 
some “soft” social factors, such as a the presence of a common background of shared rules, 
values, etc. (Ibid.; Asheim and Isaksen 2003). In other words, this approach abandons a 
classical (orthodox) atomistic perspective, and re-calibrates its analytical lens towards the 
collective foundations of economic behaviour (Amin 1999). 
Central elements of this approach are therefore institutions, conceived as a complex set of 
formal and informal norms, arrangements, routines and practices which make possible 
collective action. In terms of economic development, the relevance of institutions consists in 
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minimising transaction costs associated with innovative activities, thus generating more 
frequent and more significant interactions (Cooke and Morgan 1998). In addition to this, the 
iterative dynamics enhanced by a dense institutional substratum can lead to the development 
of conventional architectures of “untraded interdependencies” (Storper 1997), which allow 
economic actors to coordinate in a coherent way the multiple interactions implied in the 
functioning of a learning system, by favouring a sort of “interpretative convergence” (Ibid., p. 
37).  
Moreover, if institutions shape the relational architecture for collective action, some social 
values - in particular trust - act as a lubricant. Trust-based relations are indeed deemed to be 
“better placed to cope with uncertainty, because […] trust reduces risks and discloses 
possibilities for action which would have been unattractive otherwise” (Cooke and Morgan 
1998, p. 30). 
In other words, an institutionally “thick” environment would favour the emergence of a 
collective order, or an “associative governance” (Cooke 1998), which influences the economic 
performances of local actors in two ways. On the one hand, it is supposed to boost the 
creation of a common industrial culture, grounded in shared interpretative schemes, which 
enhance firms’ absorptive capacity and knowledge transfer (Bramanti and Ratti 1997). On the 
other hand, it would promote the development of a local reflexive dimension, that is the rising 
of a mutual awareness about aims and costs of the common development trajectory (Amin 
and Thrift 1994), thus easing the socialization of negative externalities, or the funding of public 
goods needed by the local system (Bellandi 2003). 
 
The relation between innovation and processes of collective co-ordination has been 
addressed also by evolutionary approaches. Similarly to institutionalist accounts, evolutionary 
approaches put at the centre of their inquiry the importance of organisational and institutional 
mechanisms in reducing the risk involved in economic and innovative activities; however, they 
diverge from the former for their stress on the relation between spatial and temporal 
dynamics.  
Indeed, according to the evolutionary perspective, the very nature of the innovative 
process entails by definition an irreducible uncertainty, which is not only related to a lack of 
information but, more fundamentally, to the fact that the result of interdependent decisions are 
not knowable ex-ante (Dosi 1998; Lundvall 1988). To cope with this fundamental uncertainty, 
economic actors develop routines, which simplify decision-making processes, but which, on 
the other side, make innovative learning a cumulative process, which is “specific and 
localized” to precise technological trajectories (Dosi 1998, p. 226). In other words, according 
to evolutionary perspectives innovative learning is “path-dependent”, in the sense that it has 
not a predictable final result, but the outcome evolves as a consequence of the process’s own 
history (Arhtur 1988). 
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Although in their early works authors under this approach underlined how path-dependent 
processes had to be understood as relative to a technological rather than geographical space, 
their conceptualisations have been quickly transposed to the study of local development 
dynamics. Boschma (2004), considering the importance of institutional factors in coordinating 
local relations (and in particular knowledge exchange), emphasises how these factors evolve 
slowly in time, thus acting as selection device on knowledge creation at local level. That, in 
turn, would explain the persistence of different regional development trajectories. 
In a similar vein, Martin and Sunley (2006) suggest considering local economic space at 
once both as a selection environment, within which firms and institutions evolve, and as an 
entity itself which evolves by virtue of the development of its constitutive elements. In this 
sense, they claim that path-dependence is to a large extent a “place-dependent process”; the 
two being linked in a circular way. The co-evolution between technological possibilities on the 
one hand, and localised capabilities and institutional arrangements on the other hand, can 
then lead to lock-in situations, in which places get stuck with previously efficient technological 
paradigms (Glasmaier 1994), but it can also start unexpected “de-locking” processes, as new 
trajectories emerge spontaneously in space (Boshma 2004). 
 
To conclude this review, we can observe how, though from different angles, all the 
previous approaches tend to identify the environment in which firms are embedded as an 
important analytical entity, which possesses its own phenomenology, and which plays a major 
role in determining firms’ competitiveness. As Bellandi and Caloffi (2008, p. 38) have pointed 
out on this regard, “labels such as milieux innovateurs, dynamic industrial districts, innovative 
clusters, and regional innovation systems explicitly incorporate the concept of system within a 
specific set of relations rooted within a context – the territory – with its history and its 
endowment of rules, norms and codes of practice”. In the next section, we will try to pull 
together the different elements above outlined, to see how they combine together to delineate 
a particular spatial conception. 
 
 
1.2.2 The new regionalist spatial conception 
We have seen that institutionalist-evolutionary literature explains firms’ innovative capacity 
as an interactive collective phenomenon, which is inscribed in a system of local institutions. 
The first feature of the spatial landscape designed by new regionalism is therefore a scalar 
specification: regions, conceived as meso-level entities operating between the national and 
the local level, constitute an important dimension of socio-economic co-ordination (Storper 
1997; Lundvall and Borràs 1997; Cooke et al. 2000). 
However, it has also been observed that, within this perspective, regional level is not 
imagined just in terms of a spatial arena, and territory is not described as a mere physical 
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support. On the contrary, the regional territory becomes an effective spatial agent, which 
models from within the shape of relations among other individual or collective agents, and co-
determines their dynamics (Bramanti and Ratti 1997; Pike et al. 2007). Bringing together the 
elements outlined in the previous section, the interpretation of the role of the territory goes as 
follows: the territory is a bounded system of contextual (i.e. tacit and specific) accumulated 
knowledge which is exploited to generate innovation by closely located firms, through 
interactive learning processes. Such processes are then enhanced by the presence of an 
institutional architecture, which facilitates the mutual co-ordination of strategies, thus leading 
to the emergence of a shared cognitive framework and a coherent governance system. 
Finally, the coupling between the system and the external environment determines its 
evolution in time, depicting identifiable trajectories, whose outcomes are however never 
predictable in the long term. 
Consequently, within this perspective, “it is not the individual or the organizational but the 
territorial level that matters” (Boschma 2004, p. 1008), and firms and entrepreneurs 
themselves are “to a large extent generated by the local context” (Camagni 2002, p. 2396). As 
Hudson has effectively summarised (1999, p. 66), new regionalism entails a “decisive shift in 
focus from firm to territory as the key economic actor […], to a collective and territorialized 
definition of competitive advantage”. 
From that it follows - and we come to the third aspect - that regions have to be 
conceptualised as autonomous organisms, endowed with teleonomy, which pursue their 
competitive strategy vis-à-vis other similar competing entities. In this sense, Camagni (2002) 
argues that, since some adjustment mechanisms that regulate international trade (the 
Ricardian law of comparative advantage) do not work at subnational level, regions operate in 
a regime of absolute advantages. That means that, in order to secure a certain level of 
economic well-being, territories have to compete among themselves, using proactively “the 
creation of collective strategies as their instrument” (Ibid., p. 2406; similarly also Gray and 
Dunning 2000). In a more nuanced way, Boschma (2004) maintain that, although regions do 
not compete in the same way as firms do, they are nevertheless “active players” which 
represent their interests with the goal of preserving or enhancing their competitive position. 
 
From the previous discussion it emerges that the strength of the propositions about 
“competing regions” is correlated with a parallel emphasis on the pervasiveness of 
globalisation imperatives. This combination would be particularly marked within the EU, where 
the implementation of the common market and the adoption of a common currency among 
many Member States would have deprived national governments of important re-equilibrating 
tools in political economy, leaving territories exposed to international competition. The last 
element of the spatial conceptualisation elaborated by new regionalism concerns thus the 
dialectic between global and local.  
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The global appears here primarily as the space in which locales compete. But the global is 
also the dimension from which territories can drain resources (especially informational) to 
nurture their competitiveness. In this sense, Bathelt et al. (2004) argue, for example, that most 
successful clusters are those that succeed in establishing a variety of channels (that they call 
pipelines) to tap into relevant knowledge produced in other “hot-spot” around the globe. 
Through pipelines, firms are able to access new and non-incremental knowledge which, 
thanks to local buzz, tends then to spill over the other firms in the cluster. As the 
establishment of pipelines is both economically and cognitively expensive for firms, clustering 
would thus represent an effective strategy to maximize the benefits coming from pipelines. 
Similar arguments have been expressed also by Bramanti and Ratti (1997) with reference to 
the need for innovative milieux, and they resonate Storper and Venables’ idea (2004) that the 
more a place is interwoven with global flows, the more it needs a local buzz to function 
efficiently. 
These accounts portray a spatial image in which the global and local develop a constant 
dialectic interaction, while remaining two clearly distinct entities. The global is in fact described 
an anonymous and entropic force, pushing towards dispersion and homogeneity; the local is 
conversely represented as a compact and coherent unit, which relies on its endogenous 
potential, that is on its unique assets (depending on tacit knowledge and institutional 
arrangements) to compete in the world. 
 
To conclude, in this section we have seen how, building on a particular understanding of 
the territorial features of innovation dynamics, new regionalism has generated a spatial 
ordering centred on the role of competing regions in a globalising world. In the next section, 
we will examine how this spatial grammar has been used to formulate a series of normative 
indications for spatial development policies. 
 
 
1.2.3 Some models for developments policies: Regional Innovation Systems and 
Triple Helix 
In the previous sections we have considered how, by combining heterogeneous analytical 
concepts (localised learning, institutions, path-dependence, etc.), new regionalist accounts 
have come to formulate quite a definite framework, through which interpreting the spatial 
dimension of development processes. 
On the basis of this interpretative scheme, new regionalist literature has then envisaged a 
wide range of policy orientations, aiming at stimulating economic growth and competitiveness. 
While the focus of these propositions may vary (cluster building, task forces, innovation 
networks, etc.), all the approaches share the following rationales: 
a) development policies should be implemented at regional level; 
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b) development policies should aim at unlocking the endogenous potential of regions, by 
stimulating the collective creation of new knowledge; 
c) this approach is particularly appropriate for less developed regions; more in general, 
this is the only viable approach to tackle territorial imbalances in the context of the new 
economic imperatives determined by globalisation. 
 
While the previous points represent a shared background, in this section we will 
concentrate on two specific policy models elaborated under the new regionalist strand: 
Regional Innovation Systems and Triple Helix. Again, the choice derives from the strong 
influence that such models have exerted on the EU regional policy. 
 
Both the RIS and the Triple Helix approaches focus on the role played by localised 
university-firms connections in boosting local development. From a theoretical perspective, 
these models combine the spatial grammar provided by new regionalism with sociological 
analyses investigating the new mechanisms of knowledge production in the modern economy. 
In this context, the work of Gibbons et al. (1994) on the emergence of a Mode 2 of 
knowledge creation has been particularly influential for the account it gives of the increasing 
interaction and permeability between the academic and the business sphere.  
According to Gibbons et al., the massive expansion of qualified workforce occurred since 
the 1960s, associated with the improvements in transportation and in ICT, have led to “an 
explosion in the number of interconnections and possible configurations of knowledge and 
skills. The outcome can be described as a socially distributed knowledge production system 
[… in which] communication increasingly takes place across existing institutional boundaries” 
(Ibid., p. 10). Such dynamics would thus signal a more significant transformation in the social 
foundations and rationales of knowledge production: while in the previous Mode 1 of 
knowledge production problem-solving was carried out following the practice relevant to a 
particular discipline in the absence of some practical objectives, in Mode 2 problem-solving 
would be organized around a particular context of application, thus always responding to one 
or more interests and social needs.  
An important point of this account relates to the fact that, according to the authors, the 
emergence of Mode 2 is driven by - but at the same time it contributes to - the development of 
dynamic markets, in which firms increasingly engage themselves in a plurality of 
arrangements to source specialised knowledge4.Therefore, the emergence of new 
mechanisms of economic coordination and the emergence of new modes of knowledge 
production are conceptualised as two mutually reinforcing processes.  
 
                                                 
4
 In the authors’ words: “in these markets knowledge itself is sought continuously, but more often than 
not it is not readily available to be bought or sold off the shelf, like other commodities. It is increasingly 
generated in the market nexus itself” (Ibid., p. 13). 
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The RIS and Triple Helix models draw precisely on this latter intuition to develop their 
analytical models, within a new regionalist framework. More precisely, form Gibbons et al.’s 
work, such models derive the idea that the competitiveness of industrial systems can be 
enhanced by decentralized institutions which, acting as brokers to pool socially disperse 
knowledge, can increase the connectivity of the system, and thus its innovativeness. 
 However, contrasting with one of the Gibbons et al.’s main conclusion that, as socially 
distributed process, the locus of knowledge production is “global” (Ibid., p. 157), in the Triple 
Helix and RIS approaches the idea of decentralized and “lean” institutions has been rigidly 
translated into regional institutions; similarly, the idea of connectivity has been rendered in 
terms of regional interconnections between firms and universities. In sum, these models have 
combined some elements of the Mode 2 theorisation with accounts coming from the 
regionalist approach, to create a prescriptive scheme of the relation between science and 
business, oriented to promoting local development processes. 
 
Moving on to examine the analytical and normative content of such a scheme, some 
differences can be detected between the two models. 
The RIS approach is based on a combination of institutional and evolutionary economics 
theoretical inputs, and focuses on the role played by different governance configurations in 
explaining the relative innovative success of some regions (Cooke 1998). Against this 
background, regions are conceptualised as dynamic systems, whose constitutive elements 
are: the productive world, the research organisations, and the political institutions. The rules of 
interaction among these three sub-systems are then determined by two sets of variables, one 
referring to the “infrastructural level” (inherent to the degree of political autonomy of regional 
authorities), the other one to “superstructural level” (the values and norms regulating the 
relations among regional actors) (Cooke 2001). The innovative capacity of a region would be 
thus dependent on the way the infra- and the superstructural levels combine together, 
determining the governance configuration which characterises each specific regional system 
(Cooke et al. 2000). Consequently, according to the RIS perspective, regional institutions 
assume essentially the role of facilitator, which tries to create cultural bridges between the 
local sources of knowledge and the business sector (Oughton et al. 2002; Asheim and 
Isaksen 2003; Bellandi and Caloffi 2008). 
The Triple Helix approach shows a more marked evolutionary perspective, and is meant to 
provide “a model at the level of social structure for the explanation of Mode 2 as an historically 
emerging structure for the production of scientific knowledge” (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 
2000, p. 118). Within this framework, innovation processes are understood as the result of the 
co-evolution of three central societal forces: academia, industry and the public sector. The 
interplay of these subsystems produces changes both at the internal level of each sub-system 
and at their reciprocal interface; these changes, if mutually coherent, can facilitate further 
interactions, thus leading to a greater integration. Moreover, at each subsequent evolutionary 
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phase, the sub-systems become increasingly inter-dependent; the final outcome is the 
development of a new overlay of communication infrastructures at the interface of the sub-
systems, which are morphologically different from the underlying sub-systems, and conjure 
new contexts of knowledge creations in most advanced knowledge societies (examples would 
be constituted by the emergence of technology transfer offices, public-private research 
centres, etc.). Finally, the role of development polices is to accelerate these endogenous 
dynamics through appropriate regulations and financial incentives. 
 
So, from the previous review it can be noted that, despite some distinctions, the two 
models share some important characteristics. 
First, both models combine analytical and normative elements. Indeed, they draw their 
insights from the study of some successful regional cases (mainly in Europe for the RIS, and 
mainly in the US for the Triple Helix), and subsequently extend their implications in a 
normative policy scheme, apt to be implemented more or less universally5.  
Secondly, as we have seen, both models distinguish the same three sub-systems and 
identify in technology transfer mechanisms (labelled “cultural bridges” or “overlay 
infrastructures”) and networking strategies among core organisations the essential elements 
to enhance the learning capacity of the regional system as a whole (Oughton et al. 2002). 
Thirdly, universities are alternatively conceived as “cornerstones” of the governance 
configuration in a knowledge economy (Cooke et al. 2000), or as catalysts of regional 
innovation processes (Chatterton and Goddard 2000; OECD 1998 and 2008).  
 
Given the importance that university acquires in the two models, and the novelty that this 
element represents compared to traditional development policies, the function attributed to 
this institution deserves here a closer scrutiny. 
The centrality assigned to university is grounded on both conjectural and empirical 
considerations. As for the first, considering the increasing importance assigned to intangible 
contents in determining economic competitiveness, universities as knowledge institutions par 
excellence are the first candidates to play the role of knowledge providers for the local 
productive system. In this sense, Chatterton and Goddard (2000, p. 474) argue that 
“regionally-engaged higher education institutions can become a key asset and powerhouse 
for economic development”. 
In empirical terms, some statistical analyses (Oughton et al. 2002) would have found that 
across Europe: i) there is a positive relation between R&D intensity, innovation activity and 
economic prosperity; ii) public and private expenditure in R&D are correlated; iii) innovative 
                                                 
5
 In this sense, Etzkowitz et al. (2000, p. 329) state that “the establishment of universities has always 
been a strategy for latecomers or lagging regions […] one element of the latecomer strategy is designing 
a new entrepreneurial university; it is also restructuring and reorganizing existing universities according 
to the MIT prototype”; in a more nuanced way, Cooke et al. (2000, p. 20) argue that “innovation policy 
cannot directly assist the unemployed back into jobs or backward regions to develop, but in concert with 
other policies […] it can” . 
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inputs and outputs vary more within nation states, than across them. These relations would 
consequently justify the claim for integrating science policy in regional development 
strategies.  
Therefore, within this perspective, concepts such as “entrepreneurial university” (Etzkowitz 
et al. 2000; Bramwell and Wolfe 2008) or “embedded university” (Lazzeretti and Tavoletti 
2005) are used - again both in analytical and normative terms - to describe/assign university a 
“third role” besides teaching and research: contributing to regional development, through a 
structural transformation which makes organisational configuration, research priorities and 
teaching programmes more responsive to regional knowledge needs. This shift in the social 
function of universities has been summarised by Chatterton and Goddard (2000, p. 475) as 
follows:  
For many higher education institutions regional engagement is becoming the crucible 
within which an appropriate response to overall trends in higher education is being 
forged. […]. The challenge is to link within the institution the teaching, research and 
community service roles by internal mechanisms […] and to engage the institution with all 
facets of the regional development process'”. 
The literature adopting either the RIS or the Triple Helix perspective has then identified a 
range of modalities, through which such an “engaged role” can be concretely articulated. The 
main forms of contribution are listed hereafter. 
a) Universities can have a direct economic impact, by commercializing new knowledge 
(through patenting and licensing activities) (Etzkowitz et al. 2000). In this sense, 
particular emphasis is put on a sound legislation which formalises university ownership 
of intellectual properties rights (the often cited model is the Bayh-Dole act of 1980 in the 
USA). 
b) Universities can strengthen the regional industrial web, by favouring the creation of 
spin-off and start-up firms6 (Bramwell and Wolfe 2008; Lazzeretti and Tavoletti 2005; 
OECD 2008). 
c) Universities facilitate technology transfer processes in two essential ways: through 
contract research and consulting activities, and through the provision of a skilled 
workforce, which would enhance the transfer of tacit knowledge and networks of 
relations from university to firms (Bramwell and Wolfe 2008; Florida and Cohen 1999). 
d) By attracting international “star” researchers, universities can act as “pipelines” through 
which local firms can access relevant knowledge, produced in other “hot-spots” around 
the world (Chatterton and Goddard 2000; Benneworth and Hospers 2007). 
                                                 
6
 The difference between spin-off and start-up firms is explained by Wright et al. (2008, p. 1207) in the 
following terms: “University spin-offs are defined as new ventures that are dependent upon licensing or 
assignment of the institution’s intellectual property for initiation. In contrast, start-ups are companies 
where the university has been involved in some way in forming the company but where it does not have 
any formal intellectual property agreement with the company’s founder” 
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e) Universities can play a role as institution-builders and network facilitators, thus 
contributing to foster trust and civic capital (Chatterton and Goddard 2000; Bramwell 
and Wolf 2008). 
 
Summarising the previous discussion, according to the outlined models the emergence of 
the knowledge economy calls for the elaboration of developmental strategies at regional level, 
which promote regional innovative capacity, through the prioritisation of local links between 
the business and the academic spheres. These strategies are then deemed particularly 
appropriate for “underperforming” regions, which have to compete their way out of their 
disadvantaged position. 
This scheme entails therefore a new approach to policy-making, in which education and 
science policies on the one hand, and industrial policies on the other hand are melted 
together in a new comprehensive innovation policy. As several authors have noted and 
claimed, such models are neither Keynesian nor neo-liberal, but represents a “third way”, 
since they abandon the individualistic and top-down approach common to the formers, and 
aim conversely at mobilising the endogenous and collective potential of regions through 
context-specific strategies (Oughton et al. 2002; Cooke et al. 2000; Amin 1999; Pike 2004). 
Moreover, in some accounts these models are explicitly presented as a more effective and 
efficient method compared to traditional redistributive welfare systems; indeed, they promise 
to reduce territorial inequalities at inferior economic costs, by generating an increase in the 
aggregate output without twisting resources allocation7. This vision has vivaciously 
championed by Cooke et al. (2000, p. 21) in the following terms: 
 “we make a strong case for focusing innovation policy and enterprise support at the 
regional level, indeed we argue that the world has moved on from the days when regional 
policy was primarily a spatial version of the redistribution of welfare to needy people in 
areas hit by deindustrialization or underdevelopment to a position where regional 
innovation policy is at the heart of economic development”.  
 
We have dwelled at length on the content and rationales of the RIS and Triple Helix 
approaches because, as we mentioned at the beginning of the section, they have represented 
a reference model for the EU regional policy. In the next section we will deal with one last and 
crucial aspect of the new regionalist policy perspective: how the implementation of the these 
models is strictly dependent upon the parallel institution of new modes of governance at 
regional, national and European level. 
 
 
                                                 
7
 It has to be noted, however, that this last issue is fairly contested within the institutionalist approach 
itself; critics have expressed particularly by Amin (1999) and Pike et al. (2007). 
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1.2.4 The role of governance according to the new regionalist perspective 
In the previous section we have gone through the main policy orientations advanced by 
some analytical models stemming from new regionalism, and in particular from its 
institutionalist-evolutionary strand. Those propositions also suggested implicitly that the 
possibility of implementing the outlined agenda requires the presence of a suitable coherent 
governance configuration which favours those informational circuits and institutional webs 
necessary to design appropriate interventions. 
Once again, new regionalist approaches do not form a unitary theoretical framework about 
the structuring of the politics of local development; nevertheless, we will see how the 
grounding elements of the spatial conception described in sections 1.2.1 and 1.2.2 resonate 
with parallel normative recommendations about the characteristics of regional governance. In 
this regard, it may be worth tracing a preliminary distinction between propositions concerning 
the governance of local development at regional level, and propositions concerning the 
governance of the wider political system (national and supra-national) in which regions are 
deemed to play a significant role.  
 
As for the first dimension, one of the cardinal elements of the governance vision 
championed by new regionalism is the idea that the definition of regional development 
strategies should be based on bottom-up processes. This is indeed considered as a sine qua 
non condition to elaborate context-sensitive interventions, shaped on the specific 
characteristics of the region. Such a stance explains the recurring emphasis on fostering, 
among the different components of the regional system, networks (Asheim et al. 2003), 
public-private partnerships (Oughton et al. 2002; OECD 1998) and negotiations (Etzkowitz et 
al. 2000), considered as appropriate devices to generate a recursive rationality (Amin 1999) or 
reflexivity. Reflexivity is then conceived as “the process which combines learning and 
intelligence such that, in a number of feedback loops, the system receives guidance” (Cooke 
and Morgan 1998, p. 73), thus signalling the emergent of an effective “learning region” 
(Oughton et al. 2002). 
The theme of reflexivity is connected with another ingredient of the governance recipe, 
namely the coherence of the system. We have already considered the importance of this 
element within the institutionalist framework; coherence is indeed imagined both as an 
essential property to detect the presence of a regional innovation system (Bellandi and Caloffi 
2008), and as condition for the system to follow an enduring development path. From a 
governance perspective, coherence is important because “regional innovation capacity 
depends on whether the individual elements of local order and their inherent governance 
elements are compatible” (Braczyk and Heidenreich 1998, p. 424). It is not always clear what 
coherence should refer to, although it is certainly related to the presence of those already 
mentioned “soft factors”, such as: shared values, trust, common identity, weak social tensions, 
etc. (Cooke and Morgan 1998). What matters here is that the recourse to collaborative 
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networks and partnerships is once again indicated as the most suitable method to expand and 
reproduce the soft base of local development (Bramwell and Wolfe 2008; Cooke et al. 2000). 
Reflexivity, coherence and the underlying function of networks and partnerships introduce 
then a last and crucial component of this framework: the importance of co-operation and 
consensus. As we have seen, co-operation is simultaneously envisaged both as an attitude 
enhanced by the presence of soft factors, and as necessary approach to develop those same 
factors. Its role is thus strategic and it represents the peculiar way-of-doing of institutionalist 
policy action; therefore, the idea is that, where co-operative attitudes are not already present, 
they can/should be stimulated. Finally, consensus complements co-operation on the policy-
making side and represents the logical consequence of the previous elements: if regional 
strategies have to reflect the characteristics of local economy, if strategies have to point to 
bridge the different components of the system in a coherent and co-operative fashion, then 
“regional governments should develop policies that have the consensus of regional 
stakeholders” (Cooke et al. 2000, p. 135). 
The importance of consensus as a political condition, and of consensus-building as a 
political strategy, has to be stressed here. These two elements complete the institutionalist 
governance framework and, more importantly, systemise the overall approach. Following 
Oughton et al. (2002), the argument can be summarised in the these terms: because of the 
role of tacit knowledge, the regional context influences significantly the innovative capacities 
of firms; more precisely, inter-firm and public-private co-operation and the institutional 
framework within which these relationships take place have a significant impact on regional 
innovation; as a consequence, “in the promotion of such innovation supportive regions the 
inter-linking of co-operative partnerships ranging from work organisations inside firms to 
different sectors of society, understood as ‘regional development coalitions,’ will be of 
strategic importance” (Ibid., p. 101, emphasis added). 
 
This account of the institutionalist approach to governance certainly simplifies a wider and 
more articulated debate. For instance, Amin and Thrift (1994) are rather sceptical about the 
possibility of reproducing the “institutional thickness” in places which are not already endowed 
with it (in a similar way also Braczyk and Heidenreich 1998). Héraud (2003) then insists on 
importance of considering regions as open systems, casting doubts on the alleged coherence 
of the regional system. In a more general sense, while stressing the potentialities of the new 
approach, Pike (2004, p. 2146) recognises that the institutionalist agenda lacks “conceptual 
and theoretical clarity, exhibiting a degree of `fuzziness'”. 
However, despite these important theoretical distinctions, what is shared among most of 
the previous readings, and what ultimately specifies the institutionalist approach within the 
wider new regionalist strand, is a common emphasis on associationalism, collaboration and, 
in many cases, consensus building. This discourse tends thus to found an “organicistic” vision 
of the politics of local development, which assumes coherence as a pursued asymptotic 
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condition, and which consequently writes differentiation and social dialectics off, in the name 
of the growth imperative. Later on, I will try to make clear why this vision becomes even more 
problematic in political terms, when it is promoted from outside as reference model for the 
actual design and delivery of development policies. Indeed, this approach tends to 
subordinate governance relationships (functionalisation of consensus) to the achievement of a 
particular development model (based on regional networking), thus becoming inherently 
contradictory with reference to the supposed bottom-up and endogenous nature of this 
processes. But to fully grasp this crucial issue, a last point still needs to be briefly considered: 
how the formulation of new modes of governance at regional level has to be coupled with a 
parallel transformation of institutional set-up at upper scales. 
 
It is evident that the formation of an associative governance and the consequent delivery of 
an innovation-based policy agenda are only possible if a downscaling of political capacity from 
national to regional level in policy-fields such as education, science, and research has already 
occurred. In other words, the realisation of the institutionalist programme clearly necessitates, 
as a prerequisite, the existence of a regional institutional level, endowed with a minimum 
degree of administrative, financial and political autonomy. 
What has to be highlighted is that, in the European context, new regionalist approaches 
explicitly promote the EU as an important driver of the regionalisation process. Several 
authors have then particularly concentrated on the key role played by the institution of a multi-
level governance system (MLG) in providing a clear political status to regional governance 
(Cooke et al. 2000; Leonardi 2006; Benz and Eberlein 1999). MLG has a double meaning: it is 
both an analytical tool which “accepts […] the emergent and innovative role of new kinds of 
policy actor” (Cooke et al. 2000, p. 98), and a specific programmatic approach advanced by 
the EU, which weaves together the new regionalist perspective on economic regionalisation 
with a political discourse over the relation between decentralisation and democratisation.  
Given the primarily European emanation of MLG, we will analyse in detail the implication of 
this concept in the next chapter. Here it suffices to point out that, as mentioned in the 
introduction, there is a two-way relationship between the new regionalist theorisations and the 
development of a MLG system. On the one hand, new regionalism has contributed to give a 
theoretical legitimacy to the MLG programme; on the other hand, new regionalism advocates 
the full unfolding of a MLG system to actualise its analyses and policy orientations8. In this 
sense, Benz and Eberlein (1999, p. 331) can argue that the regionalisation of EU policies and 
the establishment of MLG are twin processes, which respond to a two-fold pressure: from 
below, i.e. from the regional level seeking more involvement in the EU processes, and from 
above, i.e. from the European Commission “looking for partners and support” for its policies. 
                                                 
8
 The importance of this latter aspect has been explained by Koschatzky and Kroll (2007, p. 1117) in the 
following terms: “the newly emerged multi-level governance system has created opportunities for the 
integration of regionally anchored innovation systems in globally operating science, technological and 
enterprise systems”. 
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Now, “while the latter [pressure] can be explained by functional requirements of policies 
differing between territories, the former corresponds to the interests of regional actors to 
maintain or extend their power in the process of Europeanization”. 
 
Recapitulating, new regionalism has provided the rationales for a downscaling of industrial 
and innovation policies at regional level. The approach has been endorsed by the European 
Commission, for “functional requirements”, but also because it responded to its legitimation 
needs and political aspirations. The European Commission has thus favoured regional 
institution-building processes centred on innovation-related issues, through the delivery 
mechanisms of its policies and by developing a suitable governance configuration (MLG); as 
Cooke et al. 2000 (p. 100) have observed:  
“as the EU programming process for Structural Funds requires non-regionalised recipient 
states to establish regional representation bodies, and as Structural Funds budgets 
increasingly encourage regional programming bids to contain more innovation-related 
projects than before, the EU can be seen to be a key driver of multi-level decision 
processes”.  
This process has effectively played a role in empowering regions as new significant 
political-economic level; regions that now naturally claim for greater participation and further 
competencies to realise their development policy. In this sense, Bellandi and Caloffi (2008, p. 
38) conclude that “the focus on the ‘region’ is related to the fact that it is a significant context 
of policy making”. As one can note, at the end of this process it is no more clear (and no more 
relevant, either) whether the claim for regionalisation is justified with the intrinsic spatial 
properties of development processes, or rather with the fact that regional level has become an 
important political-economic actor, which expresses its own programmatic agenda, and 
consequently try to “regionalise” economic processes. For these reasons it can be argued that 
new regionalism and the EU MLG are strengthening each other. 
In the next chapter, we will consider more in-depth in which way the EU has absorbed the 
new regionalist perspective and translated it into its flagship policy. But a last observation 
needs to be anticipated here: literature on MLG, but also the interpretation formulated by the 
European Commission (see section 2.3), emphasise the fluidity (variable geometry) and 
transcalarity of MLG configurations (Koschatzky and Kroll 2007; Perry and May 2007; Cooke 
et al. 2000). However, what is found empirically, and what has also emerged implicitly from 
the previous discussion is that the MLG system interests and involves almost exclusively the 
administrative dimensions of regional governance, namely regional governments and 
authorities. These bodies are indeed given the opportunity to relate directly with the EU for the 
implementation of the regional policy, by-passing in certain circumstances the national level. 
However, other regional socio-economic actors, or other institutional units at sub-regional 
level are only marginally involved in MLG and, in any case, always through the mediation of 
regional authorities.  
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Later on we will analyse at length the rationales explaining this differentiation which has 
immense effects on regional governance. However, it was important make clear here what 
appears as a strong feature of the Cohesion Policy governance, which is likely to persist also 
in future evolutions. Indeed, it is meaningful that the recent Green Paper on Territorial 
Cohesion - that we mentioned in the introductory chapter - leaves completely unexplored the 
issue of the governance mechanisms regulating the determination of the policy objectives. 
Similarly, the Barca Report (Barca 2009), which overall rightly emphasises the necessity of 
founding the elaboration of the Policy priorities on a wide and high-level political debate, then 
tends to narrow the discussion on the nature of such debate to which kind of new institutional 
bodies should be put in place at EU level. As we will see in the next chapter, the sense and 
the scope of MLG is probably one of the most important and thorny element of the Cohesion 
Policy architecture. 
 
To conclude, throughout the previous sections it has been examined how new regionalism, 
especially in its institutionalist-evolutionary articulation, builds on a particular interpretation of 
the spatiality of development processes to work out a set of policy indications coupled with 
precise governance models, which aim at stimulating endogenous dynamics and/or 
embedding global processes of growth. New regionalism has thus come to synthesise an 
influential discourse over the competitiveness imperative in the era of globalisation, which 
pushes regions and locale to become “agents of their own development” (Pike 2004), and 
which has found in the EU an important actualisation context. In the following sections, we will 
consider how the very theoretical foundations of this approach, that is its spatial 
conceptualisation, have been significantly challenged. 
 
 
1.3 Theoretical limitations of new regionalism and emerging research and 
policy agendas 
We have seen that the theoretical core of the new regionalist approach lies in the 
distinction between codified and tacit knowledge, and in the consequent role played by spatial 
proximity in fostering interactive learning and innovativeness among co-localised firms. It is on 
these grounds that new regionalism develops then its territorialised definition of 
competitiveness, and the consequent emphasis on co-operative innovation networks and 
consensus-building as pillars of its policy orientations. 
In the following sections I will take into consideration empirical findings and theoretical 
arguments which question both the spatial-temporal generalisability of new regionalist 
analyses, and, more substantially, its spatial conceptualisation. I will start from a review of 
empirical studies which challenge the policy indications advanced by the Regional Innovation 
System and Triple Helix models. I will then consider how these and other findings lead to 
interrogating the spatial grammar underpinning the two models, and especially the concept of 
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proximity. Finally, the last section will be dedicated to seeing how these critiques lay the 
bases for an alternative interpretation of the spatial dimension of socio-economic phenomena, 
which also calls for reconsidering the scope and the sense of a politics of local development. 
 
 
1.3.1 The uncertain effectiveness of RIS- and Triple Helix-derived policy schemes 
In section 1.2.2 we have identified RIS and Triple Helix as two of the most influential 
models in the field of regional innovation policy. We have seen that both models stress the 
importance of localised innovation networks in boosting local development; both models also 
converge in assigning university the role of engine of knowledge-driven economies. More 
precisely, literature has distinguished a series of functions through which “entrepreneurial 
universities” can effectively enhance regional environments: new knowledge 
commercialisation, spin-offs and start-ups generation, and, above all, knowledge diffusion and 
institutional building support. Now, consistent empirical evidence points to the contingent and 
sometimes clashing nature of these functions. 
Huggins et al. (2008), quoting a study conducted by the National Science Foundation in 
the USA, find that licensing incomes have been concentrated among relatively few 
universities. Similar findings come also from an in-depth study of six universities located in 
mid-range regions (in terms of GDP and R&D effort compared to the EU’s average) in five 
different European countries. This study has highlighted that, with the exception of the English 
case, patenting activity was not a breakeven operation, and the royalty revenues were 
relatively small, inconstant and concentrated in few research groups (especially those in 
which a “star” researcher was present), so that the cost of patenting was barely covered 
(Wright et al. 2008). Accordingly, the authors conclude that “an IP [Intellectual Property] 
strategy is only likely to be successful at regional level if it is embedded in a critical mass of 
research, attractive enough for international companies to build embedded laboratories at the 
university site” (Ibid., p. 1221). 
More generally, several authors have suggested not overestimating the importance of 
legislation formalising the ownership of IPRs by universities, as in most cases the emergence 
of entrepreneurial universities would predate the enacting of the legislative reform (Lawton 
Smith 2007). What is more, with specific reference to the USA, which first introduced this kind 
of legislation (the over-quoted Bayh-Dole act of 1980), Florida and Cohen (1999) have noted 
a growing concern both among academics and industry about the “overzealous” pursuit of 
revenues through technology transfer on the part of the universities. 
Considerations similar to those expressed for licensing activity can also be made in 
relation to universities’ capacity to favour the creation of spin-offs. The already quoted study of 
six European universities shows that most of them possess a limited portfolio of spin-offs 
(around 15 in average), and some of these firms result “dormant” (Wright et al. 2008). Further 
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confirmations in this sense come also from a study of industry-university links in high-tech 
sectors conducted in Italian Objective 1 regions (Pellegrin 2007). Interestingly, the two studies 
also agree in finding that, even when spin-offs are effectively created, they need to go rapidly 
international, losing their regional dimension. 
 
This last element introduces the crucial question of how much localised university-industry 
links are relevant for knowledge diffusion processes. The first aspect which needs to be 
assessed is the aptitude of universities to play as “knowledge centres” for local industry. In 
this regard, from a significant number of empirical research it emerges that knowledge flows 
between university and local firms are normally weak, and that, even in the case of high-tech 
clusters developed around high-ranked universities, firms do not consider the proximity to the 
local research base as an important factor for knowledge interactions. For instance, a survey 
of seventy-five Oxfordshire biotech firms has found that “although being close to universities 
was the top locational advantage, universities were not the prime source of information: they 
were ranked 9th, behind conferences, competitors, friends, collaborators, ex-colleagues, trade 
fairs, the Internet, and other published sources” (Lawton Smith 2007, p. 106). These findings 
are consistent with the fourth Community Innovation Survey (CEC 2004), which has shown 
that only 5% of innovating firms indicated that universities were `highly important' for 
innovation, compared with 28% who rated clients or customer as important.  
Similar results come also from studies focusing on traditional SMEs, which should 
represent, in the RIS perspective, the main beneficiaries of local entrepreneurial universities, 
as they are the most dependent on territorialised resources (Asheim and Isaksen 2003). For 
example, inquiring a representative sample of 200 manufacturing (mainly SMEs) firms 
localised in Alsace, Héraud (2003) has found that the most important intermediaries of 
innovation are again clients and suppliers, followed by the participation in fairs and 
exhibitions. Universities and technology transfer centres are reported to be the last source of 
external innovation, and the author significantly argues that: 
 “these potential partners, that typically belong to the ‘technology infrastructure’ of the 
region, and are the ordinary intermediaries of public policies, were seldom quoted by the 
firms. We find here the most paradoxical situation since these ITIs, considered in the 
enquiry as minor actors of the innovative activity of the regional industry, are the more 
‘regionalized’ category” (Ibid., p. 46). 
 Another interesting result from Héraud’s research is then represented by the fact that 
innovative partners are predominantly localised outside the regional borders (only 25% is 
regional) and, especially with reference to the category of suppliers, “the [National System of 
Innovation] itself is even contested by larger systems” (Ibid., p. 46). In similar terms, after 
reviewing a series of studies on the innovation sources of SMEs localised in peripheral 
regions, Lagendijk and Lorentzen (2007, p. 463) conclude that “customers and suppliers 
abroad were very important partners in the knowledge and innovation networks”, and that 
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these innovation sources were accessed mainly through temporary proximity events 
(meetings, fairs, etc). 
 
Previous results are then mirrored in investigations conducted on the “university side”. In 
their comparative study, Wright et al. (2008) show that, although numerous government 
initiatives had been implemented to stimulate cooperative research between local SMEs and 
universities, 30-50% of contract research agreements stipulated by the surveyed universities 
were with international companies, located outside the region. Similarly, from a triple helix 
analysis of the relatively uncompetitive regions of Yorkshire and Humberside in the UK, 
Huggins et al. (2008) have found that, while universities do engage in collaborative knowledge 
networks with other universities or large firms, their interaction with local SMEs is far less 
significant. Moreover, even when universities are involved in knowledge transfer processes 
with SMEs, their relation seems to be eminently market-oriented, in the sense that 
“universities are either directly seeking a financial return from SMEs or are receiving it 
indirectly through government-funded programmes” (Ibid., p. 331). 
To sum up, these studies indicate that there exists a frequent mismatch at regional level 
between the research sphere and the local productive world. On this matter, in addition to the 
already mentioned survey on the regional sample, Héraud also presents the results of a 
cross-regional statistical analysis, aimed at testing the influence of regional scientific context 
on the nature of the “competence to innovate” of local firms. From the exercise it emerges 
that, in general, there is a statistical link between “regional scientific density” and the overall 
level of competences to innovate among firms. However, the link appears particularly 
significant only in high-tech sectors; in other sectors results are more contrasted, and in “in 
many cases the more ‘scientific’ regions are not even the best environment. […] Such a 
statistical result proves at least that the hypothesis of systematic positive correlation between 
innovative competence and quality of regional scientific environment must be rejected” (Ibid., 
p. 51). 
In this perspective, it is meaningful that Cooke et al. (2000, p. 133), who insistently stress 
the importance of university and technology transfer, in their study of over 1000 big and small 
firms in eleven European regions have found that: i) most of the surveyed SMEs were 
excluded form regional technology transfer initiatives; ii) the regional supply of expertise did 
not often match the innovation bottlenecks experienced by firms; iii) in general, the strengths 
of universities and technology transfer structures did not “necessarily correspond to the 
industrial strengths of the regions”. 
 
Overall, the above outlined review suggests two important considerations. 
The first concerns the effectiveness of policies fostering localised university-firms links. 
While universities certainly have a socio-economic impact at local level, previous studies 
question the supposed role of universities as pillar of techno-industrial agglomerations. More 
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precisely, they show that, although this role has been played in some well-known cases, it is 
nonetheless contingent upon a plurality of historical, political and socio-economic factors, 
which are difficult to replicate (Lawton Smith 2007). 
Among these factors, the most important is probably represented by the presence of an 
industrial web which is able to absorb technologies and graduates generated by the local 
university (Florida and Cohen 1999). However, previous researches also suggest that this 
condition, although necessary, is not sufficient. In fact, firms (including SMEs) seem to rely on 
knowledge networks which are functional to their productive specialisation, and which 
consequently may or may not include universities, and not necessarily local university. 
Similarly, even when universities perform commercial activities, they do not necessarily focus 
on the local level (and it would be odd if they did so, since there are not economic agents who 
try deliberately to limit their economic activity to local level). For these reasons, Lagendijk 
(2002), Huggins et al. (2008), and Lawton Smith (2007) are probably right to observe that the 
engagement of firms and universities in regional networks depends more on specific policy 
initiatives (and incentives), than on new spatial-economic imperatives. 
In addition to this, the claim for a downscaling of science policy at regional level is doubly 
problematic. Firstly, a greater responsiveness of universities to regional needs may clash with 
the university’s primary function, which is the pursuit of excellence in research and teaching 
(Power and Malmberg 2008). In fact, it can be argued that, if regional knowledge needs are 
typical of a low-tech or traditional industry, an excessive focus of university on the local level 
may affect negatively its research standards. Moreover, this may also diminish its 
attractiveness for international “star” researchers and students, who, in turn, are deemed one 
of the key factors for local success. Secondly, and more in general, several author have 
pointed out that regionalisation of science policy can pose problems to the criteria according 
to which science policy is assessed and funded (Perry and May 2007), and can be conflicting 
with national priorities, leading to redundancies and inefficiencies (Héraud 2003; Koschatzky 
and Kroll 2007). 
For all these reasons, many authors cast doubts about subsiding R&D, science parks and 
scientific poles as an appropriate strategy for local development, especially in less favoured 
regions which lack the necessary conditions (Amin 1999; Boschma 2004; Breschi and Lissoni 
2001; Lawton Smith 2007; Saxenian and Hsu 2001). In this sense, after analysing a series of 
disappointing innovation policies in some French and German regions, Koschatzky and Kroll 
(2007, p. 1125) conclude that “regional actors should be discouraged from understanding their 
science, technology and innovation policy as a substitute or a complement for regional policy 
aimed at equalization”. 
 
However, the previous literature raises also another, more fundamental question, 
concerning the prioritisation of regional links in RIS and Triple Helix models. As Power and 
Malmberg (2008, p. 243) have argued, while the three components of regional innovation 
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system (business, academia and support services) certainly contribute to regional 
development, they are nonetheless “to a large extent globally defined and developed by 
means of the successful nurturing of global links” (Ibid.); accordingly, they conclude that the 
problem of regional development “might not be regional after all”. This last observation points 
at the very conceptual core of new regionalist perspective, questioning its explanatory 
capacity. In the next section, we will draw on this point to discuss the spatial conceptualisation 
underpinning new regionalist accounts. 
 
 
1.3.2 Questioning new regionalist spatial conceptualisation 
We have just seen that there are consistent empirical findings which challenge the 
universal significance of university for local development; also, specific concerns have been 
raised about the opportunity to use science policy as a regional development tool, especially 
in less favoured regions. We have concluded by observing that, on the basis of this literature, 
it is also possible to discern substantial theoretical problems in the RIS and Triple Helix 
models, especially with regard to the role of spatial proximity.  
In this sense, a growing number of authors have critically contended that the link between 
spatial proximity and collective learning is too vague, as there is “little research on ‘actual 
learning processes’ to give support to the claims about ‘localized learning’” (Oinas 1999, p. 
364), and that explaining clustering through knowledge spillovers actually means presuming 
what has to be demonstrated (Ibid.; Breschi and Lissoni 2001). 
From a more analytical stance, Boschma (2005) emphasises that proximity is a multi-
faceted concept, and that spatial proximity is neither necessary nor sufficient to interactive 
learning, as other forms of proximity (such as cognitive or organisational) are simultaneously 
needed, and, on the other side, they may act as substitutes for the spatial one.  
This line of reasoning is consistent with the argument advanced by Torre and Rallet 
(2005), who urge to distinguish geographical from spatial proximity. While the latter refers to 
physical distance, the concept of geographical proximity concerns precisely the way in which 
distance can be bridged through mobility and the sharing of some interpretative codes (“logic 
of similarity”). Accordingly, they point at the significance of temporary co-localisation events 
(such as meeting, conferences, etc.) for the circulation and diffusion of knowledge. The 
importance of temporary proximity, as an effective social practice to access non-local 
knowledge and overcome long distance, is stressed also by Bathelt and Sculdt (2008), who 
specifically focus on the complex information and communication ecology characterising 
these events, and on their consequences for global buzz (re)production (similarly also 
Lagendijk and Lorentzen 2007; and Power and Jansson 2008). 
The influence of non-local interdependencies and the consequent problematic definition of 
the right scale to analyse innovation processes is also at the centre of Martin and Sunley’s 
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analysis (2006, p. 414), who recommend not to “fetishize place”, suggesting that the profound 
recursive interpenetration between exogenous and endogenous forces may make their 
distinction “artificial”. 
 
The last quotation from Martin and Sunley about the interpenetration between exogenous 
and endogenous puts forward a further critical contention to new regionalist 
conceptualisations, which concerns the local-global dialectic. Two diverse arguments have 
been particularly formulated in this regard. 
On the one hand, the embeddedness of local knowledge networks the and interpretative 
convergence allegedly favoured by the local mileu is disputed. For instance, in a critical 
review of the econometric literature on knowledge spill-overs, Breschi and Lissoni (2001) have 
convincingly argued that what on the surface appears as a knowledge externality (the local 
leaking of knowledge from universities and firms), to a closer observation it appears as 
knowledge transfer mediated by market mechanisms (relating to the mobility of researchers). 
Focusing more on the cognitive content of local relations, in a network analysis of three wine 
clusters Giuliani (2007, p. 140) finds that, while business linkages are effectively diffused 
within the clusters, innovation-related knowledge circulates in “a selective and uneven way, a 
property that reflects the different internal capabilities of firms to transfer and absorb 
knowledge”. According to the author, these findings raise doubts about the importance of local 
environment as a source of competitiveness, and re-cast the attention on the role played by 
firms in shaping the networks “that eventually favour cluster firms’ innovation” (Ibid., p. 163). 
Giuliani’s results also chime with Boschma’s observation (2005) that relevant knowledge 
(included tacit one) tends to circulate within a-territorial networks which, even when localised, 
may assume an exclusionary nature (similarly Breschi and Lissoni 2001). 
 
On the other hand, different studies demonstrate that innovation systems can emerge 
through networks connecting distant localities. As Saxenian and Hsu (2001) have shown in a 
study on the socio-economic links between the Silicon Valley and Hsinchu region in Taiwan, 
the development in the latter of an excellence high-tech cluster has strongly depended on the 
emergence of a “technical community” of US-educated Taiwanese engineers, which bridges 
the two localities through a complex architecture of business links, social networks, and 
shared technical know-how. According to the two authors, this dense social web and the 
increasing number of “astronaut” engineers travelling regularly between the two regions play a 
central role in coordinating economically and technologically the two systems in a way which 
is beneficial for both. In a similar perspective, Coe et al. (2004) describe the functioning of the 
BMW’s world production chain to illustrate how global production networks are essential to 
trigger local development processes, insofar as they constitute an important mean through 
which local resources are mobilised and enhanced. 
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Also Lagendijk (2004) emphasises the role played by global networks which, by 
interconnecting different locales, influence their scope for development. In another article on 
the wine industry, this time focusing on the role of “flying winemakers”, Lagendijk shows that 
this professional category of expert oenologists, travelling around the world to advise local 
winemakers, has been crucial for the world-wide diffusion of technical know-how concerning 
grape cultivation (i.e. something inherently tacit), but also market strategies and trends. More 
importantly, through this circulation, flying winemakers play a key role in creating global 
imaginations and tastes in the wine markets, and in constructing the identity of a wine area, 
thus ultimately determining its success. The author concludes by noting that, although global, 
the world of wine production is still a social world, based on conventions, codes, and symbols. 
For these reasons, the market and the social cannot be conceived as two distinct entities 
existing in separate space. But the market is not simply “embedded” in the society either; as 
Callon (1999) has convincingly shown, the market is an historical and social construction, 
which requires precise regulative procedures, technical devices, material investments and 
theoretical elaborations to be realised. In other words, as a physical or (now increasingly) 
virtual space where competitive behaviour can occur, the market is always socially 
constituted.  
 
Recapitulating, these theoretical reflections and empirical findings make problematic the 
spatial reading offered by new regionalism. What is at issue here, from a theoretical point of 
view, is the attribution of intrinsic properties to some spatial concepts (regions, distance, 
place, etc.) (Lagendijk 2006). In the following section, we will consider how this perspective 
has been completely reversed by approaches which point at considering spatial structures not 
as the manifestation of an immanent reality, but as the results of social practices. 
 
 
1.3.3 Local development from relational perspectives 
We have just seen that the significance of the analytical distinction between “near” and 
“far” as bearers of different knowledge content (codified and tacit) is theoretically and 
empirically questionable. It follows that also the ontological differentiation between “local” and 
“global” in terms of their relational specification (cooperative and competitive) and of their 
spatial effects (differentiation and homogenisation) can be challenged. 
Drawing also on these considerations, approaches adopting a relational perspective have 
in particular suggested changing the analytical lens, to observe how space is constantly (re-
)constituted in an ever-changing fashion through the relations agents develop among each 
other (Massey 2005), and to focus on the means (linguistic, technological, organisational, 
physical) which enable or hamper such relations. 
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Therefore, according to Amin and Cohendet (2004, p. 84) this approach calls for an 
“expanded definition of space”, which recognises its varied composition (in terms of mobility, 
communication, nodality, etc.), beyond the importance of territorial ties. But it also suggests a 
new geographical map, topological rather than territorial, where “near” and “far” are no more 
(or not only) a matter of scale gradients or physical distance, but they come to indicate the 
connectivity and extension of relational networks (Amin and Thrift 2007). 
 
This vision clearly entails also a different interpretation of the space of knowledge creation 
and diffusion. All the empirical works reported in the previous section point at the importance 
of networks, for their double-edged capacity to connect and exclude from knowledge flows. 
They also stress the centrality of firms and, more in general, organisations for network 
structuring, thus questioning the alleged subjectivity of local environment in shaping 
knowledge relations (Giuliani 2007; Oinas 1999). In this sense, Amin and Cohendet (2005, p. 
467) argue that, although knowledge work in global connection is not the same as it is in local 
ones, corporate-, community-, and other forms of distanciated networks “replicate more of the 
‘‘buzz’’ normally assigned to local networks than we think, and that the differences between 
the local and the global may be more a matter of differences in the organizational architecture 
and topology of the learning networks, than in the nature of the learning that is going on”. 
Such a reframing of the space of learning and knowledge creation has two important 
implications. Firstly, it indicates that there is no more a privileged scale for learning and 
innovation, since networks are “spatialized but not confined to certain scales” (Lagendijk 
2002, p. 85) and display a varying spatial composition and reach. Secondly, and 
distinguishing relational perspectives from other approaches similarly focusing on networks, 
attention is directed not only towards the way in which knowledge circulates across networks, 
but also - and more importantly - on circulation itself, as “a core element of the ontology of 
knowledge formation and accumulation that is, of the build up of competence and expertise as 
well as their mobilization in learning” (Amin and Cohendet 2005, p. 481). 
 
Consequently, this perspective leads to reformulating the sense of the term “local”, in the 
“local development” diade. Indeed, locales and regions are not more conceived as bounded 
and coherent units but, on the contrary, they are re-imagined as places of overlapping 
networks of varying extension and heterogeneous morphology (Amin 2004; Uyarra 2007). 
Accordingly, the extent and duration of local development processes are seen as the result of 
the “position and profitability of individual firms in their respective wider circuits” (Amin et al. 
2003, p. 25), rather than as the effect of the upgrading of local interconnections. In this 
perspective, some human, natural and cultural resources are still understood as embedded in 
local contexts, but their value and meaning is now “contingent upon how and by whom they 
are enrolled” (Lagendijk 2002, p. 88). More generally, the relational nature of space always 
entails “situations of mutual implications” in the various development trajectories of places, so 
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that the uneven geographies of development cannot be really comprehended without carefully 
considering the asymmetries and power geometries which characterise spatial relations 
(Massey 2005).  
Therefore, from a relational stance it is suggested that local development policies should 
focus less on bridging local sources of knowledge and production - which, as seen above, 
have not necessarily a local dimension - and more on “making sense of knowledge - in all its 
forms - as an immanent and circulating force” (Amin and Cohendet 2005, p. 481). In other 
words, the challenge for regional policy-makers becomes to understand where local 
organisations, enterprises and communities fit into chains of value creation connecting 
different places (Lawton Smith et al. 2003). Consequently, especially in less favoured and 
peripheral regions, policies should aim at improving the density and quality of integration of 
individuals and collective entities in relevant relational systems, by favouring their access into 
this geography of circulation (Lagendik and Lorentzen 2007; Bathelt 2006). This means 
targeting primarily the infrastructures - material and immaterial - which strengthen 
connectivity: for instance, development policies could promote the integration of the regional 
economy into logistics networks, by financing the creation of infrastructure for intermodal 
goods exchange; but this would also entail supporting firms to acquire the technologies and 
know-how needed to exploit logistics potentialities (as regards tracking devices, GPS 
technologies, etc.). Enhancing connectivity may also involve assisting firms in taking part in 
international fairs, expos, and more generally in all those settings which, as Lagendijk (2004) 
has shown, are an essential element in the emergence of market trends, codes, interpretative 
frameworks, etc. Assisting firms in this field, then, means providing financial support schemes, 
but also helping them develop the competences (linguistic, technical, formal) to make sense 
of this participation. Furthermore, if networks are organisationally rather than territorially 
constituted (Amin et al. 2003), policies should facilitate firms to find suppliers, knowledge 
providers or financing partner by enhancing their “projection capacity” in the external 
environment, regardless if the supplier/partner is localised or not in the same region. 
These are just some examples of an alternative local development policy based on a 
relational perspective, and they remain strictly indicative. Indeed, a relationally-imagined 
development policy is still “context-sensitive”, not in the sense that it looks at local 
connections, but rather because it points at identifying the varying articulation of the 
geography of circulation and of its accessibility conditions (in terms of enabling infrastructures, 
codes, competences, culture, etc.) across industries, social groups, economic stratifications, 
etc. As Gibbons et al. (1994, p. 164) have observed, if knowledge production is increasingly 
socially distributed and spatially dispersed, this does not entail that it is distributed and 
dispersed in an equal manner; consequently, the economic benefits stemming from the 
growth in knowledge interconnections will be disproportionately absorbed by those actors and 
those places which are better equipped and located to participate in the economy of flows. 
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Finally, this also involves recognising that networks may be asymmetrical in terms of 
power relations. It follows that local development policies are also a matter of exercising 
“nodal power” (Amin 2004), which means considering the importance of other dimensions - 
apart from the market forces - in the production of territorial inequalities. Concretely, this 
perspective has two main consequences. Firstly, it calls for a greater attention to the unequal 
spatial effects generated by sectoral policies (Héraud 2003; Perry and May 2007; Uyarra 
2007). Secondly and accordingly, it points out the significance (and the difficulty) of 
influencing those nodes, whose decisions may have an immense - but again spatially 
differentiated - impact over long distances. In this sense, the most typical examples are 
represented by the decisions over interest exchange rates taken by central banks, or the 
investment decisions by important financial institutions and governments; but these decisions 
can be also less evident and the organisations less well-known, such as for example the 
committees which, on the behalf of the European Commission, set the technical 
specifications9 for industrial productions and which can constitute important entry-barriers for 
many SMEs both inside and outside the EU. 
 
To conclude, a radical critique is derived from previous arguments about the possibility that 
territorial imbalances can be tackled only through strategies aiming at boosting endogenous 
potential, as they neglect important dimensions (and spatialites) of modern economy. 
Accordingly, relational approaches also call for policies which, besides the attention to local 
specificities, solicit a substantial distribution of economic resources and dispersion of 
decisional power, as an essential strategy to address the sources of inequalities. 
In the next and last section, it remains to explore in which way this approach necessarily 
leads also to a radically different conception of local governance.  
 
 
1.3.4 Towards an alternative politics of local development 
In the previous section we have examined how relational approaches challenge new 
regionalism in an essential point, namely the idea that the local and global are ontologically 
different and that regions can be characterised as self-contained units. Clearly, imagining 
regions as “perforated entities” of changing composition (Amin 2004, p. 34) also demands that 
we reconsider the new regionalist governance framework. In particular, two main problems 
should be discussed. 
                                                 
9
 Standards are voluntary agreements which establish important production criteria for products, 
services and processes. Within the EU, standards are created by one of three official Standard 
Organisations. Theoretically speaking, the process of standard creation is open to anyone, but given the 
high technical complexity of the matter, it is well known that Standard Organisations are often influenced 
by bigger companies, which have the financial means to afford for experts. If standards are based on 
voluntary agreement, once endorsed by the European Commission, they become binding for all 
producers, outside or inside Europe, who want to sell their products within the Single Market. 
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The first issue concerns the definition of the scale of governance, and particularly the 
sense of the regional level. In sections 1.2.2 and 1.2.4 we have seen that new regionalism 
identifies the region as an essential level of economic co-ordination and, accordingly, assigns 
regional political institutions the task of steering and - to a certain extent - of generating a 
regional governance of economic development; that is, it assigns regional authorities the 
mission of creating a regional institutional system, based on the interconnection between the 
academic and the productive spheres, which is apt to implement new regionalist policy 
models. However, on the grounds of the previously outlined arguments, this stance appears 
doubly problematic.  
On the one hand, it has been observed that networks assume a varying spatial extension 
and, as a consequence, the scalar (and especially regional) definition of socio-economic 
relations cannot be presupposed (Lagendijk 2002). Accordingly, under relational approaches, 
scale “is no more seen as a preordained hierarchical framework for ordering the world, but as 
a contingent outcome of structural forces and practices of human agents” (Gualini 2006, p. 
885). Therefore, the first problem which would need to be theoretically and pragmatically 
addressed regards precisely the potential mismatch between the ever-changing geography of 
network formation and knowledge circulation on one side, and the traditional spatial 
configurations based on nested hierarchies of bounded institutional units on the other side 
(Swyngedouw 2004). Within this perspective, the EU MLG approach is also challenged, given 
the primacy it attributes to the regional institutional dimension. We will come back to this issue 
in the next chapter, but it is important to stress here that, as Gualini (2006, p. 890) has noted, 
the MLG concept bears an evident a semantic baggage deriving from traditional territorial and 
hierarchical spatial conceptions. 
But the prioritisation of regional scale for economic governance is problematic also for 
another set of reasons which concern the limits of political power of regional institutions. First, 
as many authors have remarked, new regionalism tends to downplay excessively the role of 
national level. Indeed, state dimension is found to be still significant for the differentiated 
territorial impact of governments’ (tangible and intangible) investment decisions and national 
budget expenditure (Lovering 1999; Amin et al. 2003); also, national cultures and educative 
systems seem to matter more than regional ones to explain the overall technological and 
industrial specialisation of European Countries (De Bruijn and Lagendijk 2005). Second, as 
we have seen in the previous section, regional economies are significantly affected by 
decisions taken in centres of nodal power; as Amin (2004) has argued, regional institutions 
alone cannot have the capacity (financial, technical, intellectual, etc.) to counterbalance the 
spatial effects produced by some important trans-territorial forces. 
 
The probable mismatch between the spatial configurations of modern economic 
relationality and the traditional institutional set-up, along with the consequent limits of regional 
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policies, is also related to the second major problem of new regionalist governance model, 
which concerns both the very object of regional governance and its methodology.  
We have already observed that relational interpretations deeply question the idea that 
regions can be characterised as homogenous entities. On the one hand it has been stressed 
that regional identities are - like all identities - always discursively constructed, and that, 
consequently, the emergence of a “Europe of regions” narrative responds more to the 
strengthening of some interests than to new spatial-economic imperatives (Paasi 2001; 
Lagendijk 2002). On the other hand, by drawing attention to the topological space generated 
by networks, relational approaches also point at the significance of other kinds of borders, 
besides the territorial ones, for explaining processes of spatial differentiation (Amin 2004). 
Overall, these arguments cast doubts on the possibility that different regional interests can 
be composed in a common regional development plan aiming at boosting innovation, in which 
each actor is supposed to take advantage thanks to his/her being part of a coherent system. 
Accordingly, these arguments also question the appropriateness of consensus-building as 
main governance methodology, warning against the depoliticisation or, worse, 
instrumentalisation of interests which can be hidden behind the consensus imperative (Amin 
2004; Gualini 2006; Swyngedouw 2004); as Pike (2004, p. 2157) has observed in an analysis 
of new regionalist policy strategies in the UK, this imperative can lead to a: 
“`hermetically sealed' policy universe [which] risks foreclosing debate, ignoring dissent, 
and marginalising discussion of alternatives concerning the fundamental questions of 
what kind of economic development is desired and for whom. Such value-laden questions 
are inherently conflictual and may require not more technocratic sophistry but a renewed, 
democratised, and potentially progressive politics of economic development.” 
Therefore, relational approaches call also for a radically different interpretation of local 
governance, which starts out from conceiving of regions not more as “action units”, but rather 
as “action spaces” (Gualini 2006). In this sense, Amin (2004) argues that the distinctiveness 
of a politics of place “as spatial phenomenon” lies precisely in the fact that it concerns a space 
where heterogeneous worlds overlap, thus generating different - and often conflicting - 
experiences and practices of the “same proximate turf”. As a consequence, a relationally 
interpreted local governance should primarily recognise the “immanent effects of 
juxtaposition” (Ibid.), that is it should accept the intrinsically pluralistic and always contented 
nature of the local public sphere. 
 
But, given the different spatialities characterising the networks which overlap on the local, 
the pluralistic public sphere which constitutes regions has also to be understood as “spatially 
diffuse and geographically mobile” (Ibid., p. 40). So, on the one hand relational approaches 
refute the ontological significance of the “global”, by pointing at how the economic and political 
forces impacting the local circulate within networks and conduits which are always 
territorialised. On the other hand, they also question the meaning of “local”, by noting how the 
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action which insists and changes places is always necessarily dislocated in time and space 
(Latour 2005). 
In this regard, it should be noted that relational readings of scale and governance differ 
from those advanced by new regionalism, but also from other geographical approaches which 
have investigated processes of state transformation. Studies on state-rescaling emerge in 
particular as one of the most prominent strand in this field. This line of inquiry rests upon a 
consistent body of works which, mainly drawing on marxist-regulationist approaches, identifies 
in a change of the predominant regime of capitalist accumulation the key to interpret the end 
of the centralised nation state, and of a related top-down redistributive-oriented regional policy 
(Trigilia 1991; Jessop 2002; Brenner 2009). More precisely, the political-economic 
transformations accompanying the end of the Fordist-Keynesian welfare state would have 
challenged the role of nation states as arena for socio-economic regulation, pushing them to 
re-articulate their traditional territorial-institutional architecture in two directions: destatalization 
(horizontal/functional delegation of policy-making functions to non-state actors) and 
denationalization (vertical/scalar shift of state authority to sub- and sovra-national bodies). 
Within this perspective, scale (of regulation) becomes thus an object of political struggles 
(Swyngedouw 2004); accordingly, the redefinition of regions as “spaces of competitiveness”, 
as well as the emergence of local development strategies and coalitions are interpreted as a 
spatial response to the increasing globalization pressures, and to the associated retreat of the 
nation state from its regulatory tasks. Such a response would then be often led by local 
business elites which, also by wittingly resorting to localist narratives, pursue a precise neo-
liberal and supply-sided agenda revolving around raise in productivity, tax reductions and 
wages compression (Lovering 1999). 
If, on the one hand, studies on state-rescaling have certainly produced some powerful 
“’big-picture’ generalizations” (Brenner 2009, p. 127), on the other hand this perspective 
seems to subordinate excessively the scope of some programmatic initiatives to global 
capitalist transformations, thus sometimes leaning towards a sort of “functionalist 
determinism” (Keating et al. 2003, p. 3). In other words, this approach has some difficulty in 
recognizing the impact of actors’ and institutions’ strategic behaviour (Keating 2001) and, 
consequently, it would tend to overlook the autonomy and peculiarity of some institution-
building projects (in fact, as Gualini (2004) has observed, state-rescaling literature has in 
general failed to take into account precisely the role played by the European Commission in 
carrying out a grand new-regionalist design). More importantly, by drawing on a territorial 
conception of scale (Jones and MacLeod 2004; Lobao et al. 2009), this strand does not easily 
distinguish new governance practices which, similarly to modern economic and knowledge 
relations, are intrinsically topological and fluid in spatial terms. 
According to Gualini (2006), such new modes of governance would be particularly 
important and widespread in Europe. The trans-territorial approach to project designing and 
interest association, which marks (or, better, represents the condition to access) the EU polity, 
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would actually signal the emergence of a new - “type II” - form of governance. More precisely, 
type II governance would be characterised by an increasing overlapping of policy fields in 
thematic, spatial and jurisdictional (state/non-state actors) terms (Büchs 2009). Consequently, 
what is reworded in this context is actors’ capacity of entering and interlacing different 
domains in a lateral and horizontal fashion. This new environment would thus challenge the 
traditional scalar and territorial ordering of statehood, as new governance arenas involving 
spatially dispersed actors are constantly created around emergent policy issues. However, 
this new mode would also challenge the control and accountability mechanisms which are 
typical of a “territorially based” conception of democracy. 
 
Recapitulating, if locales are perforated by extended networks, and if local governance is 
necessarily stretched along innumerable directions, then the question arises of what ought to 
be the scope of the politics of local development, intended as the whole of institutional 
mechanisms, procedural rule, (accepted) confrontation spaces and issues, which should 
ultimately enable actors who share the same “proximate turf” to decide their development 
trajectory.  
As we have seen in the previous section, according to relational perspectives innovation 
and development policies should concentrate on enhancing connectivity and nodal power. 
This then calls for institutional arrangements which allow the different realms of society where 
knowledge is produced - research laboratories, associations, craft workshops, practitioners’ 
company etc. - to gather and discuss together on specific problems and choices. On the one 
hand, this would be coherent with the contextual nature of knowledge creation in modern 
societies (Gibbons et al.1994). On the other hand - and crucially - this would foster the 
emergence of the diverse economic, cognitive and spatial needs and interests which 
characterise different social groups, so that decisions over resources allocation, rules, etc., 
would be the result of clear political discussions. In other words, from a relational stance, 
institution-building is not about recentralising innovation and industrial policy at regional level 
but, on the contrary, is about finding the socio-institutional practices to make “the invisible 
register of political life visible” (Amin 2004, p. 40).  In terms of methods, this means fostering 
engagement and involvement - rather than consensus - as typical procedural dimensions, in 
order to expand and maximise the opportunities for identifying and discussing alternative 
political choices, as well as the different interests attached to them. 
 
To conclude, in these sections we have seen how, drawing on a diverse and expanded 
spatial conceptualisation, relational approaches reverse the new regionalist logic from the 
roots, suggesting an alternative content to regional development policies based on an 
alternative political approach. In this sense, we have also observed how the two dimensions - 
substantive and procedural - are necessarily and intimately linked.  
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In the next chapter, I will thus build on relational reasoning to formulate the research 
questions which will concern a specific EU programme in the field of regional development. 
However, relational approaches pose also new theoretical and empirical issues as regards 
both the more accurate definition of different “institutional arrangements” and their 
compatibility - or clash - with traditional administrative organisation and institutional practices. 
In this sense, the present empirical inquiry will be also in part dedicated to pinpointing and 
exploring such issues.  
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CHAPTER II: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NEW REGIONALISM AND 
THE COHESION POLICY 
2.1 Introduction 
Several authors have emphasised how, starting from the second half of the 1990s, new 
regionalist approaches have become the reference paradigm for the elaboration of regional 
development policies in many Countries (Lovering 1999; Hudson 1999; De Bruijn and 
Lagendijk 2005; Pellegrin 2007; Painter 2002). Both the substantive propositions (university-
firm relations, cluster building, etc.) and the governance methodology (public-private 
partnership, consensus, etc.) of new regionalism have then been strongly fostered by 
important institutional organisations, such as the OECD (OECD 1998, 2001, 2008). This trend 
has been particularly marked in the European context, where the EU, through the regional 
dimension of its Cohesion Policy (CP), has greatly contributed to disseminating new 
regionalist conceptualisations among European regional policy-makers. 
We have already mentioned in the first chapter (in particular sec. 1.2.4) that there exists a 
mutually reinforcing relation between new regionalism and the EU Regional Policy: on the one 
hand, the adoption by the EU has contributed to actualise new regionalist visions and, on the 
other hand, the EU regional policy has represented - to a certain extent - an experimental field 
for new regionalist policy models. In this chapter we will therefore consider in which way the 
EU has absorbed new regionalist indications and in which sense it has constituted a 
“playground”. 
We can anticipate here that the transposition of theoretical elements in the concrete policy 
has not been - obviously - a linear process. The EU has mediated new regionalist 
perspectives in a way which was functional to the realisation of its MLG framework and, more 
generally, regional policy has been surely influenced by other approaches and political 
imperatives. However, there are clear correspondences as regards to some grounding ideas, 
and such correspondences increase significantly when we consider the content of policy 
strategies fostered by the EU. These parallelisms thus justify the theoretical discussion 
proposed in the previous chapter and allow us to raise specific questions on the basis of the 
critical contentions outlined in the last part. 
The chapter is then organised as follows. In the next section we will see how the EU 
regional policy has derived from new regionalism the main rationales, namely the idea that 
regional competitiveness based on innovation strategies can increase aggregate growth while 
reducing territorial disparities. Subsequently, we will see how regional policy is coherent with - 
and contribute to - the realisation of the wider MLG framework designed by the EU. The third 
part will be dedicated to examining the content of the CP and we will consider in detail a 
specific programme implemented under the CP in the previous programming periods which, 
although limited in terms of budget, has been conceptually meaningful and strategically 
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crucial. In the last part, I will highlight some problematic aspects of the Programme and I will 
define the main research questions. 
 
 
2.2 Rationales of the EU regional policy  
There is general agreement among scholars and policy-makers that the original rationale 
for the establishment of the Cohesion Policy at the end of the 1980s was to counterbalance 
potential “side-effects” generated by the programmes for the completion of the internal market 
and the introduction of a common currency (Amin and Tomaney 1995; Maiarte 2006; Leonardi 
2006). Indeed, during the period which preceded the establishment of the CP, the European 
Commission presented several reports which warned about the concrete risk that the process 
of market integration could have led to a substantial increase in regional disparities across 
Europe (Leonardi 2006; DG Regio 2008). 
In its early formulation in 198810, the Cohesion Policy envisaged essentially two different 
forms and two different causes of territorial disequilibrium. The first form concerned those 
regions characterized with a long-term condition of industrial under-development (the so-
called Objective 1 Regions). These regions were basically located in the geographical 
periphery of Europe (Greece, South Italy, Iberian Peninsula, Ireland, and, later, also the 
former East-Germany); their condition was fundamentally explained in terms of poor 
infrastructural endowment, and, therefore, of marginality and “disconnection” from the 
economic flows connecting the most developed regions. Consequently, Structural Funds in 
these regions were mainly directed to the improvement of infrastructures (in transports, 
energy and telecommunications), and to their connection with the networks of more “central” 
regions. Along with such improvements, the other main area of intervention of SF in “lagging 
behind” regions was providing support to the industrial system, through direct incentives to 
firms. The combination of these two strategies was expected to reduce the “structural” deficits 
hampering the development possibilities of the regions concerned, thus generating a 
convergence trajectory11. 
The second type of problematic area envisaged regarded regions (the so-called Objective 
2 Regions) which were characterised with high rate of employment in mature industrial 
sectors, and which were undergoing severe processes of industrial restructuring. For these 
areas, interventions under SF mainly aimed at supporting industrial modernisation, and at re-
training exceeding workforce. 
 
                                                 
10
 The first formulation of the Cohesion Policy is formally regulated by the Council Regulation (EEC) n. 
2052/889. 
11
 On this regard, article 3 of the 1988 EU’s regulation on structural funds (Reg. (EEC) n. 2052/889) 
clearly stated that the European Regional Development Fund “shall in particular provide support for: (a) 
productive investment; (b) the creation or modernization of infrastructures which contribute to the 
development or conversion of the regions concerned” 
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Starting from the mid-nineties, the European Commission abandons progressively the 
previous analytical framework, to adopt new regionalist perspectives. Indeed during its first 
ten years CP aimed at achieving socio-economic convergence through a reduction of the 
infrastructural deficit and/or industrial reorganisation of less favoured regions in relation to the 
most developed ones. However, with the reform of 1999, the focus shifts to the endogenous 
potential of regions, now singularly considered. Therefore, while keeping the spatial 
categorisation of problematic areas unchanged, the new regulation on Structural Funds (Reg. 
(EC) n. 1260/99) and, especially, the Commission’s Guidelines on the use of Structural Funds 
(CEC 1999), delineate a new model to tackle regional imbalances, which, echoing new 
regionalism accounts, puts explicitly at the centre of its action the nexus between growth, 
innovation and systematic integration at regional level. In this sense, the Guidelines for the 
2000-2006 programming period state that: 
“In general, successful regions will be those that take a strategic approach to innovation 
and offer help to companies to integrate their own resources and expertise with those of 
government agencies, higher and further education, business support organisations and 
other companies for the effective management of new technology, research and 
development, and product and process innovation” (CEC 1999, p. 15). 
The previous quotation reflects quite clearly the new regionalist understanding of the 
sources of local development. More generally, from new regionalism CP derives two essential 
analytical elements. The first concerns the idea that this new framework for regional 
development is a necessary response to the combined effect generated by the pervasiveness 
of globalisation forces and the advent of the knowledge economy: 
Globalisation is resulting in stiffer competition on account of the greater integration of 
markets […] The transition to a knowledge-based economy and the promotion of the use 
of new technologies in regional economies as a whole are, therefore, becoming priorities” 
(CEC 2001a, p. 2). 
The second element is related to the identification of regional level as “particularly 
appropriate for mobilising a critical mass of partners” (Ibid.), and to the consequent emphasis 
on co-operation and cohesiveness in designing local development strategies12. 
 
In the following - and current - programming period (2007-2013), the new regionalist logic 
of the CP is confirmed and further strengthened. On the one hand, there is a renewed stress 
on the “growth of the knowledge economy by research and innovation capacities” (Council 
Decision 2006/702, p. 14), which becomes the second priority axe of intervention under 
Structural Funds (see sec. 2.4.1 for a detailed analysis of this approach). On this regard, it is 
interesting to observe how the nature of the expenditure supported by the Structural Funds 
has progressively shifted from “hard” to “soft” infrastructures. Indeed, while in the first two 
                                                 
12
 In a Communication, titled The regional dimension of the European Research Area, the Commission 
states that: “local action should start from […] the definition of common strategic objectives. All local 
players should be integrated in the regional strategy, including the regional authorities, the private 
sector, academic and RTD institutions, social partners and the civil society” (CEC 2001b, p. 9). 
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programming periods (1988-1993; 1994-1999), one-third of the total funds was directed to 
financing transport infrastructures, this share has currently decreased to approximately one-
fifth (DG Regio 2008). Conversely, the expenditure for the improvement of R&D capacity and 
the creation of technology-transfer centres has increased from a 4% in average in the first 
programming period, to approximately one-fourth of the total budget in the last generation 
(Pellegrin 2007; Technopolis 2006).  
On the other hand, the idea of “cohesion through competition” is given full recognition. This 
represents a crucial aspect, and it may explain - at least in part - the convinced adoption of 
new regionalist conceptualisation by the EU. Indeed, in the previous chapter (sec. 1.2.3) we 
have seen that new regionalism promises to reconcile the imperatives of competitiveness and 
equity, thus attaining a greater wealth for all. The aspiration for achieving such a “perfect” 
coupling has been clearly expressed by the European Commission in the following terms: 
“the regional dimension is essential to improving European competitiveness and 
innovation. The Commission’s proposed new cohesion policy addresses persistent 
regional disparities in these fields by making competitiveness and innovation an explicit 
and central basis for Structural Fund intervention” (CEC 2005, p. 10; emphasis added). 
Recapitulating, as Pellegrin (2007, p. 208) has noted, the latest generations of CP have 
witnessed a progressive re-centring: the targets remain equity and efficiency “but in the 
context of a shift of the policy focus from redistribution to competitiveness” (Ibid., p. 208). This 
vision has been confirmed also by a European Commission’s officer in a recent article, in 
which he maintains that CP cannot be only a redistributive mechanism, but has to perform an 
allocative function as well, since “a transfer of financial resources from the richest to the 
poorer regions would lead to a loss of output at the EU level, since the latter are less 
productive than the more prosperous ones and have lower returns on investment” (Maiarte 
2006, p. 171). 
 
In terms of the broad architecture of the CP, this shift has entailed an important spatial 
consequence. In the new programming period, the former “Objective 2” has been in fact 
substituted with the new Regional Competitiveness and Employment Objective, which covers 
all the EU regions with an average GDP per person above the 75% of the EU average. That 
means all EU regions not covered by the Convergence Objective (former Objective 1, which 
has kept the same identification criteria). Although the access of wealthier regions to funds 
under the new Objective 2 is modulated according to their socio-economic condition, this 
“spatial expansion” of the CP coverage reflects the swing from a relative definition of territorial 
disequilibrium, to an absolute one based on the competitive potential of regions. In other 
words, since all the regions have to compete in the international environment, there is no 
more a determinant reason to limit the contribution of SF to less developed areas. As the 
former Commissioner for Regional Policy, Ms Danuta Huebner, has clearly claimed in her 
forward to the Fifth Progress Report on Social and Economic Cohesion: 
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 “European Cohesion Policy supports key investment, particularly in R&D and innovation, 
in the most developed regions of the Union, which face their own competitive challenges 
in global markets. Although these regions invest three times as high a share of GDP in 
R&D as the less developed regions do, they continue to lag behind their world 
competitors in terms of both public and private R&D expenditure” (CEC 2008, p. 3). 
 
In conclusion of this analysis of the CP rationales, a quick reference to the current debate 
on the future of the Policy - and in particular to the positions put forward by the Barca Report 
(see note n. 2) - might be opportune. In this regard, it must be observed that the Report 
questions in part the idea that a greater cohesion can be achieved through enhanced 
competition; indeed, it claims for a clear distinction between efficiency and social inclusions 
objectives, as they might clash with each other and, in any case, they require different kinds of 
interventions. Also, the Report pays a greater attention to the role that functional and 
economic “interdependencies” between places play in determining situations of uneven 
development. However, the “placed-based policy” approach fostered by the Report fully 
remains within an endogenous and self-contained conception of development13 (see also sec. 
2.2 and 2.4.3). Consequently, it reaffirms that the main raison d'être CP cannot be 
redistribution, but rather unlocking the potential of regions through a more efficient use of local 
resources. In this light, it also supports the present approach as regards the distribution of 
funds to wealthier regions, on the grounds that these regions might encounter inefficiency and 
social inclusion problems too. So, although the political discussion at EU level on the future of 
the CP is still in progress (no official document on this matter has been issued by the 
Commission yet), we can hardly expect a substantial departure from the essential elements 
which characterise the current model.  
   
To sum up, in this section I have tried to make clear how the CP has derived from new 
regionalist perspectives the spatial framework and the rationales for a regional policy centred 
on innovation and competitiveness. In section 2.4 we will consider which concrete policy 
actions are supported by this scheme (i.e. what kind of “soft measures” are fostered). But 
before that, we will examine how the regional dimension of the CP is entangled with the MLG 
framework designed by the European Commission.  
 
 
                                                 
13
 In the Report’s words: ““A place-based policy is a long-term strategy aimed at tackling persistent 
underutilisation of potential and reducing persistent social exclusion in specific places through external 
interventions and multilevel governance. It promotes the supply of integrated goods and services tailored 
to contexts, and it triggers institutional changes” (Barca 2009, p. vii). 
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2.3 The EU regional policy in the framework of the EU Multi-Level Governance 
In this section we will analyse how the EU regional policy is framed within a wider 
discourse on European governance (next subsection), and which institutional mechanisms 
regulate the formulation and delivery of regional development strategies under the umbrella of 
the Structural Funds. 
This analysis is important for two reasons: firstly, it helps to understand the wider political 
perspective in which EU regional policy is located; secondly, it makes clearer which politics of 
local development is concretely fostered through the EU regional policy. 
 
 
2.3.1 Framing the EU regional policy in the European discourse over governance 
The European “doctrine” on governance has been formulated by the European 
Commission in an White Paper adopted in 2001 (CEC 2001c). 
The White Paper was intended to respond to a growing number of critiques questioning the 
degree of democracy and transparency of the European political process. If on the one hand 
the White Paper constantly draws attention on Member States’ responsibility in creating the 
perceived “democratic deficit”, on the other hand it also recognises that there is a “lack of 
clarity” about many aspects, especially as regards the weight of particular interest groups and 
the role of experts14. 
As a consequence, the White Paper envisages a series of interventions to open up “the 
policy-making process to get more people and organisations involved in shaping and 
delivering EU policy” (Ibid., p. 4). In this perspective, different institutional reforms are 
proposed in order to widen the spaces of participation both to local political actors, and to the 
civil society. This latter is identified both in its traditional manifestations (trade unions and 
employers’ organisations, professional associations, etc.) but also - and interestingly - in new 
forms of aggregations organised around networks, communities, etc.  
In general, the proposed reforms are meant to satisfy “five principles of good governance”: 
openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence. These principles are 
then supposed to “reinforce those of proportionality and subsidiarity”, thus contributing all 
together to increase the degree of inclusiveness of policy-making and, consequently, its 
effectiveness (Ibid., p. 5). 
Within this framework, a greater involvement of regional levels of government in the 
European policy-making is indicated as a key condition to realise the outlined governance 
model, and some policies - in particular CP and Agricultural Policy - are identified as the main 
device through which forcing national governments to leave a wider space of manoeuvre to 
                                                 
14
 In this regard, the White Paper clearly states that: “Public perceptions are not helped by the opacity of 
the Union’s system of expert committees or the lack of information about how they work. It is often 
unclear who is actually deciding - experts or those with political authority” (Ibid., p. 19). 
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sub-national institutional layers. In addition to this, the Commission assigns local governments 
the role of primary interface with citizens for the translation of EU policy15. In other words, the 
Commission seems to find in local governments a (co-interested) partner for a strategy aiming 
at achieving political legitimacy vis-à-vis national governments and public opinion.  
In this perspective, MLG becomes both an operative concept and a playfield in which to 
discuss the re-articulation - and re-distribution - of political functions and powers in Europe; 
the White Paper thus concludes stating that:  
“The White Paper has highlighted a tangible Europe […] based on multi-level governance 
in which each actor contributes in line with his or her capabilities or knowledge to the 
success of the overall exercise. In a multi-level system the real challenge is establishing 
clear rules for how competence is shared – not separated” (Ibid., p. 34). 
 
However, apart from the previous quotation, the White Paper does not discuss further the 
sense of the MLG system. Indeed, while representing mainly the Commission’s view, the 
While Paper also constitutes a “synthesis document” which collects and mediates the bulk of 
opinions arrived from a plurality of stake-holders during the consultation which preceded the 
publication of the document. Therefore, in order to better understand the Commission’s 
position on the MLG system, it is worth considering two thematic “reports” annexed to the 
White Paper, which deal in particular with the issues of multilevel-governance (4c), and of 
decentralisation (3b)16. 
The report on multi-level governance is probably the most interesting, not least because it 
recognises that there are critical aspects in the emerging MLG system. 
Firstly, the report admits that there is no clear definition or common interpretation of the 
principle of subsidiarity17, and that, consequently, “the debate on multi-level governance is 
becoming difficult and skewed in the sense that the participants choose the interpretation of 
subsidiarity which favours them, often leading to a dialogue of the deaf” (CEC 2001c -4c, p. 
5). 
                                                 
15
 In the words of the White Paper: “regions and cities often feel that, in spite of their increased 
responsibility for implementing EU policies, their role as an elected and representative channel 
interacting with the public on EU policy is not exploited” (Ibid., p. 12). 
16
 The alpha-numeric codes identify the working groups which elaborated the report. The working groups 
included exclusively Commission’s staff. Their complete titles of the two reports are: Multi-Level 
Governance: linking and networking the various regional and local levels (4c), and Decentralisation - 
Better involvement of national, regional and local actors (3b). 
17
 The principles of subsidiarity and proportionality are recognised and defined in the Treaties 
establishing the EU and the EC since the Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997. The article 5 of the new Treaty 
of Lisbon defines the two principles in the following terms: “Union competence is governed by the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality […] Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not 
fall within its exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if and insofar as the objectives of the 
proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at 
regional level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better 
achieved at Union level. […] Under the principle of proportionality, the content and form of Union action 
shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties”. 
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Secondly, it acknowledges that, in some circumstances, the move towards regional 
development can lead to a “decentralised competition” between local authorities which can act 
“counter to the general interest in matters of area development” (Ibid., p. 24). 
Thirdly and echoing similar claims advanced by several scholars (Amin and Tomaney 
1995; Héraud 2003), the report draws attention on the potential territorial impact of many EU 
sectoral policies. More precisely, also adopting conceptualisations coming from the European 
Spatial Development Perspective18, the report stresses that many “effectiveness criteria” 
included in some EU policies (such as Transport or Technology) may work to the advantage 
of regions that “are already well developed” (a problem recently recognised also in Barca 
Report). Significantly, it concludes on this point stating that “it would therefore be wrong to 
think that new rules on the distribution of powers between different levels of government 
would suffice for Community policies to stop having a territorial impact across the EU” (Ibid., 
p. 48). 
In general, the report frames these problematic aspects within a wider theoretical 
background which recognises the increasing institutional complexity generated by the twin 
processes of regionalisation and European integration. Resonating somehow with scholarly 
works on this issue (see sections 1.2.3 and 2.4.3), the report finds the outcome of these 
trends is that “all public action is now conceived and implemented in the context of 
polycentric, highly complex networks of actors that are characterised by considerable 
interorganisational dependency” (Ibid., p. 20). Moreover, it is noted that these networks - 
constituted by public institutions but also private actors and new interest groups - are 
mobilising and articulating themselves according to patterns which are not referable to the 
traditional and hierarchical institutional set-ups, and which are crossing European territory in a 
topological fashion. Consequently, the report rightly identifies the definition of new 
mechanisms to coordinate multiple networks and dispersed policy-making processes as the 
major question to be addressed. 
                                                 
18
 The European Spatial Development Perspective was meant to be a sort of master document for the 
elaboration of spatial policies in Europe. Elaborated by the European Commission and endorsed by an 
ad hoc Council of Ministers responsible for spatial planning in 1999 (CEC 1999b), the ESPD focuses 
primarily on the spatial impact - in terms of concentration - produced by the EU sectoral policies. 
Accordingly, the ESPD calls for a new approach to policy-making, in which spatial considerations and 
evaluations are fully integrated in the policy-design process. In this sense, ESPD does not propose a 
new policy, but rather it puts forward a new method which integrates the objectives of the CP. ESPD is 
particularly interesting as it lays down quite a different interpretation of the spatial dimension of 
economic inequalities, compared to the one advanced in the regional policy. Indeed, it starts from a 
recognition of the interdependent and relational nature of spatial disequilibria (between cities and rural 
areas, between bigger cities and small cities, between central and peripheral areas). Also, it points at the 
relevance of accessibility to mobility infrastructures and knowledge sources as a central dimension of 
spatial inequalities. Consequently, it claims the necessity that “spatially effective policy decisions and 
investments […] should therefore be oriented towards a polycentric development model” (Ibid., p. 21). 
The stress is thus very much on dispersion and integration, rather than on endogenous potentialities. 
However, indications expressed in the ESPD have not found a political follow-up afterwards; as the 
recent Green Paper on Cohesion recognises, “the debate, however, has not progressed as far as it 
might have until recently” (CEC 2008b, p. 11). Better, it could be argued that recent versions of the 
regional policy have adopted a reversed logic, insofar as the problem of the spatial impact of sectoral 
policies is resolved by stating that the mobilisation of endogenous potential will enable less favoured 
regions to take part in other polices. 
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Recapitulating, the report offers a lucid and sound analysis of the main dimensions and 
challenges entailed by the emergence of a new governance model in Europe; what appears 
less clear and readily-acceptable are some solutions proposed and the assumptions 
underlying them (which reflect analogous considerations proposed in the other report on 
decentralisation). In fact, despite the accent on the complexity and multi-dimensional nature of 
networking, the report tends to give quite a limited definition of MLG, restricting its possible 
articulation to three levels: “infranational, national and Community” (Ibid., p. 18), and 
circumscribing its scope mainly to institutional entities. 
Also, the report seems too hasty in assuming that a greater physical proximity of decisional 
centres to citizens corresponds automatically to a greater political accountability and 
democracy19. Similarly, and accordingly, it takes for granted that sub-regional networking and 
co-operation are already effective and inclusive practices in most European regions, 
especially as regards the delivery of the EU regional policy20. Finally, and echoing new 
regionalist approaches, partnerships at regional level are unproblematically identified as the 
most appropriate procedure to design development strategies21.  
Within this framework, the EU regional policy and its institutional arrangements are then 
indicated both as the model which better “responds to increasing demands on public policies, 
from both sub-state-level public players and civil society” (Ibid., p. 6), and as “the best 
example of how subsidiarity should be applied in practice, [… since] not only [it] allows a 
dialogue between the state and the regions but also enables the European interest to be 
incorporated at the local level (Ibid. p 18, emphasis added). Consequently, both reports 
suggest using the method of “tripartite partnership between the regional and national 
authorities and the European Commission”, which characterises the EU regional policy, as a 
basis for the full realisation of MLG, expanding this mechanism to other EU policy fields. 
 
In the next section we will consider how this method works. But, at the end of this analysis, 
it has to be stressed how the assumptions on the link between proximity and democracy, on 
the role of infra-regional partnerships, and on the consequent subsumption or assimilation of 
regional governance with regional authorities are deeply problematic22. In section 2.4.3, and 
                                                 
19
 The reports states in this regard that: “the growing numbers of elected leaders at regional and local 
level offer a source of democratic legitimacy” (Ibid., p. 1) 
20
 “Networking at infra-regional level seems to function well” (Ibid., p. 17) 
21
 In the report’s words: “networking and the development of partnership at intra-regional level (between 
regional and local public authorities and socio-economic players) are perceived by all as a now essential 
precondition for the formulation of territorial development strategies” (Ibid., p. 17). 
22
 As we have noted in section 1.2.4, the Barca Report stresses the importance of founding the 
elaboration of the CP priorities on a high level political debate. According to the Report, this represents 
indeed the essential condition to increase effectiveness and relevance of the Policy. However, the forms 
that such a debate should concretely take are then discussed mainly in terms of institutional balances 
between EU bodies, thus disregarding the problem of the participation of other non-institutional actors, 
especially at local level. More generally, the Barca Report chimes with the White Paper as for the 
assumption that local institutions are the most appropriate and legitimate to design local development 
policies. However, the report then makes out an interesting contradiction when it justifies the claim for a 
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more in-depth in the next chapter, we will see how these assumptions are empirically 
challenged precisely in the field of regional policy. 
 
 
2.3.2 Institutional mechanisms regulating the formulation and implementation of EU 
regional policy 
In this section we will briefly examine the working mechanism of the Structural Funds for 
the current programming period (2007-2013), as defined by the Reg. 1083/2006. This analysis 
is necessary because, as we will see, procedural and substantive dimensions are bound 
together. 
 
The Reg. 1083/2006 defines the modalities through which the three Structural Funds (see 
note n. 3 for a distinction) will contribute to achieve the CP’s objectives23, and the criteria for 
their allocation.  
The first step of the process consists right in the fact that the Regulation does not define 
what the objectives of the CP are; on the contrary, it delegates to the European Commission 
the task of drafting the Strategic Guidelines on cohesion, which delineate “an indicative 
framework for the intervention of the Funds” (art. 25). On the other hand, the Regulation 
specifies that the Guidelines should be broadly based on the Community Strategy for Growth 
and Jobs24 and, in this regard, it provides rather strictly that “Commission and the Member 
States shall ensure that 60 % of expenditure for the Convergence objective and 75 % of 
expenditure for the Regional competitiveness and employment objective […] is set for the 
abovementioned [of the Strategy] priorities” (art. 9; we will come back to the content of the 
Strategy in next section). 
Once the Guidelines are adopted, the Member States assume the task of drafting a 
national reference framework, which describes how resources from SF shall be used. The 
national framework has to be formulated in collaboration with the Commission, and art. 27 
highlights that its content has to be “consistent with the Community strategic guidelines on 
cohesion”. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Commission’s guiding role in this field with the fact that the EU level is “further removed from the 
pressure of local interest groups which can distort or obstruct the development path pursued” (Barca 
2009, p. ix).  
23
 The term ‘objective’ in the context of the CP can be ambiguous, since it refers to two different 
concepts at the same time. Indeed, in addition to the common meaning of ‘finalities, ‘Objective’ also 
refers to the categorisation of the regime of intervention: “Convergence Objective Regions” (former 
Objective 1); “Competitiveness Objective Regions” (former Ob. 2); “European Territorial Cooperation 
Objective” (former Interreg). In case of ambiguity, we will distinguish the latter meaning by using a capital 
letter. 
24
 The Strategy has been adopted in 2005 and is meant to replace the Lisbon Agenda. We will examine 
its content in the next section. 
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Finally, after the national framework has been approved by the Commission, Member 
States have to submit the operational programmes25 which define the development strategy 
for each of the areas identified as eligible for assistance from SF. Article 35 specifies that 
operational programmes should be drawn up at the “appropriate geographical level”, and “at 
least at NUTS level 2” for Convergence Objective regions, and NUTS 1 or NUTS 2 for 
Competitiveness Objective. In addition to this, article 37 provides that, for each operational 
programme, Member States have to design a managing authority, that is a “national, regional 
or local public authority or a public or private body” which will be responsible for managing 
and implementing the operational programme. Moreover, the Regulation requires that 
Member States organise - during the formulation process - partnerships with authorities and 
bodies such as competent regional, local, and other public authorities, socio-economic 
partners, NGOs, etc. (art. 11). Also, although it does not specify which authority should draft 
the programme materially, the Regulation suggests that “programming […] should be carried 
out at the level of the operational programmes” (that is at regional level); de facto, in the 
majority of Member States (and especially in those with a federal or regional structure), 
operational programmes are elaborated by regional governments which also represent, in 
most cases, the managing authorities26. Last, and importantly, the Commission has reserved 
the right to ask for changes, or even for a complete revision, if the operational programme is 
considered not consistent with Guidelines’ priorities27 (and it seems that the Commission has 
exercised this right more than once, according to what Cooke et al. 2000 have reported). 
 
A last important element to understand the mechanics of the CP concerns the principle of 
“additionality” (art. 15), which aims at increasing the “multiplier effect” generated by SF, and 
which influences significantly the level of resources allocated to each Country. In fact, while 
the identification of eligible areas is based on automatic criteria for Convergence Objective 
regions and on proposal from Member States for Competitiveness Objective, the amount of 
resources allocated is matter of negotiation between the Commission on one side, and 
national and regional governments on the other side. During this process, the principle of 
additionality intervenes in two ways. Firstly, it enables the Commission to modulate its 
contribution both on the basis of the respective amount of resources provided by national and 
regional governments, and of the degree of consistency of national frameworks and 
operational programmes with the Guidelines. Secondly, the amount of resources is also linked 
                                                 
25
 Art. 2 defines the operational programmes as a “document submitted by a Member State and adopted 
by the Commission setting out a development strategy with a coherent set of priorities to be carried out 
with the aid of a Fund, or, in the case of the Convergence objective, with the aid of the Cohesion Fund 
and the ERDF”. 
26
 This can be easily checked, by scrolling down the list of managing authorities on the Commission’s 
webpage: http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/manage/authority/authority_en.cfm. 
27
 The article 32 clearly states that: “where the Commission, within two months following the receipt of 
the operational programme, considers that an operational programme does not contribute to the 
achievement of the objectives of the national strategic reference framework and the Community strategic 
guidelines on cohesion, it may invite the Member State to provide all necessary additional information 
and, where appropriate, to revise the proposed programme according”. 
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to the “absorption capacity” demonstrated by managing authorities in the previous 
programming period28. As we will see in the next chapter, this principle has a significant 
impact on the very politics of local development. 
 
To sum up, the institutional system designed by the CP seems to assign an important role 
to the regional level of government which, especially in countries with a federal or regional 
system, has the possibility to carry out its strategy and to interface directly with the 
Commission (Leonardi 2006). On the other hand, within this framework the Commission 
keeps a substantial capacity to influence the directions of regional and national strategies, to 
make them coherent with its priorities. In particular, this capacity is assured both through the 
“stick” of article 32, and through the “carrot” of additionality. In the next section we will thus 
analyse such priorities. 
 
 
2.4 New regionalism and the content of EU regional policy: main elements and 
critical aspects 
In section 2.2 we have seen how the EU regional policy has derived from new regionalism 
the grounding theoretical elements of its approach, namely: the logical association between 
innovation, competitiveness and growth; the idea that territory is the source of competitive 
advantages for firms, and region is the essential level for economic coordination; the 
prescriptive conclusion that regions, like firms, compete in the international arena to secure 
their development. In section 2.3 we have then examined the role played by this policy in the 
wider framework of the Commission’s strategy on governance. We have also observed that 
this strategy is functional to reinforce both the role of regional governments as new economic-
political units, and the position of the Commission in orienting development priorities in 
Europe. In this sense, Cooke et al. (2000, p. 9) can argue that regions should have stronger 
links with the EU than with national level in innovation policies, “because consensus has built 
up in many regions that the kind of judicious support provided by the EU through regional 
policies and regional innovation experiments is well-attuned to regional capabilities”. 
In the following subsections, we will thus consider which “regional capabilities” are 
addressed by the regional policy; in other words, we will examine how the Commission’s 
priorities are translated in concrete operational content. We will see how, once again, the 
Commission has derived from new regionalism, and especially the Regional Innovation 
System model, two main features: the emphasis on localised innovation networks, and the 
importance attributed to a sound governance configuration at regional level. This last element 
in particular has represented the rationale for a specific programme, implemented during the 
                                                 
28
 The regulation specifies that “as a general rule, the level of the expenditure […] shall be at least equal 
to the amount of average annual expenditure in real terms attained during the previous programming 
period” 
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previous programming period (but introduced again with some changes in the current and 
earlier periods), which has acquired a strategic importance in the overall Commission’s 
approach. In the last section we will try to show how this programme and, more in general, the 
Commission’s approach, are based on some problematic assumptions and raise specific 
policy dilemmas. 
 
 
2.4.1 The RIS approach and the policy toolbox of the CP 
In the previous section we have seen that the Regulation on SF for the current 
programming period indicates the Growth and Jobs strategy as the basis for elaborating the 
Guidelines, and requires that a consistent amount of European resources is specifically used 
to meet its priorities. 
As already mentioned, the strategy was adopted in 2005 (CEC 2005) and is meant to 
renew the Lisbon Agenda. While some of the excessively ambitious objectives of the latter are 
scaled down, the new strategy fully conserves the underlying logic. As regards the regional 
policy in particular29, the strategy reaffirms two essential principles: the idea that equity and 
efficiency can be conjugated in a competitiveness perspective, and the related emphasis on 
R&D and regional systemic integration as highroads to “improve knowledge and innovation for 
growth” .  
Therefore, drawing on the Growth and Jobs strategy’s indications, the Guidelines explicitly 
recommend that “financial effort in support of these fields of action [knowledge, research and 
innovation, and human capital] should be significantly increased” (Council Decision 2006/702, 
p. 14). Moving from this leading provision, the Guidelines then identify in promoting localised 
innovation networks the key intervention scheme. This approach is based on the assumption 
that “the specific nature of RTD […] requires close interaction between the players […]. 
Geographical proximity through the existence of clusters of SMEs and innovation poles 
around public research institutions, for instance, can play a key role” (Council Decision 
2006/702, p.19, emphasis added). Accordingly, the primary task for local public authorities 
becomes to “ensure that research institutions, the private sector and the public sector exploit 
to the full the potential synergies between them” (Ibid., p. 20). 
Overall, this policy model is expected to improve the effectiveness of regional innovation 
systems and to boost entrepreneurial dynamism, thus seizing the regional potential for 
growth. But in addiction to this - and reversing the ESPD perspective (see note n. 18) - this 
                                                 
29
 In broader terms, the new strategy identifies three main priorities: “making Europe a more attractive 
place to invest and work; knowledge and innovation for growth; creating more and better jobs” (Ibid., p. 
15). While the first and the last priorities revolve around, respectively, the necessity of adopting a more 
favourable legislation for business, and the recommended reforms with regard to welfare system 
(pensions) and labour market (mobility), the second priority concerns directly the regional and the 
industrial policy. 
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strategy should also contribute to “raising the research and innovation capacity in the region 
up to a level where it can participate in transnational projects for research” (Ibid., p. 18)30.  
Subsequently, following this approach and responding to Regulation’s provisions, a 
detailed series of “categories of expenditure” is drawn up; the list is intended to constitute the 
reference frame for regional authorities when formulating their operational programmes. The 
expenditure categories are subdivided in “priority themes”, the first being “research and 
technological development (R&TD), innovation and entrepreneurship”, which includes the 
following actions to be financed: 
• R&TD infrastructure and activities in research centres; 
• Technology transfer and improvement of cooperation networks between small and 
medium-sized businesses (SMEs), between these and other businesses and 
universities, regional authorities, research centres and scientific and technological 
poles. 
• Investments in firms directly linked to research and innovation (innovative 
technologies, establishment of new firms by universities, existing R&TD centres 
and firms, etc.). 
 
From the previous exposition it emerges that the indications provided by the Guidelines are 
not just a list of generic priorities, but they are very detailed and specific indeed. 
Also, the correspondence existing between these indications and those advanced by RIS 
and Triple Helix models should be evident (see section 1.2.3). In fact, they both share: 
• the role attributed to spatial proximity in favouring local innovation capacities;  
• the emphasis on bridging public institutions, universities and firms to unlock local 
potential; 
• the consequent prioritisation of technology transfer and commercial exploitation of 
scientific results as the key areas of intervention. 
 
To conclude, it can be argued that the previous framework represents someway the “policy 
toolbox” of the CP; a toolbox derived to a significant extent from the RIS and Triple Helix 
models. However, following the arguments proposed by these models, the translation of the 
policy tools into effective measures at regional level is dependent upon the presence of sound 
                                                 
30
 The Growth and Job strategy will be soon replaced by the new Europe 2020 Strategy (CEC 2010). 
From a thematic point of view, the new strategy does not break away significantly from past approach: 
the stress is again very much on innovation, although enriched with a greater attention to the theme of 
climate change and the “green economy”. More substantial changes can be instead identified in the 
overall governance, as EU institutions should gain greater intervention powers vis-à-vis national 
governments as regards implementation of the strategy.  
The Commission’s Communication on Europe2020 does not specify how the new strategy will impact 
the Cohesion Policy, but it is certain that, as for the Growth and Job strategy, Structural Funds should be 
mainly directed to achieve the strategy objectives. Anyway, the Barca Report also fosters innovation as 
first and foremost priority for the next Cohesion Policy; however, differently from the EU2020, the Report 
pays a greater attention to issues of social inclusion (including the theme of migration, which conversely 
does not appear in the EU2020 communication).  
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governance configurations. In other words, systemic strategies cannot be applied in a top-
down manner, but they should be the result of endogenous and autonomous processes. 
This clearly poses a policy dilemma, that the Commission has tried to tackle through a 
series of measures which have been explicitly aimed at inducing the “soft” institutional and 
cultural change required for enhancing the regional absorptive capacity for SF. These 
measures will be the focus of next sections. 
 
 
2.4.2 Objectives, mechanisms and criticalities of the Innovative Actions Programme 
At the beginning of this work we have observed that the EU regional policy has also 
represented - to a certain extent - the experimentation field for new regionalist policy models, 
and in particular for the RIS approach. This is certainly the case of those programmes - such 
as the Innovative Actions31 scheme (IA) - which, under the umbrella of Structural Funds, 
aimed at diffusing innovative ideas and methodologies among regional policy-makers. Indeed, 
authors working on the RIS model have explicitly promoted these policy schemes as the most 
accomplished example of their theorisations; in Cooke et al.’s words (2000, p. 119): “the EU 
regional innovation norm should be that every LFR [Less Favoured Region] receives funding 
for a RIS32 which is implementable using SF. Each implementable RIS must have at its core a 
strong university-industry innovation networking programme”.  
The budget assigned to such programmes through the ERDF has been relatively limited33. 
However, several authors agree in finding that these policy tools have effectively played a 
decisive role for the widespread integration of the new regionalist approach into regional 
development policies (De Bruijn and Lagendijk 2005; Pellegrin 2007; Charles et al. 2000). 
This would be demonstrated - among other things - by the fact that, following the participation 
in these programmes, regional governments and regional agencies have significantly 
increased the budget allocated to innovation-related activities (Socitec 2005). But more 
substantially, according to Cooke et al. (2000, p. 138), “this initiatives have empowered 
regions to develop their own policies, irrespective of their national government’s stance”. 
The strong claim expressed by Cooke et al. points at the strategic role played by such 
programmes in the wider framework of the SF, but also calls for assessing attentively its 
consistency and implications.  
In the following sections and in the next chapter, we will thus focus on the IA programme 
implemented in the previous programming period. The choice has a twofold motivation: i) 
differently from the RIS initiatives, the Commission has not yet proceeded to publish the 
                                                 
31
 The name has varied depending on the different programming periods. It was Regional Innovation 
Strategies (RIS) and Regional Innovation and Technology Transfer Strategies and Infrastructures 
(RITTS) in the programming period 1994-1999; Innovative Actions in the period 2000-2006 and Region 
for Economic Change in the present generation. 
32
 RIS is the equivalent for IA in the 1994-1999 programming period. See previous note. 
33
 Around 0,4% of the ERDF’s budget for the programming period 2000-2006. 
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evaluation reports for this programme; ii) regional programmes funded under the Region for 
Economic Change are still “in progress”, and thus not assessable.  
Hereafter, we will first examine content and operational mechanisms of the IA programme, 
and we will then analyse its rationales. 
 
 
2.4.2.1 Content and operational mechanisms of the Innovative Actions programme 
During the seven years implementation period, 144 EU-15 regions (out of the eligible 156) 
participated in the IA programme. On the whole, 173 regional proposals of innovative actions 
were approved, with a total contribution from the EU - through the ERDF - of 416 millions 
Euros.  
The legal base of the programme is provided by Article 22 of the Regulation on the 
Structural Funds for the previous programming period (Council Regulation 1260/1999), which 
states that “[the ERDF] may finance innovative actions [… which] contribute to the preparation 
of innovative methods and practices designed to improve the quality of assistance under 
Objectives 1, 2 and 3”. 
The objective of the Programme is further specified in the related Guidelines (CEC 2001a). 
The Guidelines define Innovative Actions as a “laboratory” in which lagging behind regions are 
offered the opportunity to experiment with “more sophisticated” ideas and “more adventurous” 
policy practices in “future-oriented fields”; through this experimentation, less favoured regions 
are then expected to become more prepared to grasp “the opportunities offered by the new 
economy for catching up swiftly” (Ibid., p. 2). 
 
In order to benefit from the EU support, the “competent regional authorities” have to submit 
a programme proposal of innovative actions, following an annual “call for projects” published 
by the European Commission. In this regard, the difference with the institutional mechanism 
regulating the broader use of Structural Funds has to be noted: in fact, differing from the latter, 
the implementation of the IA programme involves an exclusive relation between the 
Commission and regional authorities; the national level is therefore excluded. 
 If the regional proposal is approved, the Programme then co-finances three types of 
activity: 
• regional programmes of innovative actions and the pilot projects deriving from them; 
• accompanying measures: support for exchange of experiences and the creation of 
interregional networks; 
• organisation of competitions aimed at identifying and developing best practices. 
The first type of activity responds to the broad “experimentation” objective above 
mentioned. More precisely, the idea is that, once defined the objectives of their regional 
innovative strategy, regional authorities use part of the EU financial support to finance in their 
turn a call for projects, addressed to regional public and private entities. This should represent 
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the real “laboratory phase” of the programme, in which new ideas and approaches are 
expected to emerge. 
The other two types of activities are meant to fulfil a second, more “functional” objective: 
the mainstreaming of best practices emerged from the experimentation phase both at the EU 
level (in the CP), and at regional level (in the operational programmes). In the Commission’s 
view, these latter activities represent the “transmission mechanism” through which the new 
ideas about innovation can be effectively spread in the daily policy-making at regional level. 
 
As for the content of regional programmes, on the one hand regional authorities are 
demanded to base their strategies “on an analysis of regional needs” (CEC 2006, p. 9); on the 
other hand, the domains in which regional authorities can formulate their proposals are 
restricted to three precise “strategic themes”: 
• regional economies based on knowledge and technological innovation; 
• e-Europe: the information society at the service of regional development; 
• regional identity and sustainable development. 
In view of the regional programme that we will examine in the next chapter, it is worth 
considering in greater detail the Commission’s approach to the first strategic theme. 
According to the Guidelines, the main source of territorial imbalances lies in the technology 
gap that divides advanced from less-developed regions. Consequently, the latter should be 
helped to “develop competitive assets based on innovation” (Ibid., p. 6). That means that 
regions should try to “establish co-operation between the public sector and the bodies 
responsible for RTDI and businesses, with a view to creating efficient regional innovation 
systems” (Ibid., p. 7). Accordingly, the content of regional programmes under this strategic 
theme is expected to cover the following aspects: 
• “creation or reinforcement of co-operation networks between firms or groups of firms, 
research centres and universities, […] financial institutions and specialist consultants, 
etc. […]; 
• dissemination of research results and technological adaptation within SMEs; […] 
• support for incubators for new enterprises which have links with universities and 
research centres; encouragement for spin-offs from university centres or large 
companies […]; 
• schemes for assisting science and technology projects carried out jointly by SMEs, 
universities and research centres” (Ibid., p. 7). 
 
A further provision concerns the formulation procedure. In fact, regional authorities are 
demanded to set up a Steering Committee, “which draws up the proposal for a regional 
programme of innovative actions in the context of a regional partnership” (Ibid., p. 10). 
Accordingly, one of the evaluation criteria of the regional programmes regards the 
“commitment and quality of the regional public-private partnership”, which has drafted the 
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programme. However, the Guidelines remain quite vague about the nature and the extent of 
the partnership; indeed, they call generically for the participation in the Committee of “public 
and private actors involved at regional level” (Ibid.). On the contrary, the Guidelines are 
decidedly detailed in prescribing that the Committee has to include all the regional authorities 
responsible for programmes under Objective 1 or 2. That responds clearly to the primary 
Commission’s interest, which is to spread innovation-related concepts among regional policy-
makers; that also explains why as many as three evaluation criteria (out of a total of ten) 
regard specifically the potential impact and influence of the innovative action on the other 
regional programmes funded under the ERDF. 
 
To conclude, it can be easily observed how the programme’s structure widely reflects the 
RIS model with regard to both substantive and procedural dimensions. In particular, and 
compared to the Guidelines for SF, there is perhaps even a stronger emphasis on technology 
transfer and university-firms links.  
At the beginning of this section we have seen that the main objective of the IA programme 
is to allow less favoured regions to experiment with innovative policy tools; in the following 
section we will analyse in depth the logic underpinning this objective. 
 
 
2.4.2.2 Rationales of the IA programme 
The main rationale for the IA programme can be identified in the following passage, 
coming from a recent Commission’s Communication on the programme, which takes stock of 
previous experiences: 
The most advanced regions have the analytical capacities to identify priority sectors on 
which to focus attention, in general those which are most dynamic and have strongest 
potential […]. In contrast[ …] the mobilisation of actors is much more difficult to organise 
in less developed regions, due to a lack of experience and expertise, as well as a lack of 
understanding of the mechanisms of innovation” (CEC 2006, p. 3, emphasis added). 
Therefore, from this standpoint, IA initiatives are important because they can help less 
favoured regions, which “still lean towards reducing development gaps in areas such as 
physical infrastructure” (CEC 2001, p. 6), to “better incorporate the intangibles” connected 
with the advent of the knowledge economy. 
This conceptualisation is significant, as it discloses the grounding principle of the overall 
approach carried out by the Commission, namely the idea that there is an “endogenous 
explanation” for the causes of territorial imbalances. In other words, according to this 
perspective less favoured regions are so because of an internal institutional failure which, in 
turn, is to trace back to a cultural gap (a crucial assumption which is confirmed also in the 
recent Barca Report, see sec. 2.2 and 2.3.4). Clearly, this idea is complementary to how new 
regionalism interprets the causes of territorial development; in fact, as Oughton et al. (2002, p. 
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104, emphasis added) have observed, “Regional Innovation Strategies (RIS) programme […] 
relies on the principle of helping regions to help themselves through initiatives designed to 
mobilise local knowledge”. 
In this sense, the primary purpose of the RIS/IA34 programme becomes tackling with what 
has been called the “regional innovation paradox”, that is, the fact that regions needing to 
spend more in innovation are at the same time those less able to absorb funds earmarked for 
this finality. In an osmotic relation with the Commission’s officials, theoreticians working on the 
Regional Innovation System approach argue that the cause of such a paradox does not lie in 
scarcity of public funds, but rather in the regional institutional characteristics: 
“In particular firms in lagging regions often articulate little demand for R&D and other 
innovation inputs and tend to lack a tradition of cooperation and trust both amongst 
themselves or with regional innovation actors, such as universities. […]. Given low levels 
of investment in innovation inputs and the complementarity between private and public 
expenditure on innovation activities such as R&D, absorption of public funds earmarked 
for R&D and innovation activity will also be low.[…] The policy conclusion […] is that what 
is required is institutional change” (Ibid., p. 103, emphasis added). 
Recapitulating, over years the CP has progressively shifted from a redistributive/relative 
interpretation of the causes of territorial imbalances, to a competitive/endogenous definition. 
In parallel, Structural Funds have passed from supporting investments in infrastructures to 
financing “soft measures” according to a systemic approach (Cooke et al. 2000). However, in 
order that the new approach is reproduced also in LFR and that the “overall innovation 
capability of the EU economy can be raised” (Ibid., p. 155), these regions have to display a 
suitable governance configuration.  
The IA programme enters into picture at this point with the idea that “by spending a small 
additional sum of money on innovation policy and networking key players, the RIS policy [can] 
increase the efficiency of industrial policy by ensuring that the Structural Funds are spent 
strategically and targeted at innovation” (Oughton et al. 2002, p. 105). Therefore, in line with 
new regionalist theorisations (see sec. 1.2.3 and 1.2.4), the strategy relies on three pillars: 
innovation as policy priority, universities and firms as policy recipients, and networking as 
policy methodology. Within this framework, the procedural requirement set in the 
Commission’s guidelines (programme designing on the basis of wide regional partnership; 
see above) is then indicated as the crucial element to create a “development coalition based 
on cooperation, which is the key policy target” (Ibid., p. 101). 
 
Following these arguments, one could argue that, if the basic mechanism may seem 
relatively simple, the programme has nonetheless fairly ambitious goals: 
                                                 
34
 Again, IA (Innovative Actions) and RIS (Regional Innovation Strategies) are two names for the same 
programme, the name changing according to the programming periods. The confusion can get even 
higher, since the acronym for the programme (RIS) and the acronym for the underlying policy model 
(Regional Innovation System) are the same (with a wordplay, we could say that the coincidence in the 
names is not a coincidence; it should be noted in this regard that some of the contributors to the 
theoretical model are also high officials of the Commission). We will try to distinguish whenever 
ambiguity may raise.  
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RISs initiative is fundamentally aimed at establishing a socio-economic dynamic (social 
and institutional engineering) based on a bottom-up open discussion and consensus-
building among the key innovation actors in a region about policy options and new 
ideas/projects to promote innovation by exploiting complementarities between private and 
public sector investment in research and innovation activity. […] A definition of a RS 
might be ‘an instrument to translate ‘knowledge’ into regional GDP” (Ibid., p. 105, 
emphasis added). 
To conclude, the last quotation represents a synthetic picture of the procedural and 
thematic elements which underpin both the RIS’ and the Commission’s policy approaches to 
regional development. Indeed, it summarises effectively the conceptual relation between 
governance structures, procedural arrangements, policies, technology offers, and relations 
among the “key players”, which inform both approaches. In particular, it explains the need for 
interventions which point at “social engineering” the region. This represents in fact the key to 
translate the RIS analytical findings into a universally valid policy model; but this also makes 
the overall approach self-contradictory, as it clashes with the supposed endogenous origin of 
these processes. Also, it can be questioned whether social engineering strategies are a 
desirable or acceptable intervention. 
The concluding section will be thus dedicated to investigating the limits and dilemmas 
which may raise from this conception. 
 
 
2.4.3 Theoretical limits and policy dilemmas raising from the IA/RIS approach 
In recent years, several authors have pointed out diverse critical aspects in the IA 
programme, concerning both its theoretical bases and its substantive effects. 
For instance, Lagendijk and Cornford (2000, p. 212) contend that, because of their marked 
technicality and competitive bidding mechanisms, IA initiatives have greatly contributed to 
creating a “strong institutional isomorphism” among regional authorities and agencies in the 
field of local development. In a similar vein, Uyarra points out (2007, p. 255) that “in relation to 
the emphasis on context-specific policy action, there is ironically a stress on interregional 
learning and learning from best-practice initiatives”.  
Particularly problematic is then the “hypostatisation” of the “administrative region” as a 
coherent economic unit. In this sense, the evaluation report of the RITTS35 programme has 
found that one of the main weakness emerging from the use of this funding scheme to build 
regional innovation systems regarded precisely the propensity of regional authorities to 
assume an automatic correspondence between the borders of the administrative region and 
the regional innovation system. However, “[in many cases], including some of the UK regions 
and Western Norway the pattern of firms interactions do not fit with the chosen regional 
boundaries” (Charles et al. 2000, p. 57). This point is also stressed by Lawton Smith et al. 
                                                 
35
 The RITTS scheme preceded the IA one in the programming period 1994-1999. See also note n. 31 
on this issue. 
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(2003, p. 864), who highlight how in some Member States - such as UK, Greece and most 
part of the eastern Countries - regional structures have been designed in accordance with the 
EU criteria, but without any reference to a possible functional region, thus “confus[ing] the 
relationship between the national state, the EU and the region and the development of 
coherent systems”. 
The prioritisation of high-tech sectors promoted by IA programmes, and more in general by 
EU regional policy also appears critical (Uyarra 2007). Firstly, as Lawton Smith et al. (2003) 
note, this approach overlooks the fact that many traditional sectors are nonetheless 
knowledge intensive and that they are normally more responsive to intervention than high tech 
sectors; the authors also point out that, although traditional, these industries can still be world 
leaders in their field and have an important economic impact at local level. Secondly, and 
consequently, policy tools based on a RIS conception are inadequate to tackle with the 
innovation needs of traditional firms, which still constitute the backbone of most of the less 
favoured regions’ economic fabric. As a matter of fact, in a study of Objective 1 regions in 
Italy, Pellegrin (2007) has shown that the participation of firms in regional innovation 
programmes is generally limited to those that are already aware of the “innovation 
problématique”, which also means those less needy of support. Thirdly, many authors have 
contested that this approach suffers from a “productivist bias”, as it disregards the importance 
of many other sectors - especially those serving local demand - in determining the local level 
of employment and wealth (Lovering 2001; De Bruijn and Lagendijk 2005; Amin et al. 2003). 
In particular, drawing on the case of the IA strategy implemented in Wales, Lovering (1999) 
argues that such a strategy fails to address the main causes of economic change in the region 
and, referring to the excessive stress on export-oriented sectors, he concludes that it mistakes 
“development in the region” with “development of the region”. 
 
In sum, on the basis of the previous review, it can be argued that regional policies 
promoted through the IA programmes are affected by a double myopia: on the one hand, they 
fail to consider spatial articulations of economic and innovative activities other than the 
regional one. On the other hand, they seem to neglect a great part of economic transactions 
and knowledge relations which take place in the regional territory. 
Slightly less considered have been perhaps the effects generated by the procedural 
mechanisms and the governance model instilled through the IA programmes and, more 
generally, through the management of the Structural Funds. An exception to this is 
represented by an important article by Benz and Eberlein (1999) in which, drawing on a 
comparative analysis of the regional development strategies implemented in two regions (one 
in France, the other in Germany) under the SF, the two authors theorise the effectiveness of 
the MLG system. 
Benz and Eberlein start their analysis from observing that twin processes of increasing 
regionalisation of public intervention and europeanisation of national policies in the field of 
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territorial development may entail an “overload” of co-ordination processes due to the 
extending linkages between levels of policy-making. This risk would concern not only the 
functioning of the European level, but also of the regional one. Indeed, this latter would be 
affected by a tension arising from the fact that regional policies, which have to be co-ordinated 
with European policies (logic of influence), are also supposed to be formulated through local 
co-operation (logic of membership). While this latter dimension would demand the broad 
participation of all relevant regional actors, the logic of influence requires substantial 
autonomy of regional representatives from their regional membership base.  
According to the authors, both the problem of “overload” and the “dilemma of exclusion 
and inclusion” would have been successfully and innovatively tackled by the governance 
model designed by the Commission - the MLG system -, thanks to a series of vertical and 
horizontal differentiations between policy arenas. At the EU level, the policy-making would 
have been made “manageable” by separating the decision process on the overall framework 
of the CP - involving the Commission and the Council of Minister only -, from the one on the 
single regional strategies - involving the Commission and regional authorities only - (see sec. 
2.3.2). 
At the regional level, and in the relation between the regional and the national level, co-
operation would be triggered by the “default condition” raised by the “costs of losing European 
funding” (Ibid., p. 338). In other words, especially in Countries with strong and autonomous 
regional governments (like Germany in their case study), the precondition for the successful 
management of the MLG would lie in an empowerment of the “political-administrative” region, 
and in a parallel compression of the political space of “the socio-economic region, in which 
public–private partnerships are organized […]. Otherwise, regional co-operation would 
threaten to break up vertical negotiations between the Land government and the EU 
Commission” (Ibid., emphasis added). Indeed, in empirical terms, Benz and Eberlein find that: 
“Arena linkages between domestic and European funding are quasi-monopolized by the 
Länder Ministries of Economics, which exercise ‘boundary control’, since they operate at 
the interface of domestic and European regional policies. In addition, there are strong 
bureaucratic linkages between the Federal and Land level, […] to the detriment of 
bottom-up and intersectorally co-ordinated regional policies. The losers in this game are 
the regional actors involved in horizontal regional development (local authorities, 
associations, public–private partnerships). (Ibid., p. 337, emphasis added). 
Now, if - as the two authors claim - the system is successful, one could nevertheless ask 
for whom it is so. In fact, the study questions strongly the alleged co-operative, inclusive, 
consensual and bottom-up nature of the regional governance model fostered by the EU 
regional policy. 
 
Also drawing on the discussion proposed in the previous chapter, we can conclude that the 
policy approach developed by new regionalist theorists and adopted by the Commission 
shows the same disputed theoretical grounds that Massey (2005) has pointed out, when 
speaking of the “cosmology of only one narrative”, that is the idea that (a certain account of) 
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globalisation is ineluctable. This tenet involves the consequent conceptual scheme which, by 
conflating “geography into history, and space into time” (Ibid.), interprets places’ diverse 
trajectories not as the expression of their own distinctive history, but rather as the (earlier) 
evolutionary stages of a unique development path. This is indeed the gist of the policy 
propositions reported in the previous sections, according to which less favoured regions 
should be taught the “Arcana” of the knowledge economy, following the example of more 
dynamic regions36. 
This line of policy is all the more striking since, on the other (theoretical) side, there is a 
rhetorical emphasis on “endogenity” and bottom-up decision processes. Such a contradiction 
necessarily leads to an ambiguous (political) frame of reference, which tries to strike an 
impossible balance between “context-sensitiveness” and determination “from above” of local 
political priorities37. The continuous tension between these two imperatives probably 
represents the real problematic knot of Cohesion Policy: a tension which is unsolvable, since 
grounded in the very conceptual nucleus of the overall approach.  
The significance of this contradiction and its link to a certain conception of the politics of 
development is also recognised by Barca Report (Barca 2009, p. 163), when it says that “the 
effectiveness of cohesion policy, as with any place-based development policy, depends on the 
balance between conditionality and subsidiarity of its multilevel governance system. In this 
respect […] the governance of cohesion policy presents some key problems that need to be 
addressed”. Following this, the Report is dedicated by and large to devise a new governance 
arrangement for the CP. The proposal advanced by the Report revolves in particular around 
the idea of a “contract agreement” between the Commission and the recipient regions, in 
which the Commission is expected to set the Europe-wide “political objectives” while regions 
should then find their own way to achieve them (the Reports also specifies that the contract 
should contain a strong set of indicators to assess the impact of placed-based policies and the 
                                                 
36
 It is extremely meaningful what Cooke et al. (2000, p. 154, emphasis added) have written in this 
regard: “having identified a failure of goals-achievement, the question arise of whether the ends or the 
means should be changed and how comparably placed or even ‘world best-practice’ regions pursued a 
successful growth path. This is the point at which any number of conduits for policy-learning may be 
activated. It is also such a relatively common and repeated point in the development curve of regions 
[…] that, ideally, a supra-state organisation such as the EU should be the first port of call, with a 
specialist task-force capability to advise the would-be learner region of better practice. By and large 
though, this is a point at which the learner region may invite the consultant in”. 
This idea that development is essentially a technical problem which can be solved by resorting to the 
“right consultant” (the Commission) characterises also the Barca Report, which expressly assigns the 
Commission the task of being “credible both as a contract partner making discretionary choices and as a 
think tank” (Barca 2009, p. xxii, emphasis added).   
37
 It is very interesting confronting the following two quotations, the first coming from a Commission’s 
communication on the innovation policy (CEC 2003b), the second excerpted from the Commission’s 
communication on the Regional Dimension of the European Research Area (CEC 2001b). 
Starting with the first: “when designing and implementing regional innovation policies, regional 
authorities must fully take into account the distinctiveness and the social and economic characteristics of 
the region.” (CEC 2003b, p. 20, emphasis added). 
Moving then to the second: “the less developed regions have few chances of catching up with the 
prosperous regions if they do not perform RTDI strategies comparable to the prosperous regions. Thus, 
a cohesion policy that does not manage less favoured regions progressing fast on this track will fail in 
the long run” (CEC 2001b, p. 18, emphasis added). 
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degree of commitment of local institutions, whereas the Commission should act in this regard 
as a high-level consultant or think thank, see note 36). 
It is quite clear that the new governance arrangement envisaged in the Barca Report does 
not differ substantially from the present organisation of the CP. The reason is that the Report 
remains within a territorialised and self-contained conception of development, according to 
which the main rationale of the CP is to tackle the institutional failure of local institutions, 
which need an “exogenous intervention” (Ibid. p. ix; that is the intervention from the think tank 
Commission) to unlock their potential.  
As I have tried to argue earlier (sec. 1.3.4), what is at stake here is the interpretation of, 
and the value assigned to, diversity and heterogeneity in geographical terms. In other words, 
the inescapable tension between “context-sensitiveness” and “conditionality” stems from the 
difficulty that new regionalism faces in recognising and accepting both the legitimacy (the 
“coevalness” in Massey’s words) of alternative development trajectories, and the always 
contested nature of space, included the proximate space. This limit of new regionalism is in 
turn related to its most questionable theoretical starting point, namely the attribution of causal 
and ordering properties to spatial concepts. It is precisely as a consequence of this spatial 
determinism, which is then coupled with a teleological interpretation of globalisation, that new 
regionalism becomes “clumsy” as regards the deduction of the political consequences 
stemming from acknowledging variety and multiplicity.  
These arguments thus enable us to outline the crucial questions which will drive the 
successive empirical inquiry. More precisely, by transposing previous contentions into the 
pragmatic field of policy-making, we can identify - in both the EU regional policy and the RIS 
model - three important assumptions which need to be critically investigated: 
i) The first assumption concerns the supposed correspondence between the political-
administrative and the socio-economic region; indeed, this correspondence is not 
empirically supported, and it is theoretically unsteady, as the very existence of an 
economic region is - at least in systemic terms - difficult to define. 
ii) Secondly, and correlatively, the importance attributed to localised university-firms 
networks is debatable. Again, there is not convergent evidence about the viability and 
effectiveness of this strategy and it can be argued that this logic is unable to make 
sense of the multifaceted socio-spatial dimensions of modern economy. A similar 
reasoning can be made with regard to the absolute economic role ascribed to 
technological innovation and high-tech sectors, which make new regionalist policy 
indications particularly unfitting for less favoured regions. 
iii) Lastly, and crucially, the imperative of co-operation and the idea that consensus can 
be always achieved or, worse, socially engineered is highly problematic. As regards 
the EU regional policy in particular, requiring consensus as a condition to access 
funds is contradictory and may also reveal itself to be “poisonous” for local 
governance. In fact, on the one hand, insisting on “being consensual” closely 
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resonates with that “be happy” imperative, that physiologists from the Palo Alto school 
found to be highly paradoxical, as it imposes a behaviour which can only emerge 
spontaneously, thus creating frustration and counter-effects (Watzlawick et al. 1974). 
On the other hand, as the Benz and Eberlein’s study shows, this approach involves a 
“functionalisation” of consensus which, in the name of the European “carrot”, deeply 
affects the politics of local government, as it may muffle dissent and depoliticise 
choices, which are re-cast as mere technical problems.  
 
In the next chapter I will try to scrutinise the previous critical issues by analysing a specific 
programme of Innovative Actions, implemented in an Objective 2 region in Italy. In particular, I 
will try to consider both the substantive results produced by the programme and its procedural 
mechanisms for, as it should be clear by now, these two elements cannot be separated. 
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CHAPTER III: A CASE STUDY OF A REGIONAL PROGRAMME OF 
INNOVATIVE ACTIONS AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR REGIONAL 
GOVERNANCE 
3.1 Introduction 
The concluding part of the previous chapter was dedicated to analysing a specific EU 
programme implemented in the framework of the CP - the Innovative Actions scheme (IA). Its 
main objective was to induce that cultural and institutional change, considered as a 
prerequisite for the effective translation of the CP’s policy orientations at regional level. We 
have seen that several authors have underlined the influence of this programme on regional 
policy-making. I have also pointed out that there is a tight relation between the rationales 
underpinning such a programme and theorisations coming from the RIS approach. 
I have then concluded by claiming that both the EU programme and the RIS approach are 
based on a series of assumptions which are theoretically problematic and empirically 
unsteady. Drawing in particular on relational perspectives, I have tried to show that questions 
can be raised with regard to both substantive elements (namely the appropriateness of RIS 
models to tackle the sources of territorial imbalances), and procedural aspects (that is, the 
contradictory processes and relations which characterise the formulation and delivery of the 
EU regional policy). 
In this chapter I will present the findings of an in-depth study of a particular IA action 
implemented in Tuscany on Regional Authorities’ initiative, that I conducted with the purpose 
of exploring the critical issues stemming from previous arguments. More precisely, my 
investigation responds to a double research interest: to provide further empirical material to 
assess the effectiveness of new regionalist policy models on the one hand; to scrutinise the 
effects of such an approach on regional governance on the other hand. This twofold line of 
inquiry is based on the heuristic hypothesis that, in order to understand the consequences 
generated by new regionalist-derived strategies in the context of the CP, we have to look at 
how regional governance simultaneously influences and is influenced both by the content of 
such strategies, and by the characteristics of the MLG system which fosters the 
implementation and reproduction of this policy approach at regional scale. In other words, the 
idea is that there exists a circular relation between procedural and substantive aspects, as 
they are both the expression of the same underlying spatial conceptualisation.  
Concretely, my intention is to show that the relation connecting the three main research 
levels (content of the development strategy, regional governance configuration, and 
institutional organisation of the CP) is generated - and constantly re-generated - by a complex 
assemblage of beliefs, rationalities, institutional procedures and rules, documents, formal 
requirements, expectations and interests, which represent a fundamental action-framework for 
different actors at various scales. Through the unifying role played by this action-framework, 
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the three dimensions form a dynamic empirical object, whose borders are never precisely 
marked - as never precisely bounded is the web of relations which shapes it -, but which has 
nonetheless distinguishable and important effects on the nature and direction of the politics of 
local development. 
Following this perspective, the outcome of my study will be a discursive reconstruction of 
such effects and processes. In this sense, the theoretical validity of this analysis will not be 
determined by its degree of generalisability (on the contrary, the description will be precisely 
framed in spatial and temporal terms). Rather, the soundness of the account I propose will 
depend on its capacity to unfold coherently - that is to make sense of - the multiple 
articulations and connections which will emerge from the empirical exploration, and which - I 
argue - hold together the diverse research levels. Therefore, although the research results 
cannot be projected beyond the context from which they derive, this inquiry keeps in my view 
its theoretical interest, insofar as it is illustrative of relations and tensions which are likely to 
occur (and recur) elsewhere, and insofar as it represents a valid approach to study similar 
contexts and phenomena.  
 
The analysis of the research outcomes and the resulting reflections will thus take up this 
and the successive last chapter. The present chapter in particular is organised as follows. In 
the next section I will dwell on some methodological issues deriving from the above outlined 
research approach. After that, I will provide some broad socio-economic coordinates 
characterising the region under scrutiny: Tuscany; such coordinates will be important to 
contextualise and better understand the implications of some regional strategies and political 
positions. The remaining part of the chapter will be entirely dedicated to examining the 
Tuscany’s programme of IA - called VINCI -, and its significance in the framework of the other 
research dimensions (regional governance and the MLG system). To do that, I will proceed 
according to a concentric pattern. More precisely, in section 3.4 I will summarise the main 
content of the programme and I will report its outcomes, as they can be drawn from official 
evaluation documents. In the following section, I will frame the programme within the context 
of the wider regional development strategy. Subsequently, mostly relying on the main actors’ 
own accounts, I will try to reconstruct which expectations, rationales, etc. have led them 
during the planning process, paying particular attention to the potential role played by the EU 
through the CP. Finally, I will try to delineate the possible effects produced on governance by 
both the content of the regional strategy and the institutional arrangements determined by the 
use of Structural Funds (SF).  
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3.2 Exploring a regional innovation programme: some methodological remarks 
Before starting the analysis of the VINCI programme, it is opportune to specify which 
methodological approach has been adopted, and how this is related to the theoretical 
perspective previously defined. 
As mentioned above, the case study has a bifocal nature. On the one hand, it aims at 
providing further insights to assess the effectiveness of new regionalist policy approaches. On 
the other hand, it intends to shed light on the effects produced by the MLG system on regional 
governance, and on how these are related to the content of the EU and regional strategy. 
Both dimensions are indeed needed to carry out the analysis. The outcomes of the 
programme are necessary to validate or to question the substantive content of the strategy. At 
the same time, the hypothesis is that the institutional mechanisms which have led the 
formulation and have made possible the implementation of said strategy (and their 
consequences in terms of governance) are not independent form the spatial conception 
underpinning the strategy itself. 
However, the two dimensions require different research approaches, and different types of 
data as well. As for the first aspect (the outcomes of the programme), I will rely exclusively on 
secondary data, namely the results contained in the official evaluations reports, which have 
been drawn by independent organisations during the intermediate and the concluding phases 
of the programme. Apart from pragmatic considerations (related to the “manageability” of the 
research project), the choice has also a more “methodological” reason: official evaluation 
reports represent the main reference for regional and European policy-makers to assess their 
policies. Especially in the field of EU regional policy, with its stress on the effectiveness of 
resource allocation, evaluations reports are often quoted in planning documents to formally 
justify the confirmation or suspension of a certain strategy. In this sense, such documents 
constitute also an important element of the overall institutional and procedural system which 
underlies the production and reproduction of development strategies at regional and EU level. 
Therefore, evaluation reports represent an essential information base to question policy-
makers about the sense of certain policy decisions (especially when, as in our case, a 
strategy is proposed again after that several evaluation reports have proved it ineffective; we 
will come back to this aspect later on). 
As regards the institutional dimension, the issue consists in tracing the intersections and 
the relations among theoretical and political assumptions, administrative procedures, 
incentives and expectations, etc. which bind together the MLG system, regional governance 
and the policy strategy. In order to give a readable account of this complex entanglement, I 
will follow Lagendijk and Cornford’s suggestion (2000) that concepts are not merely 
communication intermediaries, but they can also shape the behaviour of agents and the 
relation between organisations, thanks to their capacity to enrol and mobilise actors. Tracking 
the evolution of concepts may thus be a viable methodological approach to describe this 
procedural and cognitive knot. However, while the two authors focused on the evolution of 
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concepts such as “learning region” and “cluster” to explain the emergence of new forms of 
regional development policy, I will concentrate on the concept of “innovation networks”, to see 
how this has been adopted from the EU regional policy, translated at regional level, and 
consequently consolidated in a set of institutional relations, interests, tensions, and policies 
(the last represented by the programme under scrutiny). As already mentioned, the objective 
in this case is to provide a picture of the action-framework in which actors deploy their 
operational capacity, and through which their rationalities, aspirations, perceptions, become 
manifest.  
In terms of research methods, in order to follow the thread of the innovation networks 
concept and reconstruct such an “action-framework”, I will chiefly rely on direct semi-
structured interviews with the main actors involved in the formulation and implementation of 
the programme. Indeed, a wide literature in human geography and social sciences converges 
in indicating qualitative research interviews as the most appropriate method to gain access to 
cultural categories and assumptions according to which subjects construe their experienced 
world (Hoggart et al. 2002; Valentine 2005). According to this perspective, qualitative research 
interviews, thanks to their open and conversational nature, become a knowing context in 
which “knowledge is constructed through the interaction of interviewer and interviewee” (Kvale 
1996, p. 37); in other words, in qualitative interview subjects are not just mere informants but, 
dialoguing with the interviewer, they come to formulate and articulate their own conception of 
the theme under discussion (Ibid.).  
Therefore, given the above outlined research objectives, interviews will represent the main 
means through which the fieldwork will be carried out. However, during the analytical phase, 
the content of interviews will be also confronted and put in relation with other sources and 
aspects, such as: planning documents, evaluation reports, studies, legislation, etc. Again, 
such a constant reframing is essential because these latter elements are as important as 
subjects’ decisions and behaviours to understand the overall direction and effects of regional 
policy. In other words, these objects have important agencies which need to be considered in 
order to account for actors’ movement and struggles.  
In conclusion, the picture emerging from this analysis should allow us to identify which 
processes, rationalities and constraints have shaped the regional innovation policy with regard 
to the determination of objectives, the choice of tools, the nature (inclusive, exclusive, etc.) of 
the relations underlying the formulation and delivery phases; that is, all those aspects that 
ultimately determine the regional politics of development. 
 
In Annex 1, I will provide more details about how and when I accessed the information 
sources which this work is based on. However, in order to make the ensuing analysis more 
fluent, I will sum up hereafter the main types of source: 
• Official planning documents. With regard to the general regional development 
strategy, the main reference documents are: the Regional Programme for Economic 
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Development (Programma Regionale di Sviluppo Economico - PRSE) and the 
Regional Operational Programme (Programma Operativo Regionale - POR), which 
defines the regional strategy for the use of SF (see section 2.3.2 for details about the 
characteristics of this document). As for the specific programme under investigation, 
the main reference documents are: the draft programme submitted by Tuscany’s 
regional government to the European Commission and the Guidelines elaborated for 
the implementation phase. 
• Official evaluation reports. With reference to the overall regional development strategy 
implemented under SF, the main references are: the Intermediate Evaluation Report 
and the Updated Intermediate Evaluation Report (Cles 2003 and 2005). For the 
specific IA programme, the main references are: the Intermediate Evaluation Report 
(Caloffi 2007), the Final Evaluation Report (Resco 2009), and the Modelling Exercise 
(Lazzeretti 2008). 
• Interviews. I have interviewed the following individuals: two members of the “expert 
group” who drafted the Guidelines for the experimentation phase of the IA programme 
(prof. Marco Bellandi and Mr Daniele Calamandrei); the author of the intermediate 
evaluation (Dr Annalisa Caloffi); the author of the modelling exercise (Prof. Luciana 
Lazzeretti); the secretary of the largest craft and small-and-medium enterprises 
association in Tuscany and member of the Managing Authority38 for SF (Ms Laura 
Simoncini). Moreover, I have interviewed three Regional Authorities’ policy-officers 
who had a major role in designing and implementing the VINCI programme (including 
the programme manager), and a regional government’s official holding a very 
prominent position in both the regional DG Development (the DG primarily in charge 
with the formulation/delivery of the POR) and the Managing Authority. Although all the 
above mentioned interviewees have been informed (both verbally and through a 
written summary submitted in advance) about the aims of the research work and the 
uses of the interviews’ content, and although all the informants expressly agreed on 
recording - through a digital recorder - the interviews, I have nonetheless deemed it 
opportune to “anonymise” interviews with Regional Authorities’ staff. In fact, while 
other informants represent either practitioners responding about the product of their 
activity or representatives of interest organisations accounting for their political action, 
interviews with policy-officers contain certain personal political opinions and 
evaluations which may do them some actual harm, considered their position as civil 
servants. As a consequence, the three policy-officers will be referred to with the 
following initials: PO1, PO2, PO3; while the DG Development high official will be 
indicated with the DGDO initials. 
                                                 
38
 As explained in sec. 2.3.2, the Managing Authority is the public authority or the public/private body 
responsible (also in financial terms) for managing and implementing the operational programme. We 
have also noted that the SF regulation provides that operational programme are preferably drawn up at 
NUT2 scale and that, in most cases, the managing authorities coincide with the regional/federal 
governments.  
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For similar but inverted reasons I have instead decided to report extracts from a 
speech that the Regional Councillor for Innovation and Development - Ambrogio 
Brenna - held on the occasion of the official presentation of the VINCI programme’s 
results. In fact, as we will see in the next section, Regional Councillors are appointed 
through a political process and have political responsibility for their acts (what is more, 
Councillor Brenna has indefinitely postponed an interview, following my reiterated 
requests)39. 
 
 
3.3 Socio-economic coordinates of Tuscany 
VINCI is an acronym which stands for Virtual Innovation and Cooperative Integration. The 
essential objective of the programme has been to foster the creation of innovation networks 
between universities/research centres and traditional SMEs, through the adoption of a 
particular networking approach (named Virtual Enterprise or Virtual Organisation VE/VO), 
derived from the ICT sector (we will specify better objectives and methodology of the 
programme later on). VINCI has been addressed particularly (though not exclusively) to three 
industrial sectors which amount to a substantial part of Tuscany’s economy: textile, 
engineering and maritime. 
Therefore, before approaching the content of the VINCI programme, it may be useful to 
provide some basic information about the socio-economic context in which the programme 
has been implemented. More precisely, in next sub-section I will briefly delineate the main 
characteristics of regional economy; I will dwell in particular on the nature of regional industrial 
districts, which have a particular relevance in the wider regional development strategy, as they 
“host” half of the regional manufacturing firms. In the subsequent sub-section, I will 
concentrate on the relation between industry and university, with specific regard to the main 
target sectors of the programme.  
 
 
3.3.1 Main industrial and economic features of Tuscany 
Tuscany is one of the twenty regions which form up Italian territory. The Italian Constitution 
defines regions as “autonomous entities having their own statue” (art. 114); as such, regions 
have their own political “bodies”, which are: the Regional Council, elected by universal 
suffrage, which exercises the legislative power; the Regional Executive which is constituted by 
Regional Councillors; and the President of the Executive who directs the policymaking of the 
Executive (Art. 121). Moreover, Regions have revenue and expenditure autonomy, which 
                                                 
39
 A part from the Final Evaluation Report, all other documents are in Italian. Similarly, interviews have 
been conducted and originally transcribed in Italian. Quotations from both these sources have been 
translated by the author. 
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means that they draw up their budget, and they “set and levy taxes” (art. 119). Finally art. 117 
provides that “legislative power shall be vested in the State and the Regions”; it then 
distinguishes between matters in which the State has an exclusive competence (such as state 
security, foreign policy, etc.), and matters that are covered by concurrent legalisation, for 
which “legislative powers are vested in the Regions, except for the determination of the 
fundamental principles, which are laid down in State legislation”. “Scientific and technological 
research, and innovation support for productive sectors” is one of the matter to which 
concurrent legislation applies. 
As one can easily deduce from this list of constitutional provisions, Italian regions enjoy - at 
least formally - a high political autonomy, which characterises Italy as a “quasi-federal” state. 
This “institutional specification” is an important preliminary aspect to understand actors’ 
perspective but also, very concretely, their effective action-space. For instance, VINCI has 
been elaborated and managed by regional policy-officers, that is by members of the regional 
administration which is politically bound only by directions coming from the regional 
government. Similarly, when discussing the content (and allocation of resources) of the 
Operational Programme (POR) with the Commission, regional officials have to account for 
their decisions only to their regional Councillor. We will discuss these aspects more in-depth 
in the next sections, but it is import to bear them in mind henceforth, in order to understand 
the institutional context in which regional development programmes are elaborated. 
 
Moving on to analyse the regional economy, Tuscany can be qualified as an “average” 
region in Europe, if measured according to traditional indicators (see table 1); however, it has 
to be observed how Tuscany’s economy (like the Italian one) has been stagnating during last 
years (see figure 1)40. 
 
Table 1: Main economic indicators of Tuscany’s economy compared with Italian and 
EU averages 
 
GDP % (EU 25 = 
100)1 
Unemployment rate 
(%)2 Employment rate (%)
2 
EU 25 100 7.2 53.9 
EU 15 111,1 7.1 54.3 
Italy 101,0 6.7 45.9 
Tuscany 109,3 5.0 49.2 
Source: author’s elaboration on EUROSTAT data. 1= 2006 data; 2= 2008 data 
 
 
                                                 
40
 Figures in table 1 and 2 do not clearly include the effects of the recent economic downturn. According 
to the latest data, in the first 2009 quarterly, regional unemployment has jumped to 7,2%, while 
employment has remained more or less stable. Between the second half of 2008 and the first half of 
2009, regional GDP has shrunk by more than 4% (5,4% in Italy) (IRPET 2009).  
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Figure 1: Average GDP growth rate in Tuscany, Italy and EU15 (%) 
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Source: Author’s elaboration on Giunta Regionale 2007b 
 
Concerning the productive structure, four main distinctive features can be identified. The 
first has to do with the “manufacturing vocation” of regional economy: in 2004, regional 
manufacturing industry employed 31,8% of total workforce, against 30,7% and 27,7% of, 
respectively, Italian and EU25 average (Giunta Regionale 2007a). The second aspect is 
related to the small dimension of manufacturing firms: in 2006, the average number of 
employees per firm was 6,3 (8,1 in Italy); overall, more than 50% of regional firms has less 
than 10 employees (Ibid.; Bellandi et al. 2006). The third element regards industrial 
specialisation: regional industry appears highly concentrated in “traditional” sectors, and 
especially in fashion-related production (textile, clothing, leather goods, and jeweller’s craft), 
which absorb more than 40% of industrial employment and 12% of total regional workforce, 
against a national average of 5% (Giunta Regionale 2007a). Somewhat related to the sectoral 
specialisation is the last feature, which has to do with the scarce propensity for R&D activities: 
indeed, the average share of R&D personnel on total private employment is significantly lower 
than national and EU27 average (see fig. 2). 
Such a productive structure shows then a peculiar, and highly unbalanced, geography. 
Indeed, 70% of the regional population and 75% of economic activities are concentrated in the 
centre-north part of Tuscany, which extends longitudinally from the hills east of Florence to 
the west coast and which amounts to only the 30% of regional territory (Ibid.) (see fig. 3).  
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Figure 2: % of R&D personnel on total private sector employment (2006) 
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Source: Author’s elaboration on Eurostat data 2009 
 
Figure 3: Population Density in Tuscany (2008) 
 
Source: IRPET 2009 
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This area is in its turn quite variegated; according to Sforzi (2003), at least three different 
“tuscanies” can be identified: the urban areas, the “tourist-industrial areas”, and the “urbanised 
countryside”41. Urban areas (in particular Florence and Pisa), are characterised for the 
location of the main regional decision-centres, and for the highest concentration of services. 
The tourist-industrial areas coincide with the coastline, and they are characterised by a mix of 
(formerly state-owned) heavy industries poles in slow but constant decline since the 1970s, a 
flourishing maritime pole (endowed with large and small shipyards), and an ever growing 
tourist industry. Finally, the urbanised countryside encompasses a wide zone, stretched along 
the Arno river and comprising many small-medium sized towns (see fig. 4), whose “dominant 
characteristic is constituted by the phenomena directly connected with the development of 
clusters of specialised small firms in typical Tuscan light industry” (Sforzi 2003, p. 32). The 
urbanised countryside is then clearly distinct from the large rural countryside in the south 
which, on the contrary , has been “negatively impacted by the effect of the industrialisation 
process” (Ibid.). 
 
Figure 4: Official district areas in Tuscany 
 
Source: IRPET 2009 
 
                                                 
41
 Such a territorial reading is substantially adopted also by the Regional Government, in particular 
Giunta Regionale 2007b. 
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Therefore, the “urbanised countryside” is the area in which most of the Tuscany’s industrial 
districts are located; an area defined by the Regional Operational Programme (POR) as the 
“manufacturing heart of Tuscany” (Giunta Regionale 2007b, p. 13), where more than the 50% 
of manufacturing firms operates. As is well-known, in Tuscany (like in some other Italian 
regions) industrial districts have represented an important driver of economic development. 
Thanks to their particular socio-spatial characteristics, they have also been the object of 
intense scholarship during the 1980s and the 1990s. There is not the space here to review the 
extensive literature on this topic; however, some general observations are necessary for the 
analysis I will carry out in the following sections. 
 
The first observation concerns the importance - in a substantive sense, but in a theoretical 
and cultural one as well - that industrial districts have had in Tuscany’s recent economic 
history. Indeed, if on the one hand “Italian districts are the strongest examples of this 
phenomenon” (Pyke and Sengenberger 1990, p.1), on the other hand Tuscany is the region 
where the characteristics of this development model were studied for the first time at 
beginning of the 1970s (Sforzi 1990). 
The second element is related to the many theoretical overlaps that can been spotted 
between the analytical results stemming from district studies on the one hand, and the new 
regionalist literature on the on the other hand (see for e.g. Storper 1997, and Cooke and 
Morgan 1998). Indeed, both approaches share the idea that firms and economic activities are 
“rooted in the territory” (Becattini 1990, p. 40). Moreover, both approaches emphasise the 
importance of some sociological factors - primarily “cultural cohesiveness” - in guaranteeing 
the co-ordination among co-localised producers and the reproduction of local know-how. In 
this sense, chiming in with much of the institutionalist literature, industrial districts are 
described as a self-contained “socio-territorial entity”, endowed with an “homogenous system 
of values and view” (Ibid., p. 39), which “preserves consensus and social compromise” (Pyke 
and Sengenberger 1990, p.6). 
Another important similarity is connected with the policy implications. Indeed, many district 
authors agree that the sustainability of the district model requires specific interventions aiming 
at fostering the development and adoption of break-through innovation by district SMEs, 
through a more intense interconnection with universities and research centres42 (Bellandi and 
Caloffi 2008; Trigilia 1992).  
 
                                                 
42
 In this regard, Trigilia (1992, p. 42) interestingly reasons that, since research structures are normally 
located in urban environments (i.e. they are not part of the urbanised countryside), the implementation of 
the above mentioned interventions requires the existence of an “intermediate level of government”, 
regional rather than local, which is able to stimulate the integration of different actors located in different 
areas. Trigilia then concludes that this ability would demand in its turn the capacity of interest groups 
and regional governments to “redefine the interests at this level […] and to assume a new regulatory 
role” (Ibid., p. 44). 
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 The relevance of district tradition, along with its supposed policy spatialities (see note n. 
42), may thus help to explain why the regional government continues to put this model at the 
core of its development strategy, despite the fact that, in the course of the last two decades, 
district systems have undergone substantial transformations and have probably lost much of 
their economic centrality. I will analyse the content and rationales of this strategy in more 
depth in the next sections; hereafter I will briefly consider the nature of such transformation. 
As regards the structural changes districts have been subjected to, three main phenomena 
need to be stressed. The first consists of the progressive contraction of the manufacturing 
component, and the parallel shift towards services. Indeed, starting from the end of the 1980s, 
the number of manufacturing firms in districts areas has been continuously shrinking, while 
the services sector has been expanding its weight in terms of both employment and added 
value (Dei Ottati 1998; Giunta Regionale 2007a). Although manufacturing activities remain 
quantitatively more important in district areas than in the rest of regional territory, this process 
mirrors a broader trend affecting the entire regional economy, with two main consequences: i) 
districts’ characterising features are now less marked than they were in the past decades; ii) 
overall, the importance of industry in regional economy has diminished (at present, industry’s 
output counts for less than one-fourth in regional economy, while it was around one-third at 
the beginning of the 1980s). 
The fall in industrial employment is then in part related to another major transformation. As 
mentioned above, the original theoretical model characterised the district as a self-contained 
unity, in the sense that it comprised all the production cycle of a particular industry thanks to 
the horizontal and functional integration of many small firms. However, again since the mid-
80s, most regional districts have begun to subcontract a growing part the production 
(especially low added value components) out of the local system; parallel to this, local 
subcontractors have started producing for firms external to the district (Dei Ottati 1998). 
Interestingly, Dei Ottati (1998) finds that this phenomenon has been accompanied by an 
intense buying into foreign firms, carried out by local entrepreneurs with the purpose of either 
improving the control on the supply-chain or penetrating new markets. In sum, during the last 
two decades, industrial districts in Tuscany have experienced a process of interconnection 
and internationalisation that Dei Ottati (1998, p. 37) describes as the “end of productive self-
sufficiency”. 
The last transformation refers to the sectoral specialisation. While in the past districts were 
largely “mono-sectoral” and specialised in semi-durable low-tech consumer goods, in the last 
years they have become more “heterogeneous” in their typical output (Giunta Regionale 
2007b, p. 12). More importantly, if the decline in industrial employment has been less marked 
in district areas than in non-district ones, this is mainly due to the growth of an engineering 
sector, specialised in the production of investment goods and machineries (often, but not 
always, in the same industrial branch characterising the related district), which has 
counterbalanced the dramatic loss in productive capacity that has affected traditional 
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sectors43. Since the growth of an engineering sector producing investment goods has 
characterised many other Italian regions in the last two decades, the POR significantly 
concludes that the profile of regional industry has become more similar to Italian average 
(Giunta Regionale 2007b).  
 
To sum up, in this section we have seen that Tuscany’s economy was for long time 
characterised by a marked manufacturing capacity, mostly concentrated in industrial districts 
specialised in semi-durable consumer goods; this constituted indeed an important driving 
force of regional economic development. However, at least from the end of the 1980s, the 
distinctive features of this model have progressively faded and regional economy has become 
more anchored to the broader Italian economy’s dynamic, with regard to both the economic 
performance44 and the characteristics of the productive structure (Giunta Regionale 2007b). 
As for the latter aspect, the most important change is probably represented by the contraction 
of manufacturing activities. Several authors (Sforzi 2003, Dei Ottati 1998) identify the cause of 
this transformation in deep socio-economic processes, but also in the structural evolution of 
regional districts, which have progressively de-localised more standardised production and 
have re-focused their business on more strategic functions (such as design, marketing, 
commercial control of the supply-chain). Moreover, according to some studies, the increasing 
internationalisation of regional districts would make more and more relevant the phenomenon 
of local firms which produce abroad (or control the production of) semi-manufactured 
products, and then import them to complete the production cycle locally, so that the distinction 
between export and import is becoming more difficult to interpret.  
This last aspect is important, for regional planning documents indicate the low 
technological content of regional typical production and the related rising competition from 
low-wage countries as the main cause of the “competitiveness crisis” affecting regional 
economy. Such dynamics - testified by falling export values - would consequently require a 
intense effort to upgrade the technological profile of regional production in order to offset low-
wage countries competition. Increasing international competition and shrinking export 
certainly represent a socio-economic problem, as they entail falling output and employment. 
However, previous arguments suggest that these processes are interwoven with a more 
variegated and complex set of factors and that, in any case, date back much earlier than the 
outbreak of East-Asian competition45. 
These elements have thus to be borne in mind as a necessary background when we will 
pass on to consider the content of regional development strategy. In the next section, I will 
                                                 
43
 Between 2007 and the first half of 2009, the value of export has averagely decreased by 6% on a 
quarterly basis for fashion and textile sector, by 2,9% for leather goods and footwear sectors, and by 
0,5% for furniture (personal elaboration on IRPET 2008 and 2009 data). 
44
 Between 1980 and 2004, the difference between the annual average GDP growth rate in Tuscany and 
in Italy has been of only 0,12% (higher in Italy). 
45
 The regional planning documents, and more generally Italian debate, frequently talk about the 
“Chinese challenge”. However, the great upsurge of Chinese competition has to be dated back to 2001, 
when China becomes a member of the WTO. 
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complete such a background framework, by focusing on the innovation dynamics which 
characterise the two main sectors targeted by VINCI. 
 
 
3.3.2 A glance at the innovative dynamics in engineering and textile sectors, and at 
the role of university 
At the beginning of this section, we have mentioned that the main objective of VINCI has 
been to foster innovation-oriented relations between regional universities and SMEs, 
especially in the textile, engineering and maritime sectors (the last being a sub-class of the 
engineering sector, according to national statistics classification criteria). As we will see in the 
following sections, this also represents the most important line of intervention of the regional 
development strategy, as university-SME relations are deemed to be the weak point of 
regional economy. Therefore, before approaching these issues, it may be worth highlighting a 
couple of elements characterising the economic role of universities in the regional context, 
with specific regard to the engineering and textile sectors. 
 
The first aspect that needs to be stressed is that the level of public expenditure on R&D in 
Tuscany is fairly high if compared with national average, and even with the EU15 average; by 
contrast, private expenditure appears particularly modest (see fig. 5). These data are 
significant as they challenge - at least for the Tuscan case - Oughton et al.’s (2002, p. 100) 
hypothesis that “government expenditure on R&D, business expenditure on R&D and 
spending by the education sector on R&D are all positively and significantly correlated, that is 
they are complementary”. As we have seen in section 2.4.2.2, such a hypothesis has 
constituted one of the main rationale underpinning both the RIS approach’s claim, and the IA 
programme’s indication, for the support to regionalised university-business networks. 
The second facet is that, differently from most of Italian regions, Tuscany’s technological 
trade balance46 has remained active during the last decade (see table 2). The PRSE explains 
that this positive figure is the combined result of a growth in sales of R&D services, and of a 
weak domestic demand. Therefore, although the value of transactions is limited (it amounts to 
less than 1% of total regional trade-balance), it is nonetheless interesting, as it indicates two 
phenomena which are consistent with previous data on R&D expenditure: i) Tuscany’s 
universities and research centres (public and private) have the ability to extend their 
commercialisation effort outside regional borders or, conversely, the results of their research 
activity appear attractive for extra-regional organisations; in any case, they rely on extra-
regional connections; ii) regional industry does not constitute - on average - a significant 
“consumer” of formalised know-how and technology.  
                                                 
46
 The regional technology trade balance measures the difference between the value of sales (output) 
and purchases (input) of non-incorporated technology (know-how, patents, design, etc.) to or from 
subjects located outside the region (Giunta Regionale 2007b).  
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Figure 5: Expenditure on R&D as % of regional GDP in Tuscany, Italy and EU15 (2003) 
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Table 2: Annual average value of the technological trade balance in the most important Italian regions 
between 1997 and 2006 (in mln euros). 
Piedmont Lombardy  Liguria   Trentino  Venetian  Emilia-Ro.  
 
Marche  Lazio Tuscany Italy 
226,6 -301,6 -1,6 -13,4 -43,4 -41,8 -30,6 -235,0 75,4 -463,9 
Source: author’s elaboration on Giunta Regionale 2007a 
 
 
Moving on to examine the engineering sector, I have already mentioned that this is the 
second most important industry in Tuscany in terms of added value. Engineering is also the 
industry that has grown most intensively in the last decade and, although Tuscany is under-
specialised47 in this filed compared with the national average, the export value of engineering 
products has exceeded the one of textile and fashion goods in 2004 (Giunta Regionale 
2007b).  
The sector is highly differentiated and it ranges from automotive and aerospace, to taps 
and fittings productions; however, a great part of recent development is concentrated in the 
production of investment goods. Interestingly, a recent and in-depth empirical study (funded 
by Regional Authorities) shows that, in contrast with what regional planning documents 
assume, the expansion of this sub-sector cannot be explained with a “district perspective” 
(Regione Toscana 2008). In other words, the survey finds that regional engineering firms have 
weak input-output relations with final firms in districts, and that, significantly, there are not 
firms producing looms, knitter or other machineries for the textile industry. Therefore, the 
research’s authors argue that, since such a development reflects similar trends in other Italian 
regions, and since this process is part of a recent wider expansion of the international trade in 
                                                 
47
 Calculated as the share of a certain sector on total regional added value divided by the analogous 
quotient calculated at national level. 
Source: Author’s elaboration on Giunta Regionale 2007a 
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engineering products, the main explaining factors should be searched in logistic and 
technological improvements which have made easier and less expansive the apportionment 
of the production process and its control over long distances. This argument would be then 
supported by the following evidence: 
i) a significant proportion of regional engineering firms48 (around one-fourth) is multi-
located, that is they have more than one plant; 47% of their employees works then 
outside the region49.  
ii) A robust correlation is found between firms’ exportation - but also innovation50 - 
propensity, and their integration within trans-national supply-chain (especially if this 
occurs in the context of multinational groups). 
iii) Only 35% of firms’ suppliers is located in Tuscany, the remaining part is situated in 
other regions or abroad; in any case, spatial proximity is never indicated by 
interviewed firms as an important criterion to select suppliers (Ibid., p. 157). 
 
The same study also provides interesting insights with regard to both firms’ innovative 
dynamic, and their relation with regional universities. As for the first aspect, innovative 
performances appear influenced by the technological characteristics of the sub-sector within 
which firms operate. However, there are not wide differences between high-tech and low-tech 
sub-sectors as regards the quality of realised innovations: in the majority of cases (52% for 
high-tech and 48% for low-tech) innovation consists just in introducing a product new to the 
firm or in developing a new product starting from an already existing one; only in a very 
residual share (0,2% for both sub-classes) we find the introduction of innovation “totally new-
to-the-markets”. In this sense, the authors conclude that regional firms are chiefly “adapters” 
of external innovation, and their competitiveness lies essentially in their timing and 
customization capacity. 
The fact that high-tech firms rely on external innovation sources more intensively than low-
tech firms do is perhaps more meaningful. However, for both categories, the main innovation 
sources are represented by customers and clients, while relations with universities and 
research centres are negligible, especially for medium-to-low-tech firms (see table 3). In this 
regard, drawing on both survey’s results and qualitative interviews, the study further clarifies 
that: 
i) Regional engineering departments and research centres show a good 
propensity to collaborate with large firms (mostly located outside the region), 
especially in the framework of research projects which display high scientific 
                                                 
48 The number of engineering firms in Tuscany amount to more than 5000 (Regione Toscana 2008). 
49 These and the following data are drawn from the above mentioned study. The study is in its turn based 
on a survey conducted on a representative sample of 300 regional engineering firms. The distinction 
between low- and high-tech sectors is based on OECD’s classification criteria. 
50
 Authors demonstrate that the “probability of being innovative” falls from 84% to 70% if the firm - ceteris 
paribus - is not part of a group. 
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standards. Again, in most cases such projects have a national - and more 
often international - extension. 
ii) Only 1,4% of regional engineering SMEs is found to have relations with 
engineering departments. The causes of this weak link are complex, though 
mostly related to SMEs’ financial and organisational limits. However, reciprocal 
perceptions - as reported by the study - are significant: according to the 
interviewed academic staff, working with SMEs is frustrating because they do 
not have a “research culture” and consider university as a service provider; on 
the other side, interviewed entrepreneurs feel to be treated by academics as 
mere technical executors during collaborative projects, without any possibility 
of intervening in the project-designing phase. 
  
 
Table 3: Main external innovation sources for engineering firms in Tuscany (% of answers) 
 
% of firms 
relying on 
external 
sources 
 
Customer
s 
Suppliers Specialised advice 
Other 
firms 
University 
and r.c. 
Other 
sources 
High-tech 66,7 28,8 8,3 6,1 12,1 9,8 1,5 
Medium-tech 63,8 32,1 12 8,2 4,7 2,9 3,1 
Low-tech 59,6 34,1 13,1 6,2 3,5 0 2 
Total 61,9 
of 
which 
32,9 12,4 7,1 4,6 1,8 2,4 
Source: Regione Toscana 2008; see note n. 49 for methodology 
 
 
If engineering is the sector that has grown most, textile is the one which has undergone the 
most severe restructuring process. Between 1991 and 2001, the number of textile firms 
decreased by 20%, and in 2003 the new firms birth rate was half than it was in 1995 (Macro-
Inn 2005)51. Textile is also the regional sector that probably suffered most from the rise of 
Chinese competition: between 2001 (the year China became a member of the WTO) and 
2005, the value of textile import from China increased by more than 400%52.  
However, if on the one hand Chinese competition has certainly offset many small firms, on 
the other hand previous data also depict a more complex restructuring process of the 
international division of labour. Indeed, between 2001 and 2005 regional export towards 
China increased as well (although less than import); between 1991 and 2003, the amount of 
foreign direct investments from Italy in textile industry abroad grew by eight times; in 2004, 1% 
of total workforce employed by regional textile firms was located abroad. Moreover, previous 
figures confirm what we mentioned in the previous section: the contraction of manufacturing 
capacity started well before the upsurge of international competition. In other words, as an 
                                                 
51
 As a consequence, the “weight” of the sector on regional economy in terms of added value has 
reduced from 14% in 1980 down to 6% in 2003 (Giunta Regionale 2007b). 
52
 Correlatively, during the same period, the share of Chinese textile imports on total imports expanded 
from 1,8% to 28,9%, and the normalised trade balance between China and Tuscany (as regards textile 
products) has gone down to -67% compared with initial -2,3% (Macro-Inn 2005). 
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empirical study has brought out, Prato district (where most textile firms are located) now 
imports a great amount of semi-manufactured products, which are finished and made-up 
locally (Macro-Inn 2005), and which are subsequently sold to international buyers. Therefore, 
the difference with the past would lie in the fact that this chain is not more locally contained, 
and that the district has lost control over some initial and final production and 
commercialisation stages. In this sense, the study concludes that the real competitive problem 
of many regional firms is that they have been unable to gain control of more strategic 
functions and productive phases, and consequently they have a subordinated position within 
global-reaching supply-chains. 
Finally, from the same study it also emerges that textile firms are averagely less innovative 
than engineering ones53. However, even though sampling criteria and survey questions are 
not the same in the two studies and consequently data cannot be automatically compared, 
some similarities can nonetheless be identified. In this sense, it is notable that the two studies 
are mutually consistent as regards the qualitative characteristics of introduced innovations. 
Indeed, as for engineering firms, in the large majority of cases (around 70%) innovation 
consisted in introducing products new to the firm (but not to the market) or in improving 
existing products. Similar too is the relationship with external innovation sources: in the rare 
cases where textile firms carry out R&D activities in collaboration with external organisations, 
they largely prefer private consultants or specialised companies to universities or research 
centres (57% against 28%). Interestingly, the study also analyses specifically a sample of 
firms which benefited from SF; it finds that: 
• firms benefiting from Structural Funds are normally larger, more structured and more 
connected to the foreign markets than average; 
• the first destination of resources coming form SF is represented by the purchase of new 
machineries, that is productive investments (this is an important aspect: we will see that 
this kind of investment is not allowed any longer in the present programming period of 
SF); 
• when using SF’s resources to purchase specialised services/advice, firms’ main 
objective (72%) is to explore new potential commercial outlets abroad or to find new 
productive and commercial partners (only in the remaining 28% specialised advice has 
a technological content). 
  
 To sum up, previous data seem to draw quite a clear picture of the “objects” that the 
VINCI programme has tried to deal with. Regional universities (especially engineering 
departments) appear rather dynamic and connected with other national and international 
public and private institutions. They are interested in taking part in collaborative projects, on 
condition that such projects can meet the expectations and academic interests of researchers; 
                                                 
53
 Only 57,1% of surveyed firms declared to have realised a product or process innovation in the last 
year (compared with 68% of engineering firms) 
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on the contrary they are reluctant to get involved with local SMEs, which cannot guarantee an 
adequate scientific level. For similar but reversed reasons, SMEs find frustrating collaborating 
with university departments. 
On the other hand, regional engineering and textile firms carry out - on average - little R&D 
activity. Probably, their low technological profile negatively influences their competitive 
performances. However, the nature and intensity of the R&D effort seem also to be 
determined - at least in part - by the specific technological trajectory of firms’ sector, and by 
their relative specialisation within it. More or less clearly, previous analyses suggest that other 
factors, such as stylistic features, advanced logistic devices, customisation, etc., may prove to 
be as important as technological innovation in determining firms’ competitiveness. In 
particular, internalisation processes appear crucial to understand structural changes occurring 
in these sectors; similarly, firms’ position and nodal power within articulated and wide-
reaching supply- and distribution-chains seem to play a critical role. In any case, as the study 
on the engineering sector has pointed out, there exists a correlation between firms’ 
innovativeness, commercial expansion and integration within multi-national groups, where the 
causal direction of this relationship is far from being univocal. 
Therefore, previous studies’ results chime with much of the literature which questions the 
heuristic validity of territorialized definitions of development, and of their related policy 
implications (see section 1.3). In particular, there are strong overlaps as regards the following 
arguments and findings: 
• More often than not, universities participate in trans-regional and trans-national 
innovation networks, where excellence and scientific relevance are the main criterions 
for membership (Huggins et al. 2008; Wright et al. 2008). Relationships between 
universities and regional SMEs are sporadic and seem determined more by regional 
public incentives than by real strategic motives (Lawton Smith 2007; Huggins et al. 
2008; Lagendijk 2002). 
• The most important external innovation sources for SMEs are customers, suppliers and 
other firms, often located in other regions (CEC 2004; Héraud 2003); SMEs scarcely 
rely on “regional research infrastructure” and, in any cases, there does not seem to be 
a strong correlation between regional research environment and industrial 
competences (Héraud 2003; Cooke et al. 2000). 
• Sectoral specificities matter for explaining firms’ innovation dynamic and needs 
(Lagendijk and Lorentzen 2007; Lawton Smith et al. 2003; Uyarra 2007). 
• SF tend to benefit the firms which are relatively less needy (Uyarra 2007; Pellegrin 
2007). 
 
In the following sections, I will finally move on to consider VINCI programme’s content and 
results. It is worth stressing here, though, that the data this section has drawn on come from 
studies funded by Tuscany’s Regional Authorities, if not from regional planning documents 
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themselves. In other words, this is information which is potentially available to regional policy-
makers. 
 
 
3.4 Content and results of the VINCI programme 
On the 20th December 2005, the European Commission approved54 two million Euros co-
financing the biannual regional programme of Innovative Actions VINCI, submitted by 
Tuscany’s Regional Authorities. The EU contribution amounted to the 47% of the total 
resources mobilised by the programme: the Regional Authorities provided further 1,5 million, 
and 0,7 million came from the private sector. The implementation started officially in February 
2006 and it formally concluded in April 2008 (although some activities went on in the following 
months). 
In the next sections, I will first review the programme’s content and objectives, and I will 
subsequently analyse the official results. 
 
 
3.4.1 Content and objectives of VINCI  
In section 2.4.2 we have seen that the EU Innovative Actions programme expressly aimed 
at socially and culturally engineering regions. We have also seen that, concretely, the IA 
programme consisted in offering Regional Authorities the possibility of experimenting more 
“sophisticated and adventurous” policy practices in “future-oriented” fields, namely the 
creation of regional innovation networks (CEC 2001). The “mechanic” of the programme then 
demanded that Regional Authorities drew up a proposal for a regional programme of 
Innovative Actions in the context of a regional public-private partnership, and subsequently 
submitted it for evaluation to the Commission. Moreover, the programme had to fall under one 
of the “three strategic themes” identified by the Commission: i) regional economies based on 
knowledge and innovation; ii) the information society at the service of regional development; 
iii) regional identity and sustainable development. 
 
VINCI has intended to experiment with innovative practices under the first of the three 
strategic themes. Within this framework, and coherently with the Guidelines’ indications, the 
programme proposal submitted to the Commission sets the following main objective: 
“Stimulating R&D activities, which are particularly weak among local small and medium 
enterprises operating in traditional sectors of the regional economy. This can be achieved 
by promoting aggregative processes among firms and research institutions, centred on 
organizational patterns based on the model of the Virtual Enterprise/Virtual Organisation”. 
                                                 
54 European Commission Decision n. CCI 2005 IT 16 0 PP 006. 
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In short, as I have already mentioned (sec. 3.3) the programme has aimed at developing 
SMEs-university networks, by supporting the dissemination of a particular organisational 
model – the Virtual Enterprise – derived from the ICT sector. The programme proposal then 
specifies the underlying rationales in the following terms: 
•  Traditional sectors of regional economy are increasingly threatened by low-cost 
productions coming from developing countries. In order to preserve their competitive 
position, firms operating in these sectors have to increase their innovative capacity. 
• Previous experiences have shown that “the creation of networks among firms, research 
centres and university represents the appropriate approach to seize the systemic 
nature of innovative processes”. 
• However, the same experiences have also demonstrated that, because of their limited 
size, SMEs are reluctant to take part in these kind of networks, considered as 
“excessively binding”. Their limited dimension, along with the specialisation in low-tech 
sectors, also explains another structural weakness affecting regional SMEs: “the 
prevalence of informal activities of R&D, which are no more sufficient to defend market 
shares”. 
• In this context, thanks to its flexible nature based on modern ICT solutions, the Virtual 
Enterprise model represents an organisational innovation which enables SMEs to 
overcome their reluctance to participate in innovation-related collaborative projects, 
thus also favouring the shift towards a more formalised approach to R&D. 
• Finally, the definition of the content of the programme is the result of an “intense 
consultation activity” which has involved both workers’ unions and entrepreneurial 
associations on one level, and the main regional research institutions on the other level. 
 
On the basis of the previous objective and rationales, the programme is then articulated in 
three main actions (or operational objectives). 
• Action 1: Analysis and contextualisation of VE/VO models 
Drawing on a review of existing VE/VO models, the initial phase has to lead to drawing 
up the guidelines for the implementation of pilot projects in the three target sectors. 
 
• Action 2: Experimentation of the VE/VO model 
This stage aims at experimenting with the identified models, by co-financing 5-10 pilot 
projects. The action is further articulated in the following steps:  
a) publication of a call for proposals, addressed to regional firms, research centres, and 
innovation poles; 
b) submission and selection of project proposals to be co-financed by Regional 
Authorities; 
c) realisation of the selected projects; 
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d) demonstration activities and results dissemination through workshops, conferences, 
etc. 
 
• Action 3: Modelling, trans-regional comparison and mainstreaming of results 
Finally, results stemming from the experimentation are meant to be modelled and 
formalised into an operational method, to be subsequently mainstreamed in other 
innovation policy actions. 
 
Of the three actions, the most significant is certainly the second one; indeed, this is the 
module that absorbs most of the available resources (around 90%) and that more closely 
corresponds to the experimental finalities of the programme. Therefore, the examination of the 
VINCI strategy has also to include a brief analysis of the Guidelines accompanying the call for 
projects. 
The Guidelines define the Virtual Enterprise/Virtual Organisation as “a system of different 
organisations which try to seize together a business opportunity, on the basis of a common 
but temporary project. Virtual Enterprise does not exist in a physical sense […] but only as a 
communication network. It represents a partnership among firms and organisations, oriented 
to jointly offering a product or service” (IRPET 2006, p. 3). 
Following this definition, pilot projects are required to possess three main building blocks: 
the identification of a business opportunity, supported by a business plan; the definition of a 
common virtual structure, based on the adoption of an ICT platform; the specification of a 
potential innovation, realisable through to the complementary contribution of different 
partners, which justifies the business opportunity. Accordingly, the key evaluation criteria 
concern the soundness of the business opportunity, the sophistication of the ICT platform, and 
the degree of innovativeness of the envisaged new product, process or service. After 
characterising the model and detailing projects’ requirements, the Guidelines end with a brief 
analysis of the three target sectors. 
Therefore, compared with the programme proposal submitted to the Commission, the 
Guidelines introduce two new elements: i) a definition of the VE model and a series of (rather 
precise) prescriptions with regard to the content and form that pilot projects have to display; ii) 
a greater emphasis on the expected commercial outcomes - the business opportunity - of pilot 
projects and, conversely, a relative downplay of the role of the ICT platform, which becomes 
only one of the elements of the model (we will see in the next sections the reasons for such 
changes at this stage). 
 
Overall, the joint examination of the programme proposal and of the Guidelines suggests 
some observations. 
First of all, it is indisputable that VINCI widely draws on a new regionalist logic: the 
emphasis on formal R&D activities, the prioritisation of localised firm-university networks, the 
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prominence attributed to high-tech sectors: all these factors contribute to ascribing this 
programme to new regionalist-derived policy schemes. 
Secondly, as we have seen, the programme proposal states that the formulation phase 
has been based on a wide-ranging consultation activity with social partners and universities, 
but no mention is made of the specific position expressed by each partner, thus implying that 
there has been unanimous consensus about the strategy.  
Thirdly, the programme proposal maintains (apodictically) that the VE is the most 
appropriate model to achieve the objectives, given the regional context; however, it is notable 
that the draft never specifies what the model consists of and thus in which ways it is 
appropriate. Curiously, in the call for projects - which is meant to represent the real 
experimentation moment - the Guidelines appear conversely quite strict in their formal 
provisions. Odd also is the fact that the Guidelines do not make any reference to the existing 
literature on the VE55. 
Lastly, and related to the previous point, the idea that the limited number of firm-university 
relations and the prevailing informal nature of industrial research activities can be explained 
only with the small dimension of regional firms is questionable and, above all, highly limiting. 
Indeed, that would mean disregarding all those factors (cultural, aspirational, sectoral, 
positional, etc.), that the studies reported in the foregoing section indicated as crucial to 
understand innovative behaviours - and the related spatialities - of target 
organisations/businesses. In this sense, it is meaningful that the Guidelines draw an analysis 
of the three target sectors only after having defined the characteristics of the VE model. 
Moreover, such an analysis mainly focuses on structural statistics (number of firms, average 
turnover, etc.): specific knowledge needs and practices are not particularly considered. Even 
when such needs emerge extemporaneously (for instance with reference to the need for 
external expertise in marketing strategies, in design-related activities, etc.), the Guidelines do 
not draw the obvious conclusion that these demands are more likely to be met by 
consultancies, rather than by tighter links with R&D university departments56. 
 
To conclude, the above reflections raise just as many questions, which will be the object of 
the following qualitative inquiry: was there an unanimous consensus among social partners 
                                                 
55
 A literature review on the VE/VO is proposed in the modelling report (Lazzaretti 2008). According to 
the author, the theme of the VE/VO has been approached by an heterogeneous set of studies, ranging 
from cybernetic theories to sociological investigations. In Lazzeretti’s view, these studies can be grouped 
in two main research fields: on the one hand, we find approaches directly derived from computer science 
and mainly interested in analysing what technical characteristics ICT platforms should possess to foster 
pervasive and diffused computing activities; on the other hand, there is a broad strand of management 
studies, which chiefly focuses on assessing potential competitiveness improvements deriving from the 
integration of users and producers through virtual communities. 
I have decided not to analyse thoroughly such literature, since what matters for the present research 
objectives is – it seems to me – how the concept is concretely translated, used and understood by the 
actors in the specific context of the programme under investigation.  
56
 Consultancies may clearly include academics among their staff and carry out high level research as 
well; what changes is the scope of research activities and the nature of incentives, which make these 
entities more suitable to fulfil firms’ requirement. 
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and about the content of the strategy? Was the programme formulation preceded by a 
thorough analysis of sectoral technological specificities and firms’ innovative needs or - as it 
seems - did Regional Authorities follow quite a “reversed” logic (that is, instead of starting 
from the analysis, they identified first the tool, and sought then the problem)? Why is the 
programme proposal so vague about the characteristics of the model, whereas the Guidelines 
are so strict? Why are there some discrepancies between the programme proposal and the 
Guidelines? 
More generally, all these questions underlie a more basic - and crucial - issue: How (who, 
responding to which rationalities and constraints, and according to which procedures) were 
the content of VINCI actually decided? And which is the real role played by the EU in this 
process? 
Answering this question means going to the heart of the relation between local 
governance, MLG system and content of the EU regional policy. However, before 
approaching this matter, we have first to consider whether VINCI has met the expected 
objectives. Indeed, as mentioned in the introductory section to this chapter, assessing the 
effectiveness of the programme (in relation to the objectives set by the Regional Authorities) 
represents the starting point for investigating the other questions. On the grounds of the 
previous arguments and of the theoretical framework developed throughout the work, the 
basic hypothesis I advance here is that the programme will be unable to achieve the expected 
goals (that is the approved projects will either not generate the expected outcomes in terms of 
innovative and commercial performances, or not display the expected SME-university 
configuration), because it fails to recognise the relational dimensions of innovation processes, 
and their related spatialities. 
 
 
3.4.2 Results of VINCI 
In July 2006, the first of the three Actions of VINCI ended with the publication of the call for 
proposals and of the associated Guidelines. In December 2006, 12 pilot projects proposals 
(out of the 32 submitted) were officially selected and granted with EU and regional funds. In 
March 2008, the experimentation phase came to an end and, in parallel, modelling and 
evaluation activities started. Finally, evaluation and modelling reports were published during 
spring 2009.  
 
Before starting to analyse the programme’s results, it is worth briefly examining the content 
of the approved projects. Clearly, there is not space here to sift the characteristics of each 
single project; therefore, I will group the projects according to their dominant logic or main 
objectives. 
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For the relative majority of cases (6 out of 12), the main objective may be defined as 
“positional”: that is, strengthening partners’ “bargaining power” within a supply-chain (for 
partnerships mainly made up of suppliers), or improving the market access by overcoming 
commercial intermediaries (for groups of small final producers). In both cases, the underlying 
strategy has consisted in pooling together complementary competences with a view to 
constituting a more integrated offer, thus acquiring greater weight and control over the supply 
or distributive chain57. 
For three other projects, the goal has been to open up new areas of business by 
transferring technologies or management methods from a (more high-tech) upstream sector to 
a (more low-tech) downstream one. Such a “technological crossover” has thus been pursued 
by grouping together operators from both sectors58.  
The remaining three cases have had a more traditional objective: developing strong 
technological innovation by assembling together differentiated and specific technological 
competencies59. 
  
Following this cursory categorisation of the experimentation projects, the first series of data 
which has to be considered relates to the “registry” characteristics of the operators which took 
part in the programme. 
Overall, the 12 pilot projects involved 81 participants, mostly SMEs (see table 4). It is 
interesting to note that only 4 of the 12 funded partnerships included one university 
department (see tab. 5), and as many as half of the partnerships were not comprised of any 
“specialised” technology-provider whatsoever. Therefore, if the creation of networks 
specifically including firms and university was one the key objective of the programme, we can 
conclude that results in this regard have been rather poor. 
Another intriguing aspect concerns the location of firms: northern Provincie60- in which, as 
we have seen (sec. 3.3.1), most economic activities are concentrated - are over-represented 
compared with southern and more rural areas (see table 6). Interestingly, the only exception is 
                                                 
57
 Within this category fall the following projects: E-meccanica (bringing together small suppliers in the 
shipbuilding industry, by developing a common designing and engineering process) – Railteam 
(basically the same as E-meccanica, but in the automotive industry) – E-nautica (bringing together small 
service providers in the ICT and logistic sectors, by developing a tracking system for goods moving in 
and out Tuscany’s harbours) - IDETOS (grouping together small producers in the furniture sector, in 
order to open a common flagship shop) – RECUBEnet (clustering a group of service providers in the 
environment-recycling industry, in order to develop a new integrated recycling service at regional level) - 
Lobyact (constituting a small group of craft-shipbuilders in order to develop common marketing and 
commercial strategies). 
58
 This category includes the following projects: Nautilus (bringing together engineering operators 
working in the automation sector with the purpose of developing new machineries for the maritime 
sector) – Prina (grouping companies and research institutes operating in the computer design sector to 
develop a new software for the engineering components industry) – VirGoal (a group of ICT and textile 
firms trying to develop a new computer-based management method for textile supply chain). 
59
 This category comprises the following projects: Pilopt (a group of companies and university 
departments trying to develop a new optical laser for the bio-medical sector) - INNOVA (textile firms and 
technology transfer centre to develop a new synthetic fibre) – MASSA (university spin-offs and research 
department developing a new device to detect gas pollution). 
60
 Provincie constitute a further administrative repartition of the territory, intermediate between region 
and municipal district. They correspond to NUTS3 level according to the European Nomenclature.  
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represented by the Prato Provincia, in which the majority of textile firms cluster, and which has 
probably felt most the effects of the economic downturn. Data on firms’ location clearly chime 
with those on sectoral specialisation: only five firms (out of 71) belong to the textile sector, 
whereas as many as one-fifth of participating firms operate in the ICT sector. More generally, 
the evaluation report finds that, in a series of indicators (ranging from financial capacity to 
size, to R&D effort), firms under investigation show better performances than regional 
average61. Therefore, these figures indirectly confirm two important critical aspects that we 
have already identified in existing literature (see sec. 2.4.3): i) this kind of strategy tends to 
benefit more firms which are relatively less needy or, in any case, already aware of the 
“innovation problématique”; ii) funds stemming from such strategies tend to be absorbed 
comparatively more by areas which are relatively more dynamic.  
 
 
 
Table 4: Breakdown of participants in the Vinci 
programme62  
  N % 
SMEs 71 87,7 
Research Centres/Universities 5 6,2 
Large firms /State-owned 
companies 3 3,7 
"Centri Servizi" 2 2,5 
Total 81 100 
Source: Final evaluation report (RESCO 2009) 
 
 
 
Table 5: Breakdown of the projects according to their 
composition 
Typology N 
Projects constituted only by SMEs 4 
Projects constituted by SMEs and university or research 
centre 4 
Projects constituted by SMEs and "centri servizi" 2 
Projects constituted by SMEs and large/public companies 2 
Source: RESCO 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
61
 In the words of the evaluators: “the VE/VO approach aroused greater interest in more structured 
enterprises, hence more capable of addressing the experimentation of innovative approaches” (RESCO 
2009, p. 33). As mentioned in note n. 39, the evaluation report is the only document available in English. 
This and following quotations are original. 
62
 According to the Programme regulation, large firms could take part in projects but they could not 
benefit from public funding. “Centri Servizi” can be defined as public-private technology transfer centres. 
They do not normally perform in-house R&D, but adapt existing technologies to specific firms’ 
exigencies. Usually, they are funded and created by public-private partnerships involving local 
authorities and local branches of business associations. 
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Table 6: Location of “VINCI” and regional firms by Provincia 
Provincia  VINCI firms Regional (total) 
 N % N % 
Florence 24 32,4 18.074 29,1 
Livorno  11 14,9 3.134 5,1 
Lucca 9 12,2 6.250 10,1 
Massa 7 9,5 2.895 4,7 
Pisa 10 13,5 6.171 9,9 
Prato 6 8,1 9.062 14,6 
Pistoia  7 9,5 5.233 8,4 
Siena 0 0,0 3.223 5,2 
Arezzo 0 0,0 5.990 9,7 
Grosseto 0 0,0 2.065 3,3 
Total 74 100 62.097 100 
Source: RESCO 2009 
 
 
Moving on to consider the proper results of the evaluation exercise, the final report lists the 
following “evaluation objectives”63: 
• verifying the congruence between the content of the “strategic framework […] and 
the procedural and implementation phases” (RESCO 2009, p. 4); 
• assessing the “degree of achievement of expected goals” (Ibid.); 
• estimating the sustainability of the model. 
 
Now, a preliminary remark has to be made: when going through the evaluation document, 
it is impossible not to note an extremely sympathetic - if not complaisant - attitude towards the 
programme. The reasons for such an approach can be various: from the well-known 
ambiguity involved in the evaluator-paid-by-the-evaluatee circumstance, to more subtle 
motives related to the common cultural “adherence” to the dominant paradigm. Whatever the 
reason, the point is that this impression has been confirmed by the Regional Authorities’ staff 
itself: according to one of the interviewed policy-officers “evaluation has been too flattering 
[…]. I would have been more critical” (PO2 13/05/09). Two aspects appear particularly 
questionable. 
First, from the very beginning the report gives a strong endorsement of the model, without 
this being substantiated by definitive empirical evidence. Indeed, the report first states that the 
model, as defined by the Guidelines, is apt to “respond positively to the demands of the 
market” (RESCO 2009, p. 20), only to then recognise that “the degree of achievement of the 
expected aims indicates an impressive performance for some aspects, while for others it is 
hard to unequivocally assess, largely because it is very likely that we have still to wait several 
months for the effects to fully emerge”. 
                                                 
63
 As for the methodology, the report has been based on the following sources: secondary data coming 
from the project proposals submitted to the Regional Authorities; direct interviews with the “project 
leaders” accompanied by random phone interviews with some project partners.  
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As regards the “impressive performances”, these mainly concern the achievement of the 
business opportunity and the strengthening of competitive positions: two areas in which, 
according to the report, “outcomes can be judged in many respects as verging on excellence” 
(Ibid., p. 6). However - and we come to the second critical aspect -, indicators appraising such 
dimensions are chiefly based on qualitative - and hardly verifiable - self-assessments provided 
by the evaluatees themselves64 (i.e. the project-leaders). That clearly weakens the reliability of 
indicators, for one can argue that, in an evaluative context, self-assessments may be easily 
biased by a plurality of factors, and primarily by the objective of gaining credit vis-à-vis 
Regional Authorities with a view to accessing future funding opportunities (and this is 
particularly the case here, as we will see later on). 
As a matter of fact, if we look carefully at more “substantive” indicators, the image we get 
changes dramatically. So, if on the one hand most of the projects have set “ambitious market 
objectives”, on the other hand, in only four cases the business opportunity has been achieved 
(that is the new product/service has been effectively brought to the markets). Similarly, if on 
the one hand the report notes “tangible signs in terms of the increase of competitive potential 
[…] for the majority of the participants” (Ibid. p. 41), on the other hand we find that in only two 
projects a growth in the aggregate turnover is recorded. More, if on the one hand the majority 
of projects is found to show “high level of functional integration among partners” (Ibid.), on the 
other hand, we observe that in only four cases operators have come to draw up a formal 
agreement to share revenues deriving from common selling or patenting activities. 
Beyond such discrepancies, and despite the aprioristic endorsement, the evaluation report 
still outlines a consistent series of shortcomings: 
i. It is recognised that the analysis of target sectors is rather generic, this representing a 
potential “weakness in terms of disseminating models showing high levels of 
sophistication” (Ibid. p. 42). 
ii. The realisation of the programme is found to be highly demanding for both the 
participants, and the Managing Authorities which provided a strong material support (in 
terms of technical advice, mentoring, help-desk, etc.) all over the implementation65. 
iii. As regards the innovative effort, in only two cases innovation has consisted in a 
product/process/service totally new to the market, whereas “in the majority of cases it 
                                                 
64
 What follows is a sample of questions asked during the evaluation exercise as they can be drawn from 
the evaluation questionnaire annexed to the report: “Did you succeed in achieving all the pre-fixed 
objectives? Did the partners set up relations of trust with each other? Did the virtual strategy work? Was 
the level of integration in the partnership such as to boost the competitive profile of the grouping and of 
the individual partner enterprises? Was the initial business opportunity achieved?”. 
65
 In the evaluators’ words: “The correct application of the VE/VO model therefore demands that the 
enterprises assume considerable responsibilities (and workloads) oriented towards modifying the 
organisational, productive and commercial structure. Instead, from the point of view of the Regional 
Authority, it is clear that the support for the implementation of the VE/VO model is crucial to avoid 
rendering the innovative contribution of the initiative futile. On the other hand, as demonstrated by the 
RPIA VINCI experience, this activity demands considerable efforts in the sphere of mentoring and 
ongoing services of assistance for most of the life cycle of the projects” (RESCO 2009, p. 61). The 
judgment has also been confirmed by one of the policy-officers: “carrying out this programme has been 
very tiring for everybody. Both us [regional administration] and participants had to face a new and 
complex methodology, that no one really knew how to manage” (PO3 19/05/09). 
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could not be classified as technological excellence” (RESCO 2009, p. 60). Moreover, 
only one of the four projects that have scored best (according to a synthetic 
performance-indicator proposed by evaluators) has included one university 
department/research centre in the partnership. And, significantly, the other three 
projects fall within the first of the three categories I have identified above: the one 
constituted by small suppliers/producers, that is the one which, theoretically, is the less 
technology-oriented. 
iv. According to more than half of the project-leaders, installing the ICT platform has not 
been a priority and, on average, its role has been deemed not significant for the full 
implementation of the project. This is an important point because, as we have seen, the 
ICT constituted an essential element in the architecture of the programme strategy: 
more precisely, it represented the lever to bridge the academic and business spheres. 
In the words of one of the expert who drafted the Guidelines, “the programme was 
called Virtual Enterprise precisely because identified the ICTs as an indispensable 
device to achieve more structured forms of networking. […]. If results in this regard have 
been disappointing, I have to conclude that we have not met the final objective” 
(Bellandi 5/06/09).  
 
Also drawing on the above outcomes, the report importantly concludes that the VE/VO 
model can be of interest only to that part of the productive system which possesses “special 
features not common to most of the regional enterprises” (RESCO 2009, p. 62). 
Consequently, it recommends that the mainstreaming of the model into standard support 
measures “be made with caution, and above all only in the presence of certain conditions” 
(Ibid.). Besides, the report suggests that, if Regional Authorities decided to propose the model 
again, this should represent a possible option among more traditional incentive-schemes, in 
order to screen out “in a natural manner those getting involved solely for the purpose of 
benefiting from the incentives” (Ibid.). What is more, it is advised that greater attention should 
be paid to the selection criteria used to assess the “innovativeness” of proposals, and that the 
ICT platform should always be optional. In any case, according to the evaluators, the three 
elements constituting the VE model - business opportunity, innovation and ICT platform - can 
be implemented separately, thus implying that the causal link between innovative and 
commercial performances is not so straight66. 
 
As a concluding passage of this review, it can be observed that the final evaluation report’s 
recommendations widely resonate with those advanced by the modelling (Lazzeretti 2009) 
and intermediate evaluation reports (Caloffi 2007). 
                                                 
66
 In the evaluators’ words: “we are convinced that the promotion of the networking approach can be 
sustained even where not necessarily linked to the business opportunity, and vice versa” (Ibid. p. 64). 
 98 
In fact, both documents point out that the three sectors were quite different in terms of 
market and technological characteristics, and that this important aspect has not been 
sufficiently taken into account by the programme. This flaw would then be mirrored in the fact 
that projects’ organisational structures (characteristics of the components) were rarely 
coherent with innovation and market objectives. In general, the intermediate report finds that 
the VE model was not appropriate for all the three sectors, and the modelling report concludes 
that the programme has not really generated projects that could be rated as best practices.  
Interestingly, the modelling report also argues that, partially because of the limitations 
imposed by SF regulation67, only territorial proximity has been favoured, disregarding other 
forms of proximity (such as cognitive, institutional etc.) which are just as important for the 
success of this kind of programme. In support of this argument, the report draws attention on 
the fact that partnerships including a research centre/university have not produced - on 
average - the best innovative results. In its concluding remarks, the report then reasons that 
building networks is not a sufficient condition to have a regional innovation system; it also 
adds that if regional firms appear slow in adopting new models, Regional Authorities are 
probably too quick. 
Another relevant aspect, stressed by both reports, is that many participants in the VINCI 
programme had already took part in other similar actions funded by Regional Authorities 
during previous years; in particular, 20% of the SMEs and 60% of the university 
departments/research centres which have benefited from funding under VINCI, had received 
financing also from a previous IA programme, implemented in Tuscany between 2002 and 
2004. Now, what is striking is that organisations participating in more than one programme 
have not performed better - on average - than entities participating for the first time. According 
to the intermediate report, this fact is particularly negative: indeed, VINCI has put a particular 
emphasis on the final (commercialisation) phase of the innovation process, while previous 
programmes had focused more on the initial (pre-competitive research) phases; therefore, 
organisations participating in both programmes would have been expected to take advantage 
of such a “continuity” in funding.  
 
So, even though they diverge on the overall appraisal of the programme strategy, the three 
evaluation reports are substantially in agreement as regards to the identification of a series of 
specific limitations and failures, which would have especially affected the initial phases 
(designing and selection). In fact, the only aspect which has been judged successful by all the 
reports and by other relevant actors/observers concerns the experimentation stage and, in 
particular, the mentoring and support activities provided by the Regional Authorities68. As 
                                                 
67 According to which entities which take part in a regional programme funded through Structual Funds 
must be located in the same region (or, better, in the territory which is under the jurisdiction of the 
managing authority). 
68
 Appreciation for these aspects has been particularly stressed by the final evaluation report. However, 
the importance of these activities has also been confirmed directly to me by the project leaders, during 
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already mentioned, the managing body (constituted by Regional Authorities’ staff) offered 
constant support and advice; it also played the role of animator, by organising a series of 
expert-led seminaries, workshops, etc. on the theme of the VE model; importantly, both the 
Regional Authorities’ staff and the project partners attended such seminaries as participants. 
The reason for such a general appreciation has been explained by the author of the modelling 
report, Luciana Lazzeretti, in the following terms: “these support activities have helped 
develop a climate of trust towards regional institutions, which is probably the best result 
achieved by the programme” (Lazzeretti 27/05/09). 
The implicit issue transpiring from the previous quotation (luck of trust between institutional 
actors and private operators) is significant because, as we have seen above (sec. 3.3.1), 
Tuscany is traditionally characterised for its widespread cooperative attitude and the 
permeation between the economic and political dimension. However, the deep sense of this 
aspect will become clear only at the end of this chapter, after we will have explored the 
characteristics of regional innovation governance.  
 
Recapitulating, in this section we have seen that: organisations and territories which have 
taken more advantage of VINCI are also those relatively less in need; partnerships including 
university/research centres have been a minority and, in any case, results on the innovation 
side have been far from being brilliant; the central element of the programme strategy - the 
organisational method based on the ICT - has been almost unanimously considered not 
significant; territorial proximity has been evaluated insufficient (if not counterproductive) to 
guarantee effectiveness of networks; Regional Authorities have been basically blamed for 
imposing models which are not suitable for regional characteristics; there are research 
organisations and firms which have repeatedly and in large amounts benefited from EU and 
regional funding, generating in exchange modest outcomes.  
In sum, this series of problematic elements can be attributed to both substantive and 
procedural shortfalls of the VINCI programme. On the one hand, the innovation strategy 
seems not consistent with the cognitive needs and practices of the vast majority of regional 
firms. On the other hand, the approach underlying the formulation phase appears inadequate, 
precisely because it is not sensitive to the complexity and plurality of those needs and 
practices. 
On the basis of these arguments, we can with confidence conclude that, overall, VINCI has 
not attained the expected objectives and that the hypothesis advanced in the previous section 
is - at least in part - correct. As a matter of fact, most of the projects have not displayed the 
expected configuration (university-firm); moreover, the most successful projects have focused 
more on improving the nodal position within their supply/distributive chain, than on realising 
                                                                                                                                            
some informal talks I had with them on the occasion of the formal presentation of the programme’s 
results. 
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technological innovations: given the analysis proposed in the previous section, this outcome 
was predictable too.  
These initial research results represent thus the basis to explore the relation between the 
thematic elements (and the results) of the strategy put forward through VINCI and the 
institutional mechanisms which have underpinned its formulation. In this perspective, the first 
question which arises is how these results have been interpreted by the main actors, and in 
particular by the policy-makers. This will be the topic of the next section. 
 
 
3.5 VINCI in the context of the regional innovation policy 
From this section onwards I will investigate the theoretical assumptions, the political ends 
and the procedural aspects which have underpinned the designing and delivery of VINCI. 
More precisely, I will first try to explain policy-makers’ personal evaluations about the 
programme’s outcomes by reconstructing the formulation process. Following that, I will frame 
VINCI in the context of the wider regional innovation policy, in order to further clarify its 
rationales and the significance of its outcomes. 
The objective of this section is therefore to delineate a more precise policy-framework, 
through which studying the regional governance in relation to the EU dimension. 
 
 
3.5.1 The formulation process of VINCI 
Drawing on the official evaluation reports, I have concluded above that the programme has 
not achieved the main targets, so as defined in the programme proposal submitted to the 
European Commission. In particular, the programme has not succeeded in building new 
significant connections between the academic and the business spheres, nor has it 
engendered a consistent shift among SMEs towards more formalised forms of R&D.  
 When questioned on these disappointing results, the interviewed policy-officers have 
replied that: 
“Yes, it is true that outcomes on the innovation side have been relatively weak, but the 
main objective was to introduce an organisational innovation which fostered more market-
oriented projects. During the implementation, we pushed strongly on the market ‘viability’ 
of the projects; in this sense, the results achieved by some of the projects are 
encouraging” (PO2 13/05/09). 
 “Well, let’s say that, from our point of view, technological innovation was important, but 
organisational innovation - that is the framework which made the various participants 
work together - was even more so” (PO3 19/05/09). 
Therefore, from the officials’ perspective, the programme has - at least in part - met some 
objectives, especially those related to market and organisational aspects. Now, it does not 
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matter here that evaluation reports cast doubt also on these alleged achievements; the point 
is rather to comprehend the evident discrepancy existing between the finalities outlined in the 
programme proposal and what is indicated as relevant by the policy-officers at the conclusion 
of the experimentation phase (policy-officers who - it is worth reiterating - are also the authors 
of the programme proposal). 
 
In order to account for such an incongruity, it is necessary to distinguish analytically the 
formulation moment from the implementation one. 
As regards the initial stage, interviews shed light on two important aspects. First, as 
predictable, the original programme proposal was drafted with a view to satisfying 
Commission’s requirements and expectations. So, as reported by another policy-officer, 
“when writing the programme, we obviously introduced elements which could appear 
‘appealing’ to the Commission, such as the idea of ‘virtual’, the benchmarking, etc.” (PO1 
08/05/09). The weight of Commission’s indications is then further clarified in the following 
terms: “VINCI had necessarily to mirror the Commission’s Communication on the Innovative 
Actions69, which urged to develop networks. Moreover, the programme had to comply with the 
very strict SF regulations” (PO2 13/05/09). 
Secondly, but related to the previous point, it seems that the choice of the model has 
occurred in a rather cursory and random manner, without minding too much to its effective 
“viability”: 
“Virtual Enterprise is a label under which you can put everything. Honestly, we have 
chosen it also because it was generic enough” (PO1 08/05/09). 
“How did we find the model? Basically, through a review of existing networking models. 
[…] We were aware that this model originated in a different sector compared to the target 
ones, but we attempted anyway” (PO3 19/05/09) 
Overall, it is recognised that: 
“Sectors were chosen quite randomly. We were not really prepared to manage the model, 
and firms were probably even less so. We proposed the model without knowing how it 
worked. That’s why we would have needed even more support and mentoring activities” 
(PO2 13/05/09). 
If, on the one hand, this tentative approach is justified by all policy-officers with the very 
experimental spirit of the overall IA programme, on the other hand, previous quotations clearly 
suggest - to say the least - that the designing phase was not founded on the pre-existence of 
a well-defined project idea. In any case, the definition of the model to be experimented 
appears strongly influenced by the Commission’s indications.  
 
Moving then to consider the implementation phase, we have already observed (sec. 3.4.1) 
that the Guidelines accompanying the call for projects introduced a series of changes vis-à-vis 
                                                 
69
 She is referring to the Commission’s Guidelines (CEC 2001). See section 2.4.2. 
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the programme proposal. In particular, we have seen that the Guidelines were characterised 
by a greater emphasis on the market dimension and by a relative downgrading of the role of 
the ICT platform. Also, we have noticed that the Guidelines provided a precise definition of the 
VE model, but without making any reference to the existing literature. The reasons for that 
have been clearly explained by the expert who led the group in charge with drafting the 
document: 
“the VE model, as defined in the academic literature, needed substantial changes to be 
transposed in a productive system such as Tuscany’s: most of the regional firms are not 
yet structurally prepared to adopt this model in its “ideal-type” formulation […] If we had 
not introduced such changes, we would have come to the conclusion that the model was 
totally ineffective” (Calamandrei, 21/05/09). 
Whether Calamandrei’s evaluation is well-grounded or not, the fact remains that the 
original approach - on which the Regional Authorities obtained the EU financing - has been 
abandoned in the implementation phase, because no longer considered adequate. 
Recapitulating, this initial overview of the formulation process delineates another important 
research result: our hypothesis about the “reversed logic” (sec. 3.4.1) was substantially well-
grounded. In other words, interviews have confirmed the impression we had already derived 
from the analysis of the programme’s documents: instead of starting from an analysis of firms’ 
needs, Regional Authorities have first identified a tool which could appear “sophisticated and 
adventurous” enough to fit with the EU expectations, and have then conceptualised the 
problem accordingly. However, they have been subsequently forced to introduce significant 
changes to the original scheme in order to make it “implementable”. 
So far we have thus established that the innovation approach pursued through VINCI and 
awarded by the European Commission has not achieved many of the expected results, and 
has not been devised with the characteristics of the target sectors in mind. What remains still 
unclear is why the interest has shifted right towards the market dimension, rather than 
towards any other aspect. To fully grasp the sense of previous quotations, it is necessary to 
make a step further, by framing the programme within the wider context of the regional 
innovation strategy. 
 
 
3.5.2 Framing VINCI 
Above we have seen that the “authors” of VINCI emphasise the commercial and 
organisational achievements, rather than the innovative ones, and that this can be partially 
justified in the light of the changes made by the Guidelines to the original approach. We have 
also seen that one of the experts who drafted the Guidelines has explained such modifications 
with the necessity to make the original theoretical model “manageable” in view of the 
characteristics of the regional economy. However, there is also another set of factors 
clarifying the emphasis on commercialisation in the later stages. 
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When questioned on the critiques raised by the evaluation reports about the suitability of 
the VE model, one of the policy-officers replied by distinguishing the rationales which have led 
the definition of the model from those which have motivated the programme. The first level 
has already been analysed in the previous section; as regards the programme on the whole, 
my interlocutor explained that: 
“we can accept most of the critiques made by the evaluators, but they have not 
considered two important aspects: […Firstly] the money we used to make this programme 
was not ours, but it came from the EU and consequently we had to comply with the EU 
regulations70. That implies that you are not wholly free when you write or implement the 
programme. We had to take in account a long series of constraints. […Secondly] you 
have to situate VINCI within a proper temporal perspective: VINCI comes at the end of a 
programming period71, characterised by a marked ‘experimentalism’, during which 
regional government has put a lot of effort in enhancing technology transfer processes. In 
short, VINCI comes after a series of policy initiatives which had tried to support the 
creation of university-firm networks. However, the projects stemming from these 
initiatives, although formally elegant, were mostly marked by a scarce financial and 
commercial sustainability. Therefore, our main objective - with VINCI - was to envisage a 
method which made these projects economically more sustainable” (PO1 08/05/09). 
This passage thus confirms the relevance of the EU framework, and suggests a further 
analytical direction: the integration of the VINCI programme within a wider constellation of 
policy initiatives, whose results do not appear, at a first sight, particularly brilliant. The 
previous account closes then as follows: 
 […] Many ideas were circulating before we decided for the VE model, from ‘open 
innovation’ models to virtual communities, etc., but, apart from the already mentioned EU 
constraints, there was also a political logic which induced us to continue on the same 
path: taking stock of previous initiatives and of an entire programming period” (Ibid.). 
This reconstruction thus completes the picture of the objectives and rationales which have 
led the formulation of the programme from the policy-officers’ perspective: the EU’s IA 
scheme offers the (financial) possibility of carrying out a particular programming course, this 
being one of the policy-officers’ main driving targets; the initial designing phase is then 
dominated by the priority of thinking up an idea which could fit the Commission’s Guidelines; 
finally, the original idea is in part translated and adjusted to make it more adequate to what a 
group of experts considers to be the regional needs on the one hand, and more consistent 
with the results of previous analogous measures on the other hand.  
Overall, this reconstruction also suggests some observations.  
First, the designing phase strictu sensu appears circumscribed to a limited number of 
people, namely the three interviewed policy-officers. Indeed, as the above quoted policy-
officer has further explained during the interview, he/she devised the idea (i.e. the VE model) 
                                                 
70
 The policy-officer is referring here to two recommendations advanced by the modelling report: i) 
opening the networks to operators located in other regions; ii) making partnerships more “fluid”, namely 
not requiring a strict ex ante definition of the participating entities. In the rest of the passage, that I have 
cut down in the quotation, the policy-officer explains that both recommendations are inadmissible 
according to the Structural Funds’ regulation. 
71
 The Vinci programme officially starts in 2006, that is the last year of the previous programming period 
of the Structural Funds. 
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first, and subsequently developed it together with the other two policy-officers. After that, the 
draft of the programme proposal was passed on to the head of the unit for approval and to the 
regional Councillor for political endorsement. At the same time, there were some informal 
talks with representatives of the regional entrepreneurial associations, mainly aiming at 
detecting the potential interest for the programme. However, changes introduced during these 
passages were - according to the policy-officer - minimal. At any rate, differently from what 
stated in the programme proposal, it is hard to detect in the above passages a wide and 
participative process. Also, the weakness of the political control over the programme 
formulation and implementation should be stressed: all the relevant decisions about the 
programme’s content and management were taken by civil servants (if not by external 
practitioners), without any involvement or direct check by elected representatives of the 
Regional Council.  
Second, all previous accounts point at the importance of what could be termed as a 
“procedural rationality”. In other words, the compliance with particular formal requirements (as 
for the EU Guidelines) or the coherence with a sort of processual dimension (the “political 
logic” in our policy-officer’s words) seem to play a fundamental role in orienting policy-makers’ 
conduct. If, at a first sight, this observation may appear quite facile, perhaps less obvious is 
that, in actors’ accounts, procedural considerations come often prior to any other type of 
evaluation (such as distributive, political, economic, etc.); or rather, political, economic, etc. 
matters seem to be ordered primarily through a procedural reasoning, punctuated by some 
crucial concepts, such as that of networks (we will discuss this issue more in sec. 3.6.2, when 
we will see how important power relations and struggles unfold precisely over a procedural 
playfield).  
Third, and consequently, previous remarks could also elicit some heuristic implications. 
More precisely, the account proposed here implies that the analysis of the content, directions 
and effects of a certain policy cannot be separated from the contextual (space/time specific) 
study of the perspectives, incentives, practices, that is of the very job of the policy-makers 
who concretely carry on such policy. So, for the specific case under scrutiny, that means that 
policy-making is also very much a matter of mediating local instances with the necessity of 
assuring adequate resources in a context of international competition for funds (by means of 
writing fashionable programme proposals, drafting financial statements, etc.).  
This represents a first - more immediate and ordinary - aspect of the relationship between 
the content of a policy and the institutional set-up which underpins its formulation; it is 
nonetheless an important aspect, as, without that, it would be impossible to fully understand 
how a line of policy is concretely translated and transmitted, also in spatial terms. We will go 
through this issue again further on, when we will see how the relationship is fairly more 
complex, since the thematic aspects of the policy generate in turn feedback on the institutional 
dimension. But to achieve this, we have first to complete the “contextualisation” of VINCI, by 
briefly considering the other support measures mentioned in the previous quotations. 
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3.5.3 The innovation support measures preceding VINCI and those following it 
We have seen that VINCI comes after a series of policy measures, all characterised by 
similar objectives. 
More specifically, between 2001 and 2006, the goal of developing university-firm networks 
was addressed by other two policy schemes: a further IA initiative (named PRAI ITT, between 
2002 and 2004), and the so-called “Docup Measure 1.772” (Docup stands for Single 
Programming Document and it corresponds to the Regional Operational Programme for the 
previous programming period). 
Without dwelling too much on the content of these programmes, it suffices to say that they 
were widely inspired to the same logic as VINCI: while PRAI ITT was particularly focused on 
the diffusion of ICTs73, Measure 1.7 aimed precisely at promoting technology transfer towards 
SMEs, through the creation of innovation networks. 
As to results, according to the official intermediate evaluation report, which has assessed 
the whole set of initiatives funded through Docup 2001-2006, outcomes produced by Measure 
1.7 have not been particularly significant, “especially as regards the development of stable 
relationships between research organisations and SMEs” (CLES 2005, p. 5). In particular, the 
report finds that, overall, the intervention has generated neither an increase in R&D 
expenditure, nor a growth in turnover among participating firms (two results which perfectly 
tally with those emerged from VINCI). 
A network analysis conducted by Bellandi and Caloffi (2008) on the networks activated 
through both PRAI ITT and Measure 1.7 shows that organisations playing a nodal role have 
been mainly research departments and technology transfer centres. Also, the relational 
system generated by these networks appears rather centralised, since a restricted number of 
institutions is simultaneously present in several projects. According to the authors, this 
outcome is predictable, as universities naturally tend to play a nodal function, by virtue of the 
wide range of competences they incorporate; nonetheless, the peripheral position of firms 
within the relational system is significant. On the one hand, by crossing data from this study 
with those from VINCI, it emerges that the names of the “nodal” institutions recur repeatedly; 
moreover, such institutions are those that the modelling and intermediate reports have pointed 
out for their disappointing results. On the other hand, the absence of “network-activators” 
among firms may be read as an approach’s failure to intercept the needs of the business 
sphere. This interpretation has been someway corroborated by the Secretary of the largest 
SMEs association in Tuscany and member of the Managing Authority of SF, Laura Simoncini:  
“many SMEs have actually participated in regional innovation networks. The problem is 
that firms have got involved primarily because including SMEs in networks was one of the 
formal requirement to be eligible for funding. In other words, we must recognize that 
                                                 
72
 Numerals indicate in a short form the different measures in which Docup 2001-2006 was articulated.  
73
 In section 2.4.2.1 we have seen that the IA programme was articulated in three strands: knowledge-
based economy and technological innovation; information society at the service of regional 
development; regional identity. While VINCI fell within the first of the three strands, PRAI ITT fell within 
the second one. 
 106 
SMEs have often played just a “walk-on” part, and they have been unable to interact 
fruitfully within the networks” (Simoncini 12/06/09). 
To sum up, not only has VINCI produced unsatisfactory results, but these are also fully 
anticipated by those emerging from preceding interventions, which failed precisely in the 
same points. That the regional networking strategy has been unsuccessful is, anyway, a 
widely acknowledged fact.  
According to one of the policy-officers, “university-firm relationships are a sore point. […] 
From what we have seen so far, we can’t say that results have been impressive […] There is 
a plethora of technology transfer/innovation centres, innovation help-desks, etc. which are 
totally inefficient” (PO2 13/07/09). Another official has revealed that “there are rumours 
claiming that even when local firms interact successfully with local university, this happens 
independently from regional incentives/programme” (PO3 19/05/09). In Lazzeretti’s view, “in 
the regional approach there has been too much attention to the ‘packaging’ - the network -, 
while little was inside”. Maybe, the most explicit judgment has been that expressed by the DG 
Development senior official: 
The approach has not worked because it has not created networks, but rather an illusion 
of networks: as soon as the funding period got over, networks disappeared as well. […] 
Some good ideas have emerged, but these networks were not grounded on any serious 
business perspective” (DGDO 08/06/09). 
Importantly, she/he also confirmed that: 
 “It’s true that organisations benefiting from these measures are always the same […]. 
Making networks has become a routine, just another way of making money” (Ibid.). 
Yet, despite the substantive evidence and the agreement among relevant actors about the 
ineffectiveness of the regional strategy, this has been reconfirmed for the present 
programming period. Even though, as the DG Development senior official has later explained, 
there has been a shift from financing technology-offer (research centres) to supporting 
demand (firms), and even though there is a greater attention to extra-regional knowledge and 
production networks, regional innovation networks remain a cardinal objective in the latest 
programming documents. 
Indeed, on the one hand, the Regional Programme for Economic Development (PRSE) 
sets the creation of “a regional research space and of a regional integrated technological 
district” as its first strategic line of intervention (Giunta Regionale 2007a, p. 60). On the other 
hand, the present Operational Programme (POR) identifies in “strengthening the 
competitiveness of regional territory and productive system” its “global objective” (Giunta 
Regionale 2007b, p. 81), which is then articulated in a series of specific objectives, the first 
being: 
Enhancing the competitiveness of the productive system, by promoting research, 
technology transfer and innovation […]: it is necessary to consolidate regional R&D 
capacity, and to direct it towards technology transfer activities and industrial innovation 
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process. This can be achieved by supporting the realisation of joint research projects 
among university, research centres and firms” (Ibid., emphasis added). 
Accordingly and in line with EU indications (see sec. 2.4.1), support to R&D and 
technology transfer has become the first area of expenditure within the overall regional 
development strategy, and the measure entitled “technology transfer and improvement of 
cooperative innovation networks between firms and university” is alone the third largest 
category of expenditure, absorbing 7,7% of total available resources. 
 
To conclude, in this and previous sections we have seen that the VINCI programme has 
been formulated with a view to responding to both EU priorities (to access funding) and the 
political objective of concluding a particular policy course, which revolved around the 
university-firm networks idea (and, in this sense, the practicability of VINCI resides also in the 
fact that the two finalities are congruent). We have also seen that both VINCI and the other 
fellow initiatives have fallen short of many expected results; but, above all, we have found that 
all these measures have been characterised by exactly the same flaws and limitations. 
Therefore, these findings coming from “official” sources enable us to bring to an end - at 
least for now - the substantive side of our inquiry. Indeed, they prove that the shortcomings of 
VINCI are not accidental, as they are fully consistent with the results of the whole innovation 
strategy, thus leaving no room to possible explanations related to the experimental nature of 
the programme. Moreover, such evidence is in line with data stemming from a wide series of 
empirical studies on similar issues (see sec. 3.4.1, 2.4.3 and 1.3.2). 
However, as we have seen, in spite of these well known and acknowledged results, the 
approach has not been abandoned. How to make sense of such an apparent paradox? To 
answer that, we have to go on exploring the procedural aspects of policy-making. In particular, 
in the next section we will see that this contradiction is reflected in actors’ accounts and that, 
rather than downplaying it (or, worse, writing it off), the contradiction needs to be kept vivid in 
order to trace the relations between regional policy, regional governance and EU dimension. 
 
 
3.6 Following the thread: the regional innovation policy between regional 
governance and EU regulations 
In section 3.5 I have investigated the set of objectives, assumptions, constraints, etc., 
which have underpinned the formulation and delivery of VINCI. In parallel, I have taken into 
account the “policy effectiveness” dimension, by confronting actors’ views with the results of 
the regional innovation policy. In this regard, we have seen that empirical evidence is 
consistent with actors’ appraisal, to the extent that both recognise the failure of the university-
firm networking strategy. I have concluded by observing that, despite this converging 
evaluation, the policy approach has been confirmed in current programming period. 
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In this concluding section, we will resume from where we have stopped, by continuing to 
follow the thread of the “innovation network” concept. More precisely, in the next subsection I 
will examine how this concept has contributed towards shaping governance dynamics, while 
in the following subsection I will analyse the interplay between governance configuration and 
the procedural mechanisms governing Structural Funds. The final objective is to provide a 
picture of the interrelation among the three main domains of inquiry. The very last sub-section 
will be dedicated to tracing possible evolutionary directions, on the basis of actors’ accounts. 
 
 
3.6.1 Broadening the perspective to regional governance: when the business, 
academic and political spheres do not constitute a regional system 
We have seen that the VINCI initiative has also derived from the determination to carry out 
a programming course, centred on the concept of innovation networks. The question which 
may now be raised is why the networking approach has been originally chosen and, in 
particular, what has been the weight of EU framework in determining the decision. 
Answering precisely these questions is not an easy task. As we have already illustrated 
(sec. 2.3.2), the strategy and allocation of resources set by the POR are the result of a 
negotiation process between the Commission and local Managing Authorities; this process 
takes place in camera, and there do not exist minutes that one can access. As a 
consequence, to get an accurate and balanced picture, it would be necessary to interview all 
the officials who conducted the negotiation on behalf of both the Commission and the 
Tuscany’s government; unfortunately, this has been only inadequately realised, due to time 
limitations and actors’ unavailability to give an interview74. 
Nonetheless, some conjectures can be formulated. The most economic hypothesis is that, 
in the same way as for VINCI, Regional Authorities have first derived the broad approach from 
Commission’s indications, and have then adapted it to the regional context. Apart from actors’ 
accounts (that we will see right hereafter), the following facts also support this hypothesis. 
Firstly, the PRSE explicitly states that regional development policy is based on the CP 
orientations and that, in particular, it takes on the Commission’s call for an integration of 
industrial and R&D policies. Secondly, as seen above, there is a clear correspondence 
between regional and Commission’s priorities as regards the categories of expenditure. 
Finally, like in the VINCI case, the original concept has been adapted by external - technical - 
experts, namely from Pisa and Florence universities. More precisely, prof. Lazzeretti has 
explained that, over the last decade, a group of academics75 from the Economics Department 
                                                 
74
 Concerning innovation policy, Tuscany’s delegation should have been made of a set of three or four 
officials, in addiction to the regional Councillor for Industry and Development (Ambrogio Brenna); I have 
been able to interview only one of them. As regards the Commission, some exploratory emails directed 
to identify the officials in charge with the Tuscany’s dossiers have been unsuccessful.  
75
 The name of this group is MARI. Unfortunately, it has not been possible to access the document 
produced by the group. Anyway, both Lazzeretti and Caloffi have agreed that there has been a 
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in Florence has produced an in-depth reflection on the concept of network, shaping it on the 
regional context (that is adapting it to a district-like model). 
Therefore, if the hypothesis is verisimilar, the problem becomes understanding whether the 
broad approach (the one deriving from EU) is shared by regional policy-makers or whether it 
is perceived as a constraint. When questioned on that, policy-officers have given rather 
ambiguous answers. On the one hand, they have emphasised the weight of EU indications 
and requirements; also, they have pointed out how, in their opinion, certain EU choices 
appear influenced by some “strong” foreign regions, whose interests do not match at all with 
Tuscany’s or Mediterranean ones. 
“The Structural Funds and programmes such as VINCI have a strong territorial constraint 
[…] This leads to a self-centred and narrow vision which is particularly bad for a “bound” 
society such as Tuscany is. You end up doing the same things with the same people” 
(PO2 13/05/09). 
“In Tuscany there is Calp, which is the third biggest glass producer in the world, and for 
them innovation is just using good materials and designing beautiful objects. Isn’t this 
innovation? But everybody wants to work on high-tech. […] It is true that this obsession 
for high-tech is also in part the effect of EU policies. […] The problem is that sometimes 
the Commission makes terrible blunders. Why? Because there are strong states and 
weak states.” (DGDO 08/06/09). 
“The choice of focusing on networks is anyway determined by EU indications. This is true 
for VINCI, but it’s even more so for POR […]. The problem is that the Commission 
sometimes proposes models which are not just the outcomes of its own decisions; I mean 
that such models are also the fruit of lobbying strategies conducted by some regions 
which manage to impose their systems […] Cluster is a typical example: a lot of 
resources have been offered to private sector through various EU programmes76, but all 
of them have favoured particular forms of networking based on highly formalised 
structures. That is clusters. A model that you will hardly find in Tuscany or in other 
Mediterranean Countries. We have to recognise that we are a bit “out” of these 
processes; often, this condition makes us executors of models that are not part of our 
DNA” (Righi 19/07/09). 
On the other hand, it is stated that, after all, constraints exist but are not so strict, and that 
the EU approach is absolutely beneficial for Tuscany and Italy. 
“It is true that the Commission gives indications on the content […] but, honestly, today 
innovation, ICT and environmental sustainability are the basis of any business which 
aspires to be modern” (PO1 08/07/09). 
“Participation in many EU-funded trans-regional networks, such as ERIK,CLUNET77, etc. 
has been an important experience for us: thanks to best-practices exchange we have 
learnt a lot. The EU approach is important because it opens your mind, and especially the 
mind of regional functionaries” (PO2 13/07/09) 
                                                                                                                                            
reciprocal influence between regional administration and the regional academic system on the 
“innovation networks” issue.  
76
 The official is referring here in particular to: the VII Framework Programme for R&D, the 
Competitiveness and Innovation Programme and Inter-regional Cooperation. 
77
 Names of trans-regional thematic networks, mainly focusing on innovation-related issues. 
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[following a question of mine on why requests coming from regional associations and 
lower tiers of governments for support to productive investments were not accepted in the 
POR] We could not accept those requests because SF regulations forbid them in Centre 
and North Italy: they allow only investments in innovation, technology-transfer and 
financial engineering […]. But on this matter, on the innovation approach, we totally 
agreed with the Commission. Because that is what we need in Tuscany: […] we need to 
inject innovation and research capacity in our traditional SMEs to spur their 
competitiveness” (DGDO 08/06/09, emphasis added). 
Therefore, we find again the same kind of contradiction that we have already detected in 
relation to the outcome of previous programmes. At this point, it might be tempting to explain 
such an apparent “schizophrenia” with the very characteristics of the CP decisional system, 
which determines the content of regional policy in a - more or less - surreptitious manner, thus 
generating ambiguity in actors’ accounts. However, besides being tempting, this explanation 
would also be methodologically questionable, since - following Latour (2005) - it would entail 
accounting for actors’ “blind” practices by adding some external social (or, in this case, 
psychological) factor, on the assumption that we know what actors ignore. If we are to map 
the net of agencies constituting the actors’ framework, contradictions may on the contrary 
represent an important signal to trace transformations in the “state of affairs” or struggles over 
power, resources and groups’ boundaries (Ibid.).  
In this perspective, the first interesting aspect to note is that it never occurs to regional 
policy-makers that the unsuccessful results of the regional innovation strategy may be due to 
a fault of the strategy itself. Rather, they put it down to the inadequacy of regional actors 
(firms and university), which are said not to be able (or willing) to satisfy the imperatives of the 
knowledge-based economy, namely to create an effective regional innovation system. It is 
meaningful in this sense what the regional Councillor for Innovation and Development - 
Ambrogio Brenna - stated on the occasion of the official presentation of the VINCI 
programme’s results78: 
“You know that there is someone who says that the weight of public expenditure in 
Tuscany79 is the result of a certain laziness, of an ineptitude of the productive system at 
looking at the necessity of a competitive upgrade. […] Recent reports describe Tuscany 
as a region in which firms tend to invest little on the innovation factors which are deemed 
to be the most modern, such as innovation networks. 
[…] When I go abroad and I talk about Tuscany, I evoke important images, but none of 
them is related to technological excellence. Yet, we have important assets in science and 
technology. […] Technology-transfer from university to firms is then essential to enhance 
regional competitiveness. Unfortunately, on this point we have often witnessed the failure 
of our organisational capacity. Maybe, this is also in part due to the fact that the academic 
system is sometimes a world in its own […]. It is necessary that the academic system 
starts serving the system of SMEs” (Brenna 30/04/09). 
 
This stance is substantially shared by the other policy-officers. For instance, the high 
official has affirmed that: 
                                                 
78
 The official presentation of the VINCI programme’s results took place during a conference held in 
Florence on 30/04/09 
79
 Here Brenna is referring to the (dis)proportion of public expenditure on R&D compared with private 
one. See fig. 5 in this regard. 
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“We assume the “goodness” of the external constraint: if there had not been the 
European Commission, I do not think we would have had the political strength to resist to 
the siren songs of business associations. They want money easily, quickly and in great 
amounts” (DGDO 08/06/09). 
And concerning universities: 
“There are regions in Sweden and Finland where expenditure on R&D amounts to 6% of 
GDP. How can I cooperate with regions like these: it is therefore natural that they have 
Nokia then. If we spent 6% of our GDP on R&D, we would have developed Nokia as well. 
But the difference is that they have been able to transform their university in industry. […] 
Our academics are unable to interact with SMEs, because they do not want to soil their 
hands” (Ibid., similarly also Calamandrei 21/05/09). 
“Regional academics are still too concentrated on districts. But the reality of district does 
not exist anymore. […] University is a bit out-of-the-world; but, in general, everybody here 
do not think themselves to be accountable to others” (PO2 13/05/09).  
Therefore, from previous quotations a clear picture emerges: regional policy-makers find 
regional landscape unsatisfactory and unresponsive, especially if compared with other 
successful regions. This standpoint seems then related to two other important aspects of 
regional governance. 
The first one concerns a general climate of distrust which characterises mutual 
relationships among actors, and which appears perfectly consistent with the above described 
policy-makers’ attitude. So, for instance, from academics’ point of view, Regional Authorities 
are becoming too “invasive” as regards the research sphere, and too “business-style” in their 
talks. 
“I am bored of hearing regional policy officers and politicians speaking like business 
managers” (Lazzaretti 27/05/09). 
“It’s true that the Florence University Industrial Liaison Office does not work and that the 
University has been unable to interact with the productive world. But, on the other hand, 
the “top-down” approach adopted by Regional Authorities does not help80” (Caloffi 
14/05/09). 
Criticisms are also addressed to business associations, which would have lost their 
capacity to represent firms’ interest. In this sense, Caloffi and Bellandi argue that, for political 
and ideological reasons, Regional Authorities are stuck to a traditional model of collective 
bargaining - Concertazione81 - which is no longer adequate for current times: 
“The negotiation system has somewhat degenerated into a sort of oligarchy, where 
business representatives represent more and more themselves rather than firms, and use 
                                                 
80
 Caloffi is referring to a recently approved regional law (Regione Toscana L.R. 20/09), which for the 
first time tries to regulate research activity at regional level. Express objective of the act is to favour 
technology transfer processes and to make research effort “more in line” with regional productive needs. 
The law has been strongly criticised by regional academics, for it is found to intervene too in-depth on 
research decisions and priorities, thus limiting academic autonomy.  
81
 The concertazione model involves that for each important economic decision (consisting in a law, a 
fund allocation, etc.) representatives of all social partners (that is all employers associations, unions, 
SMEs and craft associations, etc.) are always consulted. Concertazione in Tuscany is regulated by 
regional law. 
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funding just to reproduce themselves. […] Regional authorities are unable to get in 
contact with the productive world, because representation is not more assured by 
business associations” (Bellandi 05/06/09). 
Predictably, similar but opposite opinions have been expressed by the representative of 
the largest SMEs association in Tuscany, Confartigianato: 
“The effort made by Regional Authorities to activate more university-firm relationships has 
to be appreciated. […] The problem is that Regional Authorities have always tended to 
idealise an entrepreneurial model which does not exist in Tuscany. That has led to the 
formulation of a series of theorisations about economic development in our region, which 
unfortunately are not fitting with reality. […] That’s why regional innovation programmes 
have not been able to involve effectively SMEs. 
[…] You have also to add to this that universities have never been interested in the world 
of SMEs. But that’s normal. Universities and SMEs speak two different languages and 
their interests are seldom convergent” (Simoncini 12/06/09). 
The second important characteristic of regional innovation governance - already transpiring 
from previous quotations - is what, for the lack of a better term and using an old vocabulary, 
might be called the “dirigisme” of regional government. Such an approach appears as the 
result of the coupling between the policy-makers’ interpretation of the strategy’s failure and 
their full endorsement of the competitiveness paradigm (paradigm which, as we have at length 
showed in the first chapter, lies at the basis of regional innovation network strategy itself). 
Indeed, the approach is basically grounded on the following argument: Tuscany has to 
compete against high-tech regions; however, since the entrepreneurial system is culturally 
lagging behind and university appears too reluctant to interact with firms, regional government 
has to take upon itself the task of steering and “forcing” the territory towards more modern 
models. 
“You need to force a bit the territory, because you have to induce the territory to grow 
also in terms of knowledge. […] Therefore, I think that the task of Regional Authorities is 
also to disseminate models. […]” (PO2 13/05/09). 
“We have to compare with our direct competitors. We have to fill the gap we have with 
Lombardy, with Catalonia, with Baden-Wurttemberg, and therefore we have to run faster 
than they do. […] The problem is that resources from SF, plus regional resources amount 
to only 1% of regional GDP. How can one expect that we succeed in changing 
entrepreneurs’ mentality with so little?” (DGDO 08/06/09)  
“Programmes such as VINCI are representative of how we are working to push firms 
towards modern forms of investment. Now, the word “pushing” may sound a bit like 
delusions of omnipotence. We have often affirmed that we do not want to use a kind of 
“godfather logic” […]. Clearly, everything we offer has to be used on the basis of a 
conviction which the entrepreneurial system must reach autonomously; we have just 
produced the incentives in order that this happens” (Brenna 30/04/09, emphasis added). 
The last quotation from the Regional Councillor is highly meaningful, as it closely 
resembles the oxymoron that we have already detected with regard to the overall CP (see 
sec. 2.4.3), when it imposes consensus as a condition to benefit from (a greater amount of) 
SF. Both stances require a behaviour which can only emerge spontaneously or, equally, they 
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force a certain behaviour, expecting at the same time that it is voluntarily (and gladly) chosen 
by those on whom it has been forced. At the end of the previous chapter, we have also 
argued that such a paradox could have repercussions for the politics of local development, 
that is on the way decisions are taken and interests are allowed for and mediated, insofar as it 
may restrict the room for discussion and the range of issues discussed. We will see in the 
next section why and in which way this is the case; here it suffices to highlight how this 
oxymoron emerges as a political constant at both EU and regional level, hooked to a series of 
correlated concepts (competing regions, innovation network, technology-transfer, etc.).  
More generally, and to conclude, in this section we have seen that the competitiveness 
paradigm and the related policy toolbox are so deep-rooted in policy-makers’ “policyscape” 
that, although their adoption is sometimes perceived as heteronomous, their appropriateness 
and political significance are never really questioned, not even in front of a clear failure. 
Rather, efforts are directed, on the one hand, to make original concepts more fitting to 
regional context by resorting to external experts’ advice, and, on the other hand, to mobilise 
regional actors towards the common end, only to then blame them for poor results. We have 
also seen that this approach nurtures - or at least is consistent with - a wary governance 
climate, which is remarkable if compared with a received wisdom depicting Tuscany as a 
cooperative and consensual region, in which social, political and economic interests are 
blended in a coherent and successful synthesis. 
We have thus approached a nodal passage of our inquiry: the relationship between the 
normative elements of a political Weltanschauung on the one hand, and the governance 
dynamics informing a certain polity on the other hand. At one - more specific - level, we have 
seen that the definition of a particular strategy (the VE model in our case) has been a rather 
cursory process, subordinated to other, more procedural/institutional, priorities. However, we 
have also seen the choice of that model (among innumerable others) has been neither casual, 
nor without effects on local governance. In other words, at another - more general - level, 
previous quotations make clear that the ascendancy of new regionalist conceptions matters 
and affects in-depth the local state of affairs: in fact, it constitutes a powerful cognitive 
orientation, which induces or legitimates certain choices, mutual expectations and, eventually, 
a system of relations. In short, in sec. 3.5.2 we have seen that, to understand a policy course, 
we have also to look at the institutional organisation which has generated it; here we realise 
that such an organisation is in turn influenced by the epistemic content of the approach which, 
at the same time, shapes the policy strategy as well. If we do not keep together these two 
aspects and the circular relation which binds them, it becomes hard to understand why a 
policy is reiterated - with growing efforts - despite its evident ineffectiveness. 
However, there is something more, as the account here proposed also points to a 
movement which is re-defining actors’ spheres of power or autonomy at regional level; more 
precisely, in the name of competitiveness objectives and of Structural Fund, Regional 
Authorities are trying to expand their influence over academic decisions on the one hand, and 
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on the other, to circumscribe the role of business associations. In the next section we will 
focus on that “in the name of”, which is crucial to fully grasp the direction of this process; that 
is, we will see how the relationship between governance configuration and the content of the 
policy approach is further strengthened by a coherent system of rules and incentives. 
 
 
3.6.2 Completing the framework: the role of the EU and the functionalisation of 
regional governance 
In the previous section, we have used the term “dirigisme” to describe a particular attitude 
shown by regional policy-makers, who hold necessary to force the territory by changing 
entrepreneurs’ mentality and by orienting academic research. We have also seen that this 
attitude is somehow justified with the competitiveness imperative, and is nourished by a 
constant comparison with other EU regions (the latter being also based also on direct 
experiences, acquired through frequent travelling abroad82, especially in the context of EU-
funded trans-regional networks).  
Such an attitude is then coupled, in the field of development policy, with a distinctive 
“policy method”, which seems to have been lately emerging (also) as a response to the 
shortcomings of the previous programming period. The “method” has been plainly enunciated 
by our high official, who has termed it “selectivity”, but it can be detected in other actors’ 
accounts as well. In short, “selectivity” consists in the idea that, if Tuscany is to become more 
innovative, it is necessary to concentrate resources on few dynamic subjects which can 
assure effective absorption of funds and visibility of results. Within this framework, decisions 
should be taken by Regional Authorities on the basis of direct relationship with firms (thus 
bypassing intermediaries, in primis business associations). 
“Regional development policies are intentional and selective. That means that, if there is 
a precise objective, this has to be pursued at any cost; it makes no sense that this 
objective is then diluted with a series of other incoherent targets. There is a contradiction 
here: the European Commission wants competitiveness and wants consensus, and then 
it wants also Gothenburg, Equal Opportunities, attention to peripheral areas, and so on. 
[…] My problem is to find those who have the strength to propose a vision. Now, we are 
supporting those who are lagging behind; but we are not the primary school, we cannot 
help the last. If the last is helped, this represents a diseconomy, and it has to get out from 
the market. The problem of Tuscany is a structural development lag and, paradoxically, it 
is precisely in this situation that we need to be even more selective. […] That’s why we 
agree with the Commission’s approach: in Tuscany, we do not need anymore 
investments in factory sheds and machineries … we need investments in innovation and 
R&D. 
[…] It is true that business associations have a “representativeness” problem and that we 
are relating directly to firms. During last months, a lot of medium and large companies 
has asked us to be accompanied in their investment plan. They come here, present their 
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 During interviews, policy-makers have frequently made reference to best-practices, that they have 
personally observed in their travels abroad. 
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industrial plan and ask to be supported through our call for proposals. Our job is 
changing: we are becoming a development agency” (DGDO 08/06/09, emphasis added) 
“In forthcoming innovation programmes, it would be opportune to introduce a “fast track” 
option, namely a mechanism to offer specific assistance and support to most dynamic 
and innovative projects” (PO1 08/05/09). 
Recapitulating, “selectivity” appears fully consistent with “dirigisme”: Regional Authorities 
take the lead of industrial and cultural transformation, by staking available resources on few 
allegedly high-growth sectors, or on few “regional champions”. Concretely, this entails that 
Regional Authorities turn into a sort of merchant bank, which reviews and decides to finance 
firms’ business plans, according to quite unfathomable criteria. 
This scheme is obviously censored by the representative of the SMEs association, who 
sees in that a strategy to deprive associations of their function. However, she also draws 
attention to the potential distortions that this approach involves: 
“Regional Authorities have been trying for some years now to relate directly to the 
entrepreneurial world. Now, we question whether this strategy is worthwhile first of all for 
Regional Authorities. […] Our organisation represents about twenty thousand firms: we 
are a complex organisation, but we have got tools to formulate mediated and shared 
positions. […] If Regional Authorities speak just with five firms, they will just receive five 
opinions, but they have no evidence that those five opinions are widespread” (Simoncini 
12/06/09).  
The idea of “selectivity” is certainly grounded on some contextual and historical factors: 
Tuscany, and more generally Italy, have a long tradition of financial incentives distributed to 
firms indiscriminately. In this sense, selectivity represents a reaction to this phenomenon. On 
the other hand, concentrating resources on subjects who assure funds absorption is also fully 
coherent with the logic which governs the allocation of SF from the EU to the regional level. In 
other words, the objective of maximising the amount of Funds coming from Brussels has to be 
considered to comprehend policy-makers’ priorities; as one of the policy-officers has 
explained: 
“During VINCI, like during all the programmes funded under the SF, attention has been 
too concentrated on the initial phase, namely on the moment in which we commit EU 
funds. That’s wrong: attention should shift towards the concluding phase, when you have 
to take stock of your and others’ work. Unfortunately, this is hampered by the fact that we 
have to spend everything within the time limits set by the Commission. That’s why for us 
the most important thing becomes spending: spending as much as possible, as quickly as 
possible, otherwise the Commission could withdraw the present financing and reduce 
future ones” (PO2 13/05/09, emphasis added)83. 
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 The point has been stressed by the Regional Councillor as well: “during the latest negotiation with the 
Commission, we managed to secure almost the same amount of Funds as for the previous programming 
period; this despite the fact that the total resources available to Italy have shrunk due to the EU 
enlargement. We succeeded in that because in the past programming period we effectively committed 
all our resources. That’s why I’m asking entrepreneurs and organisations to increase their efforts on the 
innovation issues” (Brenna 30/04/09). 
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To grasp the sense of previous quotations, we have to recall the importance of the 
“absorption capacity” principle (see sec. 2.3.2), which, along with the “additionality” one, 
modulates the amount of resources allocated to each region during each programming period, 
and which basically consists in the following idea: the more you manage to absorb (spend) 
now, the more you will get in the future. Therefore, “absorption capacity”, SF regulations 
(which only allow for investments in innovation and R&D), Commission’s indications for 
networking strategy, benchmarking procedures, all these elements are needed to account for 
policy-makers’ pressing necessity to find firms or organisations which promptly respond to 
Regional Authorities’ calls. The problem is that this very mechanism seems to contribute to 
determining certain shortcomings of the policy. In this sense, Simoncini reasons that: 
“It was surely necessary to introduce stricter selection criteria and to concentrate 
resources. At the beginning, there was a flood of projects, and the great majority of them 
was really low value. And I must admit that business associations benefited in part from 
that chaotic situation. The problem is that now Regional Authorities are not selecting on 
the basis of real firms’ needs, but rather on the participants’ ability to draw up projects 
which are formally exemplary, but which are totally disconnected from regional economic 
reality, and consequently do not have any triggering effect. The final result is that 
Regional Authorities have subsidized a series of technology-transfer structures, 
organisations and firms which are totally dependent on public contribution to survive, as 
they have no market perspectives.  
[…] Regional innovation programmes are written in a very complicated language, often 
derived from EU indications, which is very difficult to understand in its real meaning. The 
Virtual Enterprise model proposed by VINCI is a good example of this jargon. Now, 
paradoxically, in front of very complicated call for proposals, it gets incredibly easy to 
write projects: you just need to use the same terminology. If I just want to open an ice-
cream shop, but I tell you that I’ll do it in accordance with the Virtual Enterprise model 
and I use the same technical elements to describe it, you have no or few elements to 
say that I’m cheating” (Simoncini 12/06/09, emphasis added). 
 
Here we have to slow down, as we are passing through a crucial point. Simoncini’s 
analysis is certainly influenced by a polemic spirit; however, it wholly resonates with policy-
officers’ own accounts (see sec. 3.5.2). More precisely, it helps comprehend better one of the 
most significant finding we have come across at the beginning of the empirical investigation, 
that is the development of a sterile technology-transfer industry, which now appears as the 
coherent result of precise political priorities, and consistent with a procedural mechanism 
which favours formal correctness over feasibility. What is more, the problem of the “language” 
of call for proposals is confirmed by one of the policy-officer: “the complexity of calls and SF 
regulation does not help, does not encourage a wide participation to these programmes” (PO2 
13/07/09).  
Therefore, the impression one derives from the previous discussion is that the system of 
incentives and constraints designed by the EU causes a real overturning of the bottom-up 
logic at regional level: instead of starting form a discussed and participated diagnosis of local 
needs to subsequently formulate a strategy, the strategy comes first and the local context is 
then demanded to adapt to it; or viewed from another angle, if the strategy has proved to be - 
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on average - unsuccessful, it is not the strategy which has to be changed, but the participants. 
This reversal, that we have already detected in relation to the formulation process of VINCI, 
emerges thus as a fundamental characteristic of the overall regional policy-making. From a 
political point of view, the reversal is determined by the necessity of securing a stable funding 
stream. Conceptually, it is justified by the dominance of new regionalist theorisations. Finally, 
in procedural terms, it is favoured by a mechanism which grants funds on the basis of the 
degree of compliance of regional programmes with the Commission’s imperatives. 
 The significance of this process is then strengthened by the fact that a regional 
development policy does not exist beyond the one implemented through SF. In fact, available 
regional resources (included national transfers) are all “added up” to those coming from 
Brussels, in order to activate the “multiplier” set by the “additionality principle” (see sec. 2.3.2); 
in other words, the regional development policy is the regional innovation policy outlined in the 
Regional Operational Programme. 
 
In addition to this, the Regional Authorities refer to the CP framework to block requests 
from social partners (as for the demand for support to productive investments) or to force 
certain changes (as for the regional law on research). In other words, the CP framework 
represents an important element around which Regional Authorities are re-defining the 
contours of regional governance (that is the set of actors, relations, interests and daily 
practices which are involved in formulation/delivery of the development policy) by means of 
changes to the politics of development (that is the set of rules, procedures, “consented” issues 
which governance hinges upon). We are not in a position to say whether the CP framework is 
exploited by Regional Authorities to achieve their ends, or it is rather experienced by Regional 
Authorities passively as a necessary constraint. What is sure is the CP mechanics enhances 
the development of an asymmetry among regional actors, insofar as it assigns an exclusive 
role of interface to Regional Authorities vis-à-vis the Commission, thus making them a 
powerful gatekeeper: 
“I have given up attending the meetings of the Managing Authority, because it is 
pointless. There is not any possibility to intervene on the content of the POR: any change 
you suggest is immediately rejected by the Regional Government’s staff, on the grounds 
that if they accepted it, they would lose the EU funding. They also say that the meetings 
of the Managing Authority are not the suitable place to raise problems, because we have 
to present ourselves united and in agreement vis-à-vis the Commission and 
representatives of national government. Then I ask: ‘please, tell me where is the place in 
which I can advance my proposals and my doubts’. But I haven’t got any answer so far. 
Sometimes you really have the feeling that this is a strategy to cut you off: for instance, 
they use to send you an updated version of the POR just the night before the meeting. 
The morning after you find out that the update concerns precisely issues which matter to 
you. […]. The point is that it has not always been like this. In the past, they used to 
consult us well in advance of the meeting; we tried to find a common position and then, 
on the day of the meeting, we all played the part pretending to be great friends. I can’t say 
precisely why this change happened; what I know is that this has happened since the 
Managing Authority has acquired important decisional powers. In fact, in the past it had a 
merely formal role” (Simoncini 12/06/09). 
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This passage thus confirms also the last hypothesis that we have advanced at the end of 
previous chapter: the architecture of the CP induces a sort of “functionalisation” of consensus 
at regional level that, in the name of Structural Funds, restrains dissent and narrows the room 
for discussion of alternatives. In other words, by setting consensus as a condition for funding, 
and by assigning Regional Authorities the role of sole gatekeeper, the CP favours a 
compression of the intrinsically heterogeneous and conflictual nature of the politics of local 
development, since it allows regional authorities to use “the cost of losing EU funds” as a 
pretext to impose their agenda on other stakeholders 
 
Recapitulating, previous observations lead to stressing the role of the EU framework in our 
case-study, which cannot be interpreted in terms of mere moral suasion: in fact, the EU 
framework impacts on the system of relations at local level, by modifying the traditional 
rapport between politics and territory (an aspect which is perhaps a bit overlooked in 
literature): 
“I think that regional government’s stress on high-tech and networking is something which 
derives from the EU. But this is a supposition of mine. Indeed, because of the SF system, 
it is more and more difficult to distinguish what Regional Authorities do decide from what 
they cannot decide because they have to comply with the Commission’s indications to 
secure the Funds. In other words, it is difficult to understand whether the Commission is 
an alibi or a cage. And you see that it makes a huge difference to me whether I have to 
orientate my action towards the Regional Authorities or towards the Commission, for in 
the latter case my capacity of intervening is fairly restricted” (Simoncini 12/06/09, 
emphasis added). 
This last quotation contains two important aspects to reflect on. First, it better clarifies the 
sense of the asymmetry between the Regional Authorities and business associations: the 
power imbalance is clearly expressed by an information gap which is related to different nodal 
positions the two actors hold. However, the asymmetry has also a clear spatial connotation: 
while the Regional Authorities can “freely move” from the regional to the EU level, that is they 
can adopt “transcalar strategies”, the business association is somehow “confined” to the 
regional level, and is consequently unable to equilibrate the bargaining power. 
Second, the quotation discloses one of the implicit question which has led this inquiry - 
“who decides what” - leaving it answerless. However, all the previous quotations, and 
especially the contradictions we have come across, suggest that, maybe, there is not even a 
definitive answer. And, maybe, this is a very finding of the present work.  
I complete hereafter one of the first quotations with which the inquiry started: 
“The money we used to make this programme was not ours, but it came from the EU and 
consequently we had to comply with the EU regulations. That implies that you are not 
wholly free when you write or implement the programme. We had to take in account a 
long series of constraints. But that’s normal. I cannot write something which is not in line 
with the POR, with the PRSE, and then these are in their turn influenced by national 
guidelines, by EU guidelines, the Lisbon Agenda, etc.” (PO1 08/05/09). 
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This quotation can be easily verified by going through the programming documents. As 
much as fifty pages (out of 180) of the POR are dedicated to describing the “coherence 
frameworks” with other programming documents. It emerges that the POR is strongly based 
on the PRSE which draws in turn on the Regional Government Plan. Both the POR and the 
PRSE are then said to be coherent with the EU Guidelines on Cohesion, but they are also 
consistent with the National Strategic Framework, which in its turn reflects the EU Guidelines. 
The EU Guidelines are than based - as we have seen - on the Community Strategy for 
Growth. At the same time, the POR takes also into account indications from Gothenburg 
Agenda; but it is also consistent with other regional sectoral programmes (such as on 
transports, energy, etc.) which mirror in their turn EU indications. Moreover, the POR is also 
the result of Concertazione processes at regional level, which are in their turn articulated on 
two levels: social partners and other institutional and governance tiers. 
So, the possibility of clearly defining “who decides what” and which interests really matter 
fades away within this striking series of crossed references, and procedural 
interdependencies. This is true for the external observer but, as we have seen, for the actors 
too. And this happens also because the CP has expanded the space of local development 
politics, by bringing in the decisional process new actors (the Guidelines, SF regulations, etc), 
new places (trans-regional networks), and new relational dimensions (and asymmetries) 
which have not a direct territorial relation with the object (the territory) of the politics, and 
which cannot be ascribed to a specific scale either.  
Probably, this process is neither intrinsically positive nor negative: after all, policy-makers 
stress the role played by the EU in “opening their mind”. The problem lies rather in formulating 
new conceptual categories and (again) new procedures, to avoid the risk that a decrease in 
the accountability of political processes occurs as a result of the detachment between territory 
and polity (we will come back on this point in the next chapter). 
  
To sum up, we have seen that many of the problematic aspects which characterised 
VINCI, also characterise the broader regional development policy, the two being both 
inscribed in the same policy field created - or at least strengthened - by the architecture of the 
CP. In this sense, this and previous sections have shown that the EU and the European 
Commission are important actors of the regional politics and governance of development. 
Indeed, they can influence the content of local strategy, and, by changing the rules of game, 
they can asymmetrically enlarge or restrict the field of opportunities of different regional 
actors.  
The EU-related intermediaries which affect the course of action at the regional level are 
then variegated: they can range from an abstract reference to EU’s presence and conditioning 
(“if we accepted this change, we would lose …”), to - more often - a wide series of criteria, 
regulations, “principles”, reports, meetings, guidelines, timing, financial calculations, and 
concepts, such as the one of innovation networks. That is the same set of actors which come 
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into play in a struggle, which is played through different scales, but which has the control over 
regional resources as stakes (Simoncini’s account of the “updated version of the POR” sent 
the night before the meeting is illuminating). In this perspective, we have also seen that the 
CP shuffles the traditionally biunique relation between a polity (and its democratic procedures) 
and territory, by recasting the policy-making process into a different and extended space. 
This section has then cleared up another substantial point. As we have seen, the core of 
the new regionalist/EU policy approach lies in the idea that regions’ governance has to be 
engineered through consensus-building strategies in order to enhance their competitiveness. 
In the case of Tuscany, we can conclude that this project has failed. Not only have new 
regionalist policies not increased innovativeness and competitiveness; not only has new 
regionalist “governance methodology” generated the contrary of consensus, namely distrust 
and conflicts; but this approach has also fostered a paradoxical reversal of the bottom-up 
principle, insofar as it has induced regional policy-makers to persist in policies which are 
clearly ineffective for the regional context. 
It is therefore the whole set of theoretical assumptions, relational dynamics, and procedural 
arrangements, in their interplay and interrelation, which need to be taken into account to 
unfold coherently a certain course of policy. That has both theoretical and political 
implications. From a theoretical point of view, previous arguments push to look at the places 
(Florence, Brussels, networks, offices, conference, etc.) and the tools (decisional and 
disclosure rules, minutes, communication devices and habits, seminars, etc.) through which 
these interrelations materially occur; in other words, they induce to study where and how a 
policy is concretely performed. In political terms, that means that, to be effective, potential 
changes have to address and consider simultaneously all the identified dimensions. We leave 
to the next concluding chapter a summary of how these interactions have taken place in our 
case study. In the next section, I will instead provide a brief example of what would involve an 
alternative politics of local development, starting from some aspects that have emerged from 
the interviews, and that cannot be included in the previous arguments.  
 
 
3.6.3 Possible directions of change 
I have concluded the previous section arguing that, to understand a policy course, it is 
necessary to study how and where it is performed. In a sense, and as already mentioned 
(sec. 3.5.2), that means investigating the very job of policy-makers. In our case-study, we 
could say that this job is very much a matter of writing: writing programmes first of all, but also 
internal working documents, call for proposals, emails with attachments, etc. The outlined 
arguments would lose most of their significance, if regional innovation policy were not also 
intended as a mundane act of writing, and reading, and comparing writings, and copying and 
pasting, normally with a PC in an office: 
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“There are thousands of ideas within the European trans-regional innovation networks. 
But these ideas have then to be contextualised within our productive system, within our 
research system, within our system of rules […]. Unfortunately, much of our job consists 
in the sad task of writing programmes, by making these ideas more mundane 
[volgarizzare]. In other words, what we do is twisting and stretching these ideas in order 
to make them ‘usable’, given the set of constraints I have listed” (PO1 08/05/09). 
 “The European Commission requires the Regional Authorities to produce an incredible 
amount of paperwork, especially programming documents. […] I think that regional policy-
officers react precisely in the same way as the one who has to write a project following a 
complicated call for proposal does. Regional policy-officers try to defend themselves; they 
say: “does the Commission want me to produce in twenty day a very complex 
programmatic document in which I say that everybody agrees on the new strategy? 
Well, I will do it, by copying from previous documents, and from Commission’s 
documents themselves, and let’s go on.” (Simoncini 12/06/09). 
When talking about the outcomes of the VINCI initiative (sec. 3.4.2), we have noted that 
there has been one result that has been unanimously appreciated, namely the mentoring and 
support activities84 organised by the Regional Authorities during the experimentation phase. 
The final evaluation report has found that participants have greatly enjoyed such activities; for 
two of the interviewed policy-officers (PO1 and PO2) they have been a success to repeat, 
while for another one (PO3) they have brought the institutional and the productive worlds 
closer. According to one of the evaluator - Caloffi - they have opened a new and needed 
space for confrontation which ought to be kept alive. 
Considering what has emerged in the subsequent sections, this result has been significant 
far from obvious. The question which may be raised now is what kind of consequences - if any 
- this result has produced on regional policy-making or, at least, on policy-makers’ approach 
to it. 
Answering this question would entail a longer a more in-depth observation, but if there is 
something which everyone agrees on, this is the awareness, or aspiration for an innovation 
policy which is something more than “writing programmes”; something which sounds like more 
participation and more involvement: 
“It’s totally pointless to create hundreds of contact-points. […] Why couldn’t a regional 
policy-officer take her little briefcase and go directly on the field, trying to understand 
personally how things are like? Instead of staying closed in this office, writing call for 
proposals … I would like to spend more time outside. […] The Lobyact project85 has been 
my greatest satisfaction, because they were completely unknown and they did not 
know anything about EU programmes. Because we have to create the conditions to 
make people participate. Because if you go out with your briefcase and meet people 
and say: let’s do something together, maybe there are some opportunities, etc., 
nobody will say no. The problem is that is difficult, tiring, and the complexity of 
                                                 
84
 As we have seen, these activities consisted both in technical advice offered by regional staff and in 
series of experts-led seminaries, workshops, etc., that the Regional Authorities’ staff and projects 
representatives both attended as “learner”.  
85
 Lobyact was the project which had scored worse in the selection phase, and it was constituted only by 
SMEs, which took part for the first time in a regional innovation programme. By the end, this project has 
been one of those which achieved the best results. 
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Community regulations does not help. […] What we need is to start learning to learn 
together, regional functionaries and the business world” (PO2 13/05/09). 
 “You are right when you say that there is a big problem concerning human capital. […] 
We would need to train hundreds of technology-transfer agents: people who go and visit 
firms with their briefcase. The problem is that we use resources for training to do stupid 
things or to finance universities which are close to bankruptcy. Look, there was a 
colleague of mine who is now retired. He was called the Master, because he had this idea 
that every two or three days he needed to go out: he would say that he couldn’t breath in 
the office. So, he would take his pipe with him and he would go out. Once he is told that 
there is a furniture firm which had an innovative project. So he goes to speak to the 
entrepreneur: ‘there is no problem: give me the project and we will finance it through the 
FP for R&D’, says the Master. Then the entrepreneur shouts: ‘Beppi come here and 
explain how the project works’. When Beppi comes, the Master asks him: ‘so, where is 
the project?’ And Beppi: ‘the project is here’ pointing at the head with his forefinger. 
These are our SMEs. We would need to find all these Beppi and help them to write down 
the project and engineer it” (DGDO 08/06/09). 
What seems to transpire from previous passages is a plea for a totally different way of 
thinking about, and organising the relationship between the institutional and the productive 
worlds. A break which requires a radical change in consolidated roles, and in what matters in 
local development policies. Stretching a bit (or maybe too much) the sense of previous 
accounts, one could say that there is the same difference between “writing call for proposals” 
and “taking the briefcase”, as there is between conceiving of regions as action units or action 
spaces. In the former case, all the attention, resources and efforts fall on complying with 
guidelines and complex regulations, and on forcing territory into some abstract model. In the 
latter case, the priority is - as notably expressed by one of the policy-officer - “learning to learn 
together”. In the latter case the primacy is on comprehending - in its etymological sense - on 
grasping together what counts, also by making clear (instead of compressing) struggles and 
divergences. 
To conclude, previous quotations also shed new light on the contradictions we have met 
during the analysis, which now appear as a - very natural indeed - tension between conflicting 
rationalities, objectives and frames of reference (a conflict which is related, to some extent, to 
the powerful entrance of the EU). 
Whether there is someone who will take the briefcase - overcoming inertia, laziness and 
constraints - clearly remains an open question. What is probable is that the thread of 
encounters and talks would take the woman or the man with the briefcase to wander well far 
from regional borders.  
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CHAPTER IV: THE LINK BETWEEN NEW REGIONALIMS AND COHESION 
POLICY - THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS AND ALTERNATIVES FOR 
POLICY  
4.1 Introduction 
This concluding chapter is composed of two different, but connected, parts. 
Firstly, I will summarise the findings from the case-study in the light of the theoretical 
framework I developed in the first part of this work. The objective is to determine whether the 
theoretical arguments are consistent with the empirical results. The test will consist in 
providing a reconstruction which enables us to interpret coherently the phenomena under 
scrutiny. 
Secondly, I will try to identify what possible implications for theory and policy the case-
study involves. To do that, I will relate the incongruities detected in actors’ accounts with the 
contradictory frames of reference that the association between new regionalist theorisations 
and CP’s policy practices creates. Drawing on relational perspectives, the objective is here to 
delineate the characteristics of an alternative politics of place based on a different spatial 
conception, which interrogates coherently and in-depth the significance of heterogeneity in 
space and autonomy in policy-making. 
  
 
4.2 Summarising research results: the link between content and procedural 
aspects in the EU regional policy 
In section 2.4, we have seen that the EU Innovative Action programme responded to two 
goals. 
The first - more direct - was to raise the innovative profile of less favoured regions. The 
second - more subtle but not less crucial - was to increase awareness among regional actors 
(not only regional authorities) about the importance of investing in “intangible assets”; for this 
reason, each IA project at regional level had to be formulated on the basis of a bottom-up and 
comprehensive process. 
The analysis of the case-study in the previous chapter has shown that, as far as the 
Tuscany’s innovation policy is concerned, none of the above objectives has been achieved. 
On the substantive level, we have seen that the VINCI programme, as well as other similar 
programmes implemented during the same programming period, has not generated an 
increase in firm-university relationships. We have also observed that the idea of transferring 
technologies from high-tech sectors to low-tech ones did not succeeded, and that no best 
practices have emerged from the experimentation phase. What is more, better performing 
projects have been those which did not include university in their partnership and which were 
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directed more to upgrading the nodal position of partners, than to developing technological 
innovation. Overall, we have observed that all the efforts made to bridge university and SMEs 
have been ineffective (at best), or they have eventually created a sterile technology transfer 
industry, dependent on public funding (at worst). 
As to the governance dimension, we have seen that the VINCI programme has been 
actually formulated by a restricted number of regional officials, in the framework of a rarefied 
debate and of a feeble political supervision. More precisely, policy-makers’ accounts have 
made clear that the definition of the strategy followed quite a procedural reasoning 
(compliance with EU and regional programming documents) and that, consequently, 
technicality prevailed over political considerations (that also includes the practice of turning to 
external experts to draft strategy documents). For these reasons, we have concluded that, far 
from being the result of a participative process, the formulation of VINCI represents the 
reverse of a bottom-up approach: instead of developing a policy idea starting from a context 
analysis, it is the context which is forcefully shaped on the idea. We have also remarked that 
this mechanism is consistent with a broader policy method, according to which regional 
authorities deem it necessary to change regional actors’ mentality. Finally, I have argued that 
this attitude is reflected in the mistrustful climate characterising regional governance, where 
everyone blames everyone else for the disappointing results. 
 
At this point, one could object that the causal direction should be inverted. In other words, 
following new regionalist theorisations, one could argue that if VINCI and other similar 
programmes have failed, that has happened just because of the conflictual governance 
relations and of the “reversed logic” followed during the formulation phase. However, what I 
have tried to show throughout this work is precisely that the way in which regional innovation 
policy is designed and implemented in the context of the CP cannot be separated from the 
content of the strategy itself, since both dimensions are based on the same spatial 
conception. In other words, my argument is that the institutional arrangements and relations 
which preside over the formulation/delivery of innovation policy from the EU to the regional 
level are - to some extent - necessarily implied by the same spatial reading which also informs 
the whole development strategy.  
To ground this argument, we have to go back to chapter II, where we have seen that the 
EU has adopted from new regionalism the theoretical framework for its new Cohesion Policy. 
In fact, shifting from an initial redistributive/relativist conception of cohesion, the new approach 
has been centred on a self-contained definition of development, and on the consequent idea 
that regions have to compete against each other on the basis of their endogenous resources. 
The new approach had two advantages. First, it promised to reconcile competitiveness and 
cohesion: by unlocking regional potential, a greater territorial balance could be achieved, 
without causing any market distortion and, thus, any loss in the aggregate output. Second, it 
responded to a Commission’s ambitious political project. Indeed, transforming regions in 
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action units involved strengthening their institutional capacity; that in turn meant empowering 
an alternative - and more Commission-dependent - tier of government which counterbalanced 
national governments’ influence86. 
However, the realisation of this programme encountered two hurdles. On the one hand, it 
posed the problem of how the policy tools proposed by new regionalist models could be 
transferred into regional programming. On the other hand, it raised the dilemma of how to 
build - among regional institutional and social actors -  consensus around the innovation 
strategy. In fact, as highlighted in section 1.2.4, the emergence of co-operative and 
consensual dynamics has been indicated by new regionalism as a key prerequisite to trigger 
local development; moreover, the creation of local “development coalitions” was functional to 
reinforce the political weight of the regional level. 
The first problem has been resolved through the system of sanctions and incentives which 
regulates the management and, above all, the allocation of SF. As we have seen (sec. 2.3.2 
and 3.6.2), the “additionality” and “absorption capacity” principles push strongly towards a 
concentration of resources on Commission’s priorities; the phenomenon is particularly evident 
in regions like Tuscany, where SF represent the main - if not the only - resource for 
development policy.  
As for the second aspect, this was meant to be tackled in two ways: by setting consensus 
as a condition for regional partnerships to increase the amount of SF, and by means of 
particular programmes - such as the Innovative Actions - which involved a direct relation 
between Commission and regional authorities. As mentioned above, these programmes had 
the objective of inducing a cultural change among regional actors. More precisely, as 
explained by some scholars who contributed to devising the programmes’ strategy (see sec. 
2.4.2.2), the underlying rationale was to use networking as a sort of governance technology to 
engineer regional institutional configuration, on the assumption that the scarce innovative 
propensity of less favoured regions was to trace back to an cultural-institutional failure. 
 
It is precisely at this stage that a logical short-circuit occurs. It affects directly regional 
governance, as it consists in requiring (or trying to induce) a certain institutional condition 
(being consensual), that can only emerge autonomously; also, it means that regions are 
expected to draw up their strategy on the basis of a bottom-up process, on condition that such 
a “context-sensitive” strategy corresponds then to the Commission’s Guidelines.  
Therefore, this is the passage - in terms of both procedures and content - which reveals 
the intrinsically contradictory nature of new regionalist policy propositions. Borrowing the 
famous Henry Ford’s adage, it is like saying that “any customer can have a car painted any 
colour that he wants so long as it is black”, where the customer clearly represents the regional 
actors, while the colour symbolizes the direction of the development strategy. So, the short-
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 As we have seen in sec. 2.3.1, this objective is clearly expressed by the Commission in its White 
Paper on governance, which assigns regional and municipal governments the role of primary interface 
with citizens to channel EU policy. 
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circuit surfaces primarily through the procedures underlying the designing process; however, 
its effects become significant precisely because the “black colour” (that is the territorialised 
definition of development) covers up the more variegated spatial palette which characterises 
social and economic relations, thus making the related policy tools ineffective.  
The crucial point is that this short-circuit is inevitable. Indeed, if economic performances 
depend on endogenous social factors - as new regionalism posits -, the only possibility to 
boost development resides in socially-engineering those factors. In other words, the policy 
method used by SF and the IA programmes represents the only way to transform an 
analytical approach stressing the endogenous nature of economic dynamics in a normative 
policy scheme. That is why, eventually, procedural and substantive dimensions are bound 
together in the context of the CP.  
 
This perspective thus enables us to clarify some of the most important results stemming 
from fieldwork. 
We have seen that (sec. 2.3.1) the Commission’s White Paper on governance clearly 
identifies “the development of partnership at intra-regional level […] as an essential 
precondition for the formulation of territorial development strategies”. However, the CP’s 
institutional arrangements assign regional authorities the monopoly of the relations with the 
Commission, thus turning them into real gatekeepers of informational and financial flows from 
the EU to the regional level. Now, given the competitive context in which EU funds are 
allocated, the main problem for regional authorities becomes to think up a strategy which 
might appear as convincing as possible to the European Commission. 
Therefore, this mechanism sheds new light on why the formulation process of VINCI has 
been a restricted process; it also helps to comprehend why one of the interviewed policy-
officer depicted his job as the “sad task” of writing programmes by adapting the innovative 
ideas which circulate within European networks to the discouraging local reality: the 
realisation of the EU regional policy is, in other words, very much a matter of writing 
programming documents, by complying with a long series of legislative and thematic 
constraints. 
 The mechanism also clarifies why the regional projects funded under the SF are selected 
more on the basis of their “formal elegance”, than on their real capacity to enhance local 
economy. The priority is in fact to commit SF as quickly as possible in projects which appear 
as innovative as possible in order to maximise future funds (see sec. 3.5.2).  
Finally, the mechanism illustrates why, far from representing an occasion for discussing 
alternative choices and bringing up different interests, public-private partnerships are actually 
contexts in which already-taken decisions are transposed: as Benz and Eberlein (1999, p. 
339) had already found out, “the cost of losing European funding” becomes an instrument for 
regional governments to restrain other stakeholders’ contentions and demands87. So, the 
                                                 
87
 However, the two authors then concluded that the CP system “successfully copes with challenge” 
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mechanism also reveals that the pretended wide agreements reported in programming 
documents may in reality hide power struggles over resources and political influence, in which 
the EU regional policy comes to play an important role (see sec. 3.6.2). 
 
Of course, there is more. The EU regional policy generates a set of constraints and 
incentives which certainly influence regional policy-makers’ decisions and movements but, at 
the same time, also represent a condition for their action. In other words regional actors are 
not just puppets but, also through the EU policy framework, they fully deploy their own 
theories, ambitions and projects. In this perspective, if, as argued, regions as action units are 
fictitious creations, this does not mean that, once created - in both material and theoretical 
terms (i.e. as institutional arrangements and as political ideas) -, they will not then produce 
very real effects. 
When the idea that regions have to compete against each other becomes a political tenet, 
“selectivity” as policy method (see sec. 3.6.1) represents then a coherent approach, and 
regional policy-makers can legitimately aspire to be the leaders of economic transformation, 
by selecting the progressive part of the entrepreneurial world (which criteria are used to select 
firms and innovative idea remains then an open question). Similarly, conditioning research 
and creating a “regional research space” (sec. 3.5.2) becomes a decisive step towards the 
creation of a regional innovation system, that regional policy-makers can show off within their 
trans-regional innovation networks. 
From this stance it then makes perfectly sense saying that “regional authorities are not a 
primary school” and that “there is not time for losers” (sec. 3.6.2). By the same token, the fact 
that innovation programmes tend to benefit those firms and those territories which are 
relatively less needy is not only unproblematic, but is something to be reinforced indeed (in 
this sense goes the idea expressed by regional officials that best performing projects should 
benefit from a “fast track” mechanism). 
The final result looks very much like a “new centralism” at regional level, which casts many 
doubts on the allegedly automatic relation between greater spatial proximity of decision 
centres and greater democracy/accountability. 
 
At this point is important to reiterate that the present research work focuses on a specific 
programme, implemented in a specific region, during a specific time-frame. Consequently, the 
reported empirical findings cannot be projected to other regions (especially outside Italy), or to 
other times (even in the same region). All the relations I took into account to reconstruct the 
puzzle/object of my inquiry are spatial-temporally situated, and so are the actors which 
interlace those relations: from the regional authorities’ officials, to the Italian constitutional 
provisions (which have repeatedly changed over the last years), to the district tradition in 
Tuscany. 
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What is more, this inquiry has some substantive limitations. In particular, the account here 
presented may be enriched by enlarging the network of actors to: the final recipients of SF at 
regional level, the Commission administrators, the EU-funded trans-regional networks. In 
other words, the proposed reconstruction could be further expanded by following the threads 
of actors’ movements and interactions, thus making the image emerging from the puzzle 
sharper.  
Nonetheless, it has been possible to predict some of the observed results on the basis of 
the existing literature, and on the basis of reasoned conjectures concerning the probable 
effect produced by some concepts, mechanisms, etc., on a certain course of action. It follows 
that, although not generalisable, the results stemming from the case-study can still be 
illustrative of a particular phenomenon and, we argue, some related reflections may remain 
appropriate for other similar state of affairs. And it is by following this line of reasoning - within 
the above mentioned limits - that the next section will engage in an attempt at unveiling the 
shape of an alternative approach to the politics of local development  
 
 
4.3 Theoretical and political implications 
Throughout this work we have followed the intertwining of an influential theoretical 
approach and an important economic policy in Europe. In the first two chapters I have 
examined the nature of this relationship, and I have argued that, in the context of the EU 
regional policy, theory and praxis are reinforcing each other. Indeed, drawing on new 
regionalist perspectives, the CP has been promoting the strengthening of (sometimes new) 
regional institutional actors, which are now coherently and legitimately pressing for further 
expansions of their domain of competences. Crucially, these claims tally with new regionalist 
indications, and thus substantiate, in a cumulative fashion, both new regionalist analyses and 
the pertinence of the CP approach. However, I have also argued that such a coupling is 
intrinsically problematic and, in the previous chapter, I have tried to sustain this argument, by 
providing an empirical account of the disappointing - if not negative - effects produced by new 
regionalist policies in a specific region. 
 
Which implications does this inquiry thus involve for theory? And what kind of political 
recommendations could be formulated on these bases? 
One of the most interesting - and challenging - aspect emerging from the case-study is 
probably represented by the contradictions in actors’ accounts; contradictions which concern 
important issues, such as the assessment of the programme’s results, the evaluation of the 
Commission’s influence on regional policy-making, the opinion on the appropriateness of the 
EU innovation approach. In the concluding passages of the analysis of findings (sec. 3.6.3), I 
have argued that these contradictions have to be ascribed to the conflict between different 
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frames of reference, which characterises policy-makers’ field of action. In particular, officials’ 
accounts seem to reveal a twofold tension: on the one hand, a clash appears between what 
their experience would suggest them doing, and the practices that consolidated routines and 
administrative procedures impose on them instead; on the other hand, they oscillate between 
obstinate aspiration and critical acceptance as regards the priorities and the fashionable 
concepts stemming from the European Commission and trans-european policy networks.  
The hypothesis is therefore that important insights to answer previous questions might 
come from unfolding such discordant rationalities; in particular, their significance could be 
grasped in the light of the incongruities that the Commission’s translation of new regionalist 
policy propositions has produced on the politics of local development.  
 
In order to explore this hypothesis, we have first to resume briefly the thematic 
correspondences which link new regionalism and the EU regional policy. 
We have seen that, despite its heterogeneous theoretical foundations, new regionalism 
develops a clear spatial conception, which involves a set of policy measures to be delivered in 
the framework of a coherent politics of place. More precisely, setting out from an ontological 
distinction concerning the nature of proximate rapports as opposed to distanciated ones, new 
regionalism advances a territorialised and punctuated definition of development, which 
revolves around the role of localised learning and the importance of trustful relations. 
Consequently, territories (regions) are conceived of as bounded and coherent systems of 
contextual knowledge underpinned by collaborative institutions, which compete in a ruthless 
and entropic global on the basis of their endogenous potential. This vision naturally leads then 
to calling for a regionalisation of economic governance, and for a correlate downscaling of 
policy-making: this would actually represent the obligatory strategy to cope with the threats 
posed by a pervasive globalisation. The final outcome is an organicistic politics of local 
development, which sets the fusion of science and industrial policies in a new comprehensive 
innovation policy as its paradigmatic intervention scheme, and which identifies in consensus-
building and local networking its typical procedural dimensions. 
On the basis of this schematisation, I have argued that the Multi-Level Governance system 
- of which the CP is said to be the most accomplished example88 - widely draws on new 
regionalist thinking. Indeed, it designs an action-framework in which regions are regarded as a 
constellation of action units, each of them facing autonomously their globalisation challenge to 
secure their own economic prosperity89. As mentioned above, within such a perspective 
regional governments are then identified as the Commission’s main interpreters, and other 
regional stakeholders are more or less implicitly demanded to huddle around regional 
authorities in support of the (EU-derived) development strategy. Overseeing this framework 
we eventually find the Commission, whose role is thus to compose the inter-regional 
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 According to the EU White Paper on Governance. See sec. 2.3.1. 
89
 For this reason, after the last reform, the spatial coverage of the CP has been extended to cover all 
the EU territory (see sec. 2.2). 
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competition dynamics; the CP then represents the device to orientate development priorities 
in regional plans and to assist less favoured regions in their “self-sustained” development 
effort. More precisely, in line with an endogenous conception of development (which, although 
sometimes overlooked, implies correlatively an endogenous justification of 
underdevelopment), assisting less favoured regions involves offering those sophisticated 
policy tools - such as clustering, innovation networks, spin-offs, etc. - which enable them to 
grasp “the opportunities offered by the new economy for catching up swiftly” (CEC 2001a, p. 
2; see sec. 2.4.2.1). 
As one can easily note, not only is the outlined institutional configuration fully consistent 
with new regionalist theorisations, but it represents a condition for their actualisation. In other 
words, the MLG system devises a series of procedural mechanisms which are intended to 
prepare the adequate institutional ordering for the implementation of the new regionalist 
policies. That is why, once again, the analysis of the policy content cannot be disjointed from 
that of the institutional arrangements, both aspects being the emanation of the same spatial 
conception.  
 
Clearly, by adopting new regionalist perspectives and rationales, the MLG system and the 
CP also inherit the related problematic features, thus giving a plastic representation of their 
effects. These have been described in the previous chapter and partially summarised in the 
opening section of the present one; here it is worth recalling the following points: 
• Firstly, the new regionalist/CP innovation strategy has proved to be ineffective, that is, it 
has not generated the expected triggering effects on local economic processes. As 
relational approaches have extensively illustrated, the fundamental theoretical problem is 
that, in contrast with what new regionalism assumes, spatial determinations (local/global, 
near/far, etc.) do not possess any intrinsic property, that is, they cannot determine the 
characteristics (intensity, frequency, etc.) of the associations which underpin economic 
mechanisms. Due to this flaw, new regionalism fails to see that the innovativeness of 
firms, as well as their (more decisive) profitability, are strongly linked to the technological 
trajectory of the industry in which they operate, and to their relative position (and 
bargaining power) within it. Also, as the case of Tuscany confirms, the technological 
specialisation of key regional industries can be totally disconnected from the fields of 
scientific scholarship in which local universities excel; scientific excellence which is then 
normally nurtured through national or global links. The conclusion is that an approach 
which prioritises local links is at best misplaced to deal with the essential spatialities of 
economic dynamics. 
• Secondly and with regard to regional governance, the attempt to induce consensus “from 
above” has actually generated conflictual institutional rapports and dirigisme. Apart from 
the repeatedly remarked contradictory nature of this method, it can also be observed how 
the tendency showed by regional authorities to reproach the entrepreneurial system and 
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the academic world for their inadequateness is perfectly consistent with an endogenous 
explanation of the causes of under-development. 
• Besides these two critical issues directly stemming from new regionalist 
conceptualisations, the CP adds then another specific contradiction: this resides in the 
fact that, while fostering a territorialised conception of development and policy-designing, 
the CP has actually contributed to extending regional governance arena outside its 
territorial borders, by bringing into play external actors (see sec. 3.6.2). This has produced 
power asymmetries at regional level, which have negatively affected the local politics as 
well. Two main consequences have been highlighted: on the one hand, we have detected 
a greater opacity as regards the political responsibility for decisions (concerning both 
where and by whom decisions are taken)90; on the other hand, but in a related manner, 
we have observed other regional stakeholders reduce their involvement in the policy-
making process. It is interesting to note, in this sense, how these two outcomes constitute 
the exact opposite of the two main objectives and rationales set by the White Paper on 
Governance, namely a greater accountability of regional decision-process (on the 
assumption of a correlation between spatial proximity and democratic control), and a 
larger political participation as a result of the opening up of the policy-making. 
 
It is therefore against this background of disappointing results and conflicting political 
priorities that the discrepancies in actors’ accounts acquire heuristic significance, thus also 
offering an advanced stepping stone to draw some concluding remarks from this research 
work.  
I have mentioned above that the quandary in actors’ narratives touches two essential 
dimensions: the nature of practices through which a policy is performed, and the ends, that is, 
the normative orientation which informs that policy. Condensing previous arguments, we could 
say that these dilemmas allow us to better specify the two essential theoretical and political 
incongruities which skew actors’ frames of reference, and which are the result of the coupling 
between new regionalism and the CP. The first incongruity concerns the mismatch between 
the fluid geography of both economic and political relations on the one hand, and the nested 
and scalar conception of development and institutional rapports upon which the MLG still rests 
on the other hand. The second one has to do with the emphasis on the local adaptability of 
policy options, and the concomitant call for confrontation and conformation to best performing 
regions. 
Given the line of reasoning pursued throughout the work, possible responses to such 
decisive issues have to be envisaged within a perspective which embraces simultaneously 
both procedural and substantive considerations, since both elements contribute to defining the 
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 The quotation from the business association representative (sec. 6.3.2), concerning her inability to 
ascertain whether the “EU is an alibi or a cage”, is highly meaningful in this sense. 
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space of opportunities of actors. What follows is thus an attempt at delineating the contours of 
an alternative politics of local development which builds upon this conceptual standpoint. 
 
As for the first of the two tensions disclosed by actors’ accounts, we can maintain that, if 
the idea that development depends solely on the endogenous potential is theoretically and 
empirically ill-founded, then the policy focus clearly needs to be readjusted as well. Drawing 
on relational accounts, I have already argued (sec. 1.3.3) that development policies should 
pay greater attention to the economic, cultural, and infrastructural conditions which determine 
the intensity and quality of local actors’ enrolment in trans-local networks. Similar indications 
have also emerged from the review of empirical studies on Tuscan traditional sectors (sec. 
3.2.2) and, finally, also from the VINCI programme itself, whose results have testified the 
importance for traditional firms to improve their nodal position within extended production- and 
distribution-chains. 
However, abandoning an absolute and territorially circumscribed conception of 
development also involves shifting attention towards the spatial relevance of other - non-
economic - policies and decisions. “Spatial” in this case has a double meaning: it refers to the 
spatial impact of “non-territorial” policies, such as decisions on big modal infrastructures, 
interest rates, trade agreements, etc. (according to some observers, Tuscany’s craft firms 
present difficulties would be explained more by the “strong Euro” than by the financial crisis 
per se); but it also points at the very material spaces where these policies are developed and 
decided91. 
In relation to both aspects, the Tuscan policy-makers’ comments about the alleged 
influence of strong regions/states over the models adopted by the Commission (sec. 3.6.1) 
are interesting and would deserve further empirical investigation. In particular, policy-makers 
have drawn attention to the importance of trans-regional policy networks, whose membership 
appears crucial, since these networks would play a central role in building the concepts and 
the alliances which affect the Commission’s decisions; decisions which then have spatially 
differentiated economic effects (as policy-makers have highlighted with regard to the 
Commission’s predilection for high-tech sectors and formal clusters). 
From an analytical point of view, the reference to the political significance of these 
networks indicates an important feature of European governance: within the EU institutional 
space, actors are mobilised through heterogeneous sets of connections which cut across 
levels and territories, as they are interest- rather than territorially-based92. Therefore, in this 
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 Actually, both aspects have been taken into account by the EU. The issue of the spatial impact was 
thoroughly analysed in an interesting document, named the European Spatial Development Perspective 
(CEC 1999b). The document proposed a series of concrete correctives and it was solemnly endorsed by 
the EU Council; nonetheless, it remained dead letter (see sec. 2.3.1). As for the second aspect, the 
White Paper on governance clearly states that decision-making is increasingly becoming a “polycentric 
process”; however it does not make a step further to see whether this polycentrism is balanced. 
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 One of the first and most celebrated example of these networks - called Four Motors for Europe - 
included four regions (Rhône-Alpes, Lombardy, Catalonia, and Baden-Württemberg) which were not 
contiguous and had not territorial interests in common, if not the one of lobbying the Commission to have 
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context, policy-making emerges as an increasingly mobile practice, which can alternatively get 
dispersed or, more often, concentrated (normally in Brussels93), and which rewards the actors’ 
capacity to interlace and enter relevant networks. 
The interpretative tools developed within relational accounts appear in this sense more 
adequate than other more “territorial” approaches to grasp the effects of this new governance 
practices on the uneven geography of development. In fact, if it is probably true that there 
exists a tension between territorial and relational perspectives (sec. 1.3.4), on the other hand, 
the risk identified by Pike and Tomaney (2009, p. 29) that relational accounts may “underplay 
or disregard the continued import of the territorialities of institutions and boundaries in 
governing economic development” seems overstated. As I have tried to show in the previous 
section, adopting a relational perspective does not prevent us from recognising that, once 
created, regional institutions do actually “regionalise” territory through various devices (in the 
case of Tuscany, they were the “regional research space”, the “regional champions”, etc.). But 
what this approach adds to other research programmes is a greater sensitivity to the spatial 
fluidity of new institutional settings, as well as to the increasing topological interdependencies 
which characterise processes of institutional and economic change. So, relational approaches 
allow us to conceptualise the EU not as a monolithic entity which stands above nation states, 
but rather as a complex and trans-scalar entanglement of networks, policy arenas and 
institutional arrangements which may or may not have a clear territorial expression, but which 
surely have spatial-economic consequences.  
 
In general, once we leave an endogenous and punctual definition of development for a 
relational and unfolded one, then the institutional set-up which underpinned the former has to 
be rethought as well. This is part an empirical realisation, part a normative stance which 
enables us to frame the most crucial question, which addresses the second of the two 
tensions revealed by actors’ account: “which kind of politics does help decide what matters for 
the ‘local’?”94  
This question, which is actually made up of two related interrogatives, is inescapable if we 
want to maintain the fundamental assumption that what matters is not the same for everyone 
                                                                                                                                            
a regional policy more attentive to very industrialised regions. In a similar logic, it is worth observing how 
the public hearings that the Commission organises before adopting strategies, working plans, etc., 
involve all the actors (singular or groups) which have been able to acquire the status of interlocutors and 
which are able to express a position, regardless if they are territorially-, interest- or in other fashion 
organised. 
93
 The plethora of regional, trans-regional, municipal and other kinds of liaison offices (along with the 
industrial equivalents), which have been created in Brussels over the last thirty years, means that when 
actors “jump” scales to increase their nodal power, they do not jump in a “global void”, but in very 
precise places indeed. Also, the recent trend towards a transfer of regulative and supervising powers 
away from the Commission - Brussels - to ad hoc agencies around Europe may be read as 
decentralisation attempt carried out by Member States: the diplomatic struggles accompanying the 
decisions over the localisation of these agencies decidedly corroborate such an interpretation 
94
 A question which, according to a functional logic, new regionalism had substituted with “[how to] 
establish inter-institutional co-ordination, linkages and collaborative networks among the different 
elements and players of the regional innovation system […in order] to translate ‘knowledge’ into regional 
GDP’ (Oughton et al. 2002, p. 105). 
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everywhere and that, consequently, a theoretical approach can aim at identifying new policy 
issues (as I have tried to do above), but it cannot also prescribe the political responses to 
such issues (and even less the related governance relations). Therefore, if we accept that 
there can be various responses to the second part of the question (“what matters”), then the 
first one needs primarily a procedural answer, namely to enlarge as much as possible the 
spaces for confrontation, both at the EU and the local level. 
In the framework of the CP, this would entail an initial and simple change: opening up the 
negotiation process over the determination of regional priorities and the consequent allocation 
of SF. Opening up, in this context, has two connotations. First, it means publicising the 
content of the negotiation and the relative positions, so that the responsibility for decisions can 
be identified more easily (as we have seen - sec. 2.3.2 and 3.6.1 - the negotiation takes place 
in camera and this is one of the main factor which determines the information asymmetry at 
regional level). Second, it entails to extend the negotiation process to other regional 
stakeholders or, at least, allow them to participate as observers. That would prevent regional 
authorities from employing EU issues to pass surreptitiously their agenda out of an extended 
and equilibrated discussion. That would also foster debate at the local level about how to 
make the most of EU resources, thus helping to better specify local priorities as well. 
 
This last issue leads us to another procedural facet of institutional change, which concerns 
more directly the politics of the “local”. In general terms, such a change can be synthesised as 
follows: imagining regions as action spaces, rather than as action units. Indeed, it is precisely 
because regions are constituted and nurtured by overlapping networks of varying extension, 
each one with its own interests and rationalities, that the “local” comes without any automatic 
promise of collaboration or “better knowledge”, as regional policy-makers themselves have 
recognised (sec. 3.5.1). For this reason, a policy methodology which aims mainly at 
composing different interests in a consensual development plan is not only fatiguing, but it can 
be perilous too, if not all the interests have the same capacity or possibility to emerge. As a 
consequence, if consensus-building is to remain as a possible procedure, this has to come as 
the second step - at best - of a political process which seeks primarily to give full visibility to 
the diverse interests and, hence, to the possible dissonant experiences and practices which 
insist on the “local”. Concretely, that means increasing the accountability of decision 
processes, by making public all the criteria, rationales, actors and discussions which have 
produced a certain act; that also means adopting confrontation, instead of consensus, as 
constitutive dimension of the local politics. 
In this sense, a tiny anecdote may be illuminating of the intrinsically conflicting nature of 
the “local” and of the consequences deriving from not making visible the different interests 
which act upon the same small corner of the world. Some journalists (Giannini 2007) have 
recently reported that a group of small craft textile firms in Prato put pressure on local fiscal 
authorities to increase controls over the increasing number of local competitors which employ 
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black labour, thus dumping illegally the supplying tariffs. Eventually, it has emerged that these 
controls would have been hampered by the big maisons and their intermediaries, which 
greatly rely on this low-cost supply; maisons which have their headquarters right next to the 
craft firms95. 
 
In conclusion, if we want to provide a response also to the substantive side of the previous 
question (“what matters for local development”), we have necessarily to go back to the actors. 
We have seen that, as regards innovation policy and the Tuscany’s case only, regional 
officials have expressed the desire for a less “document-writing” and more participative 
politics: so that all the Beppi, who have innovative ideas but who have not the good fortune of 
working for Google, can find a context where discussing such ideas and maybe finding some 
help to realise them. 
Would that be appropriate and sufficient to trigger local development in Tuscany? The 
academic answers can be disparate, and all of them can certainly enrich the political debate; 
the important is that the political debate takes place. In other words, in the context of the EU 
regional policy, none of the potential answers should be - more or less surreptitiously - 
imposed from above: if “context-sensitivity” has to remain as a main policy orientation, then 
the Commission should really and definitely make a step back from the aspiration to find a 
recipe which can suit all the circumstances, leaving local actors the possibility/duty to find 
autonomously their answer. 
This clearly involves accepting the possibility of failure, which would in any case occur in 
much greater probability with universal recipes, as the case of Tuscany shows. It also involves 
recognising that competition and cohesion are two different things pulling in opposite 
directions, and that one cannot “have his cake and eat it”. In other words, if a local 
development policy can, perhaps, stimulate local capacities and energies, it cannot also act 
as a substitute for a redistributive policy; that is, it cannot alone re-balance the disequilibria 
depending on power and resources asymmetries. A redistributive policy remains thus 
necessary to increase people and locales’ participation capacity in networks through which 
knowledge, resources and decisions circulate. In this perspective, a redistributive policy will 
not only consist of economic transfers, but it will also call for a dispersion of nodal powers, will 
question the accessibility criteria to networks, and it will draw attention on the uneven spatial 
effects generated by non-territorial policies. 
 
At this point, the very last question becomes why “context-sensitivity” should be preserved 
in development policy. One tentative answer is: precisely because there does not exist a “one-
size-fits-all” solution. If space becomes (socially and economically) significant by reason of its 
                                                 
95
 Another intriguing facet of this anecdote is the battle that business association representing textile 
SMEs are fighting at national and European level to make compulsory the traceability of textile and 
fashion products (in the same way as it already happens for food products). It seems that this fight is 
primarily opposed (not very publicly actually) by the big maisons that today produce abroad great part of 
the components and then they just assemble in Italy.  
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heterogeneity and variable accessibility, if, in other words, scale is not imagined as an 
immutable ordering grid and space as a neutral container, but as the results of multiple (and 
changing) interrelations, then the co-existence of diverse trajectories has to be recognised as 
a constitutive element of our very possibility to make sense of space. The alternative is to 
conceive of spatial heterogeneity as a temporary condition which is expected to vanish, as 
soon as the unique development process which embraces the whole mankind - nowadays 
called globalisation - has run its course. Fortunately, this vision is routinely disproved in 
empirical terms, but its two political corollaries are significant: the first consists in legitimising a 
tutelage by the forerunners of globalisation over less favoured regions (this appears indeed 
the spirit of the IA programme, see sec. 2.3.2 and note n. 36); the second leads to the 
postulation of an historical determinism which leaves little room to political imagination and 
action (two propositions which may appear in contradiction at a first sight, but which are 
deeply related in fact)  
Moreover, the acknowledgement of the intrinsic heterogeneity of space cannot stop in front 
of an allegedly coherent and authentic place. Not only are places made up of relations as 
much as space is, but their distinctiveness as spatial phenomenon resides precisely in being 
the spot in which different networks of relations gather and overlap. Therefore, another 
tentative motivation for keeping context-sensitivity points at the fact that it is particularly on the 
small “local” that the differentiated spatial effects produced by diverse and dislocated 
interrelations become more visible, thus calling for the widest and most extended discussion 
about what matters. 
 
I have begun this work by analysing different spatial conceptualisations concerning the 
geography of innovation, in order to understand which diverse politics of development they 
entailed. I have concluded by exploring alternative spatial conceptualisations of the politics of 
place, to see which diverse development implications they could involve. I hope I have been 
able to show - at least in part - the thread connecting analytically and pragmatically the two 
dimensions. 
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METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX 
The objective of the case-study which has provided the empirical material for this work was 
to reconstruct a certain course of policy in a particular region. The research focus was on the 
rationalities and the constraints/opportunities which underlay the work of the main actors 
involved in the policy-making and policy-delivery processes. Accordingly, the questions which 
guided the inquiry tried to touch the crucial passages of these processes: why certain policy 
directions have been taken, how the policy has been implemented, how it has been assessed 
by the main actors, which effects it has produced on the regional governance.  
I have already explained in the text the theoretical rationales which have determined the 
choice of the two main information sources (programming documents and evaluation reports 
on the one hand, and regional policy actors and stakeholders on the other hand) and the 
research methods to interrogate such sources: contents analysis and direct semi-structured 
interview. Also, I have delineated the methodological approach through which I have analysed 
data stemming from my sources (sec. 3.1 and 3.2). In short, by developing a continuous 
analytical “dialogue” between actors’ accounts and programming documents’ contents with 
regard to the concept of innovation networks, the purpose was to study to what extent and by 
which means the EU regional policy has influenced regional policy actors’ frames of reference 
and field of opportunities. Finally, in the concluding chapter I have mentioned the limitations of 
the empirical findings in terms of generalisability and exhaustiveness, as well as the related 
theoretical implications (sec. 4.2).  
The present methodological appendix aims then at providing further details about how the 
field work has been conducted. In particular, I will illustrate the different steps of the field work 
has been articulated, the access conditions to my sources, and the factors which may have 
hampered the full realisation of the original research plan (such limitations thus differ from 
those listed in the final chapter: while in the latter case these are either inherent to the 
research approach or related to time and financial limits and, consequently, they were 
somewhat already “weighted up” from the beginning, in the former case shortfalls have been 
caused by unexpected hurdles). To make the account clearer, I will distinguish hereafter 
between written sources and interviews. 
 
Written sources 
The written sources have constituted the starting point of the empirical inquiry. Information 
contained in the programming documents and evaluation reports has indeed provided the 
basis to draw the outline for the successive interview phase.  
At the time I defined my research plan, all the main documents were already available, with 
the exception of the evaluation reports. In this sense, a postponement from February to late 
April 2009 in the publication of these reports by the Regional Authorities (I was communicated 
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the original expected issuing date by the programme manager) caused a general delay and a 
consequent compression of all the field work. 
 
Overall, the written material employed in the case-study is constituted by either legal acts 
or official documents. In the first case, they are published in the Official Journal of the Tuscan 
Regional Authorities (references are provided in the bibliography). In the second case, they 
are directly released by the Regional Authorities and are normally available on internet 
(references are provided in the bibliography). Only one document - the VINCI’s intermediate 
evaluation report - is classified as internal staff working document; following a request of mine, 
I was allowed by the Regional Authorities to access one copy and to use it (quoting) in my 
work. On the contrary, it has not been possible to access another internal document: the 
working paper drafted by a group of academics of the universities of Pisa and Florence, which 
served as a basis for the Regional Authorities’ officials to draw the regional innovation 
strategy (sec. 3.6.1). Confronting this document with the official programming documents 
would have important to measure to what extent regional policy-makers have followed or 
deviated from the academics’ indications. 
 
 
Interviews 
Eight direct interviews were conducted during the months of May and June 2009. 
All the interviews took place in the interviewee’s workplace during working time. All the 
interviewees were informed in advance by email about the content and the finalities of my 
research, and the kind of information I was looking for. Before starting the interview, each 
interviewee was clearly informed about the modalities through which the interview would take 
place (open questions), the devices employed (written notes and digital recorder), the nature 
of personal information that would be reported in the present work (name, professional 
qualification and her/his in relation to the programme object of the empirical inquiry), how I 
would potentially elaborate and make use of the content of the interview (quotations, 
summaries, etc.), and the terms of accessibility and publicity of my work under university 
regulations. In this sense, each interviewee was expressly asked whether: 
- she/he agreed that her/his name would be published, as well as her/his professional 
qualification; 
- she/he agreed to be recorded. 
All the interviewees gave their consent to the first question. Only one interviewee - prof. 
Luciana Lazzeretti - did not agree to be recorded. 
All the interviewees were also clearly informed about the possibility not to answer certain 
questions or to leave certain answers “off the record”. 
I made clear to the interviewees my responsibilities as regards the protection and 
conservation of other potentially sensible data and of the transcripts of interviews. 
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As mentioned above, the interviews phase was preceded by and built upon an in-depth 
analysis of the most significant documentation concerning the programme and the policy 
under scrutiny. In addition to this, before conducting the interviews, I also had a series of 
informal talks with other actors who were someway related to the programme/policy. In 
particular, I had a long meeting with one senior researcher working for IRPET (Istituto 
Regionale per la Programmazione Economica), the Tuscany’s Institute for economic planning. 
IRPET is an independent public institution, although it is financially dependent on the Regional 
Authorities, which are also the IRPET’s founders. IRPET’s mission is to assist regional policy 
makers in the formulation of regional policies, by providing technical and scientific advice in a 
number of matters ranging from demography to environmental issues. Its role in the VINCI 
programme has been rather significant, since it was commissioned the task of drafting the 
guidelines for the experimentation phase, even though IRPET has subsequently sub-
contracted this work to a group of external experts. In general, the importance of IRPET for 
the system of relations which preside over the definition of regional policies has to be 
underlined, as it represents a sort of trait d’union between the regional government and the 
regional academics involved in policy-making (I will get back to this issue in a moment). 
Besides this meeting, I had informal conversations also with some managers of the 
projects funded under VINCI and with a couple of regional government’s officials who were 
not directly involved in VINCI; finally, I had a long chat with one of the academics who were 
subsequently formally  interviewed: prof. Marco Bellandi. All these encounters have 
represented for me an important introductory step to develop and refine the research design; 
however, except for the case of Bellandi, I decided not to ask for successive direct interviews 
with these individuals in order to keep the object of the inquiry well framed. 
Conversely, there have been two people that I repeatedly and unsuccessfully contacted for 
an interview: one is, as already mentioned, the regional Councillor Ambrogio Brenna, the 
other is the head of the economic research unit of IRPET, dr. Stefano Casini, who was the 
person in charge with the “VINCI dossier” for IRPET. As for the first case, the impossibility of 
obtained a direct account by the political responsible for the innovation and industrial policies 
in Tuscany has certainly represented an important research gap. This has been in part filled in 
with the speech that Brenna held on the occasion of the official presentation of the VINCI’s 
results, and which appeared particularly revealing of the Councillor’s political vision (sec. 3.6.1 
and 3.6.2); however, many important issues have remained uncovered. Among these, the 
most significant is probably constituted by negotiation process between Regional Authorities 
and the Commission about priorities and resources allocation of the regional development 
policy; Brenna was indeed the head of the regional delegation. With regard to the IRPET, an 
interview with Casini would have shed light on the relationship between academic world and 
policy-makers and, in particular, on the nature of the information that regional policy-makers 
ask and rely on to build their decisions. 
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Concluding remarks 
Dealing with problems related to the accessibility of sources is a particularly thorny issue. 
In fact, not only do such problems impoverish the quality and exhaustiveness of the empirical 
data but, given the object of the work, they become also a substantive part of the very 
research outcomes. Indeed, as I have tried to show (sec. 3.6.2 and 4.3), the opacity of the 
decision process is one of the most important finding, since it is revealing of some highly 
problematic aspects characterising the politics of local  development in Tuscany and the 
political approach fostered by the European Commission. Therefore, because of these “meta-
implications”, accessibility issues involve also theoretical considerations, in addition to mere 
practical ones.  
Exploring thoroughly this matter would go beyond the scope of this appendix, but it is 
interesting to observe the correspondence between the difficulties faced by a research 
approach methodology aiming at reconstructing the content of the policy-making, and the 
power asymmetries and the democratic issues stemming from restrictions to participation and 
control of the decision process. In other words, this correspondence points at the tight link 
between the quality of the democratic game and the possibility of knowing. 
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